Alexis Walckiers

Pricing of Scientific Journal and Market Power

We analyze the empirical relationship between journal prices, their quality measured by their citation counts, their age, as well as conduct of publishers. The database covers 22 scientific fields and over 2600 among the most highly reputed and cited journals in 2003. We show that (a) for-profit journals charge roughly 3 times more than journals run by scientific societies; (b) the number of citations has a positive impact on prices; (c) there are large differences in prices across fields that vary from 1 and 6; these are highly (and positively) correlated with the degree of concentration in the industry.

What means rich in publishing? Competition between for-profit and not-for-profit publishers from an economist's point of view

In our report for DG-Research of the European Commission entitled “Study on the economic and technical evolution of the scientific publication markets in Europe”, published almost two years ago, we showed that, on average, journals published by for-profit publishers are three times more expensive than journals published by not-for-profit publishers. Not-for-profit publishers are, in general, not subsidized, and our results are thus consistent with impediments to effective competition on the market for scientific publications. Relying on these observations I address two questions sequentially. First, I review the potential, natural and strategic barriers to expansion and entry. Second, scientific associations have large market shares in some scientific disciplines. I discuss the objectives of not-for-profit publishers and study whether they help innovate and drive prices down. Finally, I conclude that there is a need to promote pro-competitive, i.e. much more flexible, pricing strategies, scrutinize mergers, and refund VAT to research institutions.

Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracies: The Vertical Expression of a Horizontal Desire?

An increasing number of horizontal agreements involve both competitors and their common suppliers (or retailers). As vertical agreements, indirect horizontal agreements can help reduce coordination failures, but they also have the capacity to dampen competition. The negative welfare effect of these agreements generally dominates when undertakings try and raise prices.Competition authorities generally distinguish alleged infringements between competitors active on the same relevant market (horizontal information exchanges or agreements) and those between undertakings and their suppliers or their customers (vertical agreements). A rising number of infringements mix elements of vertical and horizontal concerted practices, because they are horizontal in nature, but involve competitors and their suppliers (or retailers). They are referred to as hub-and-spoke exchanges (or A-B-C exchanges), where the spokes are active on the same product market and interact indirectly through the hub.From an economics perspective, there is not always an indisputable motive to classify hub-and-spoke agreements as mainly vertical with an horizontal effect, or mainly horizontal with the involvement of a supplier. In the European Union, the legal standards for horizontal and vertical infringements differ significantly. While the Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints characterize vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements as hardcore restrictions, relying on the presumption that such agreements have an anticompetitive effect, the legal test for indirect horizontal concerted practices developed by the UK Courts is more demanding. It requires that competition authorities prove that the spokes and the hub transmit the information with an anticompetitive intent.

Competition and price regulation of retail services in Belgium

Not only the high level of prices for processed food, but also the significant price increases have stimulated political discussions in Belgium. There have for instance been calls for increased regulation of retail services through price regulation of goods that are deemed essential. This article reviews the issue of insufficient, or excessive, regulation of retail services, and discusses whether retail markets would deliver a better outcome for customers in the absence of some regulatory requirements.