Alexander Mihailov

Operational independence, inflation targeting, and UK monetary policy

This paper evaluates empirically the feedback and stance of monetary policy in the United Kingdom under inflation targeting, implemented since October 1992. Its principal contribution is in comparing two subsamples, before the Bank of England was granted operational independence in May 1997 and after that. We find that the operational independence subperiod has differed from the preindependence one in terms of a weaker response to inflation but stronger sensitivity to the output gap and a less restrictive stance of monetary policy. Such behavior appears justified given the Banks mandate and the evolution of the business cycle.

Inflation Dynamics in the New EU Member States: How Relevant Are External Factors?

In this paper we evaluate the relative influence of external versus domestic inflation drivers in the 12 new European Union (EU) member countries. Our empirical analysis is based on the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) derived in Gali and Monacelli (2005) for small open economies (SOE). Employing the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), we find that the SOE NKPC is well supported in the new EU member states. We also find that the inflation process is dominated by domestic variables in the larger countries of our sample, whereas external variables are mostly relevant in the smaller countries.

Who Supports the ECB? Evidence from Eurobarometer Survey Data

This paper contributes empirically to the long-debated issue of the legitimacy of the European Central Bank (ECB) with regard to European polities. Using micro-level data from the Eurobarometer survey, we shed light on the socio-demographic determinants of public-opinion support for the ECB. We find that people with higher level of education and income and centre to right-wing political orientation tend to support the ECB, as well as people with optimistic expectations on the economic situation. By contrast, the unemployed tend to distrust the ECB. The policy relevance of such results is important for ECBs communication strategy with the general public.

Classifying Monetary Economics: Fields and Methods from Past to Future

We propose a simple, yet sufficiently encompassing classification scheme of monetary economics. It comprises three fundamental fields and six recent areas that expand within and across these fields. The elements of our scheme are not found together and in their mutual relationships in earlier studies of the relevant literature, neither is this an attempt to produce a relatively complete systematization. Our intention in taking stock is not finality or exhaustiveness. We rather suggest a viewpoint and a possible ordering of the accumulating knowledge. Our hope is to stimulate an improved understanding of the evolving nature and internal consistency of monetary economics at large.

The Grand Experiment of Communism: Discovering the Trade-off between Equality and Efficiency

This paper aims to explain the rise and fall of communism by exploring the interplay between economic incentives and social preferences transmitted by ideology. We introduce inequality-averse and inefficiency-averse agents and analyze their conflict through the interaction between leaders with economic power and followers with ideological determination. The socioeconomic dynamics of our model generate a pendulum-like switch from markets to a centrally-planned economy abolishing private ownership, and back to restoring market incentives. The grand experiment of communism is thus characterized to have led to the discovery of a trade-off between equality and efficiency at the scale of alternative economic systems.

Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees

The democratic accountability of policymaking institutions which are autonomous within delegated mandates has not received as much attention as their independence. We analyze in a theoretical model the effects of accountability in the form of possible overriding of economic policy decisions by the government under different degrees of independence of expert committees conducting monetary and fiscal policy. The equilibrium outcomes of such alternative institution-design frameworks are compared according to key macroeconomic performance criteria. Our results stress the trade-off between anchoring inflation expectations on target and output stabilization that is not solved with accountability.