Alfred P. Montero

Decentralization and democracy in Latin America

The nine essays in this collection represent the first book-length treatment of one of the major changes that have shaped Latin America since independence: decentralization of the state. Contributors argue that though the assignment of political, fiscal, and administrative duties to subnational governments has been one of the most important political developments in Latin America, it is also one of the most overlooked. This volume is divided into three sections. Part one presents an overview of the topic by the editors; part two considers the political origins of decentralization; and part three examines decentralization and economic reforms. Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America explores the causes of decentralization in six significant case studies: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela. Shorter analyses of Uruguay and Peru are also included. The essays in this volume find substantial common ground across regime types, historical periods, and countries, and yield several substantive conclusions.

The State and Capital in Chile: Business, Elites, Technocrats, and Market Economics.

Introduction Capitalists, Neoliberal Economic Reform, and Democracy Import-Substitution Industrialization and the Breakdown of Democracy Gradual Adjustment Under Military Rule Radical Neoliberalism Ascendant Triumph and Collapse of Radical Neoliberalism Pragmatic Neoliberalism Pragmatic Neoliberalism and the Politics of Chiles Transition from Authoritarianism

The Renewed Developmental State: The National Development Bank and the Brazil Model

This study examines how Brazil operationalised a renewed developmentalist project during the democratic period, and especially during the presidency of Lula da Silva. We use an original data set of 2,115 loans made by the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) between 2002 and 2011 to show elements of both change and continuity with Brazil’s developmentalist past. Large loans continued to flow to many of Brazil’s historic large firms and industrial sectors – as reported widely – but the data also show significant numbers of smaller loans to firms in all sectors, as well as renewed support for internationalisation and innovation. We conclude that BNDES’s lending reflects less a wholly new model of developmentalism than it does a developmentalist strategy that has been renewed and updated for the challenges and opportunities of a more market-oriented economy.

Macroeconomic Deeds, Not Reform Words: The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America

Numerosos estudios sobre los factores que determinan el fl ujo de inversión extranjera en Latinoamérica subrayan la importancia de las instituciones que rebajan el riesgo y los costes de inversión, las instituciones que apoyan el buen gobierno, las libertades políticas y económicas, y que muestran la dedicación de la región a la reforma económica. Este estudio investiga estas variables en comparación con el tamaño del mercado, las políticas macroeconómicas y factores de producción para averiguar las combinaciones de variables que explican la distribución de los flujos de inversión extranjera. Para el estudio se utilizó una base de datos comparativos y longitudinales de quince economías latinoamericanas desde 1985 a 2003. El estudio concluye que el reciente desempeño del balance comercial proporciona un compromiso suficiente de los gobiernos regionales y por otro lado asegura que el tipo de régimen, buen gobierno y reformas son, por comparación, determinantes débiles de la inversión directa extranjera. Numerous studies on the determinants of foreign direct investment flows in Latin America underscore the importance of risk- and cost-mitigating institutions that support good governance, political and economic freedom, and demonstrate a credible commitment to economic reform by regional governments. This study tests these variables against market size, macroeconomic policy, and factor controls to assess which combinations of variables explain the distribution of foreign inflows. Using a time-series cross-sectional data set of fifteen Latin American economies from 1985 to 2003, the study concludes that past performance on the current account provides sufficient commitment by regional governments and that regime, good governance, and reform variables are, by comparison, inconsistent predictors of foreign direct investment.

The limits of decentralisation: Legislative careers and territorial representation in Spain

Scholars of decentralisation in comparative perspective have argued that these reforms should lead to a ‘territorialisation of politics’. For the party system and the legislature this means that subnational interests will increasingly influence rules and practices as well as positions on policy choice. This study tests this proposition in Spain, which has undergone extensive decentralisation during its democratic history (1977–present). By examining the career trajectories of deputies in the ruling lower house, the study finds little evidence that decentralisation expanded the influence of subnational representatives within the party system or the parliament of democratic Spain. This was true despite the growing cohort of deputies with subnational experience in the Congreso, the ability of subnational party offices to recruit and place candidates on electoral lists, and the increasing importance of regional issues in national elections.

Transforming the Latin American automobile industry : unions, workers, and the politics of restructuring

A general overview of the entire problem of evil from a philosophical perspective. Avoiding excessive technical and formal philosophical language, it includes many user-friendly features including interesting examples, a glossary of key terms, as well as sources for further study.

Political Governance and Macroeconomic Variables in Determining Foreign Direct Investment Flows: A Reply to John P. Tuman

I thank Professor John Tuman for the opportunity to pursue questions I raised in my article but could not engage further in the original study (Montero 2008). I will attempt here to address his commentary with an eye toward clarifying how additional testing of the data not only raises questions about Tuman and Emmert’s (2004) fi ndings concerning human rights and regime type but also refi nes my own fi ndings about macroeconomic performance and particularly the role of the current account. I hasten to underscore that it is still not my primary purpose to disprove the results of Tuman and Emmert (2004) or to engage the broader literature on regime type and investment fl ows. However, as I conclude in my article (Montero 2008, 76), the data thus far do not sustain consistently the fi nding that human rights violations and regime type affect foreign direct investment (FDI) fl ows in Latin America. Moreover, my study is not meant to challenge Tuman’s point about the importance of the domestic political and economic institutions of the home countries of multinational corporations (MNCs). I argue here that exploring these factors requires a different kind of study than the one I initially designed. Yet I also raise doubts about whether such a study can be sustained with the data available and implemented using time-series cross-sectional techniques. Regarding my study’s fi ndings that regime type and human rights violations proved inconsistent predictors of FDI, Tuman responds that a fl aw in research design—namely, the pooling of FDI infl ows per Latin American country-year—explains the performance of these political variables. He argues that the disaggregation of fl ows by sending countries would introduce the effects of different domestic institutions and pressures to direct FDI in certain ways in the Latin American region. The examples he gives in his commentary suggest that differences between liberal America and social democratic Europe explain the conditions under which

Eroding the Clientelist Monopoly: The Subnational Left Turn and Conservative Rule in Northeastern Brazil

Well-financed opposition parties can exert their organizational strength to undercut the territorial advantages of political machines and clientele networks. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, leftist parties in Brazil’s Northeast region brought conservative dominance to an end. The Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) led this shift, not only garnering regional majorities in presidential elections but also winning multiple governorships and increasing its share of federal and state legislative seats in the region. In contrast to arguments attributing recent electoral shifts in the Northeast to civil society, aggregate growth, and conditional cash transfers, we argue that the territorial expansion of the PT organization played a central role. A spike in party finances between 2001 and 2003 enabled the PT, for the first time, to establish party offices in northeastern municipalities from the top down. Drawing from underutilized data and sources, we show that the PT leadership eroded conservatives’ monopoly on rural territory in the Northeast by strategically targeting hundreds of conservative-dominated municipalities and investing resources to stimulate the formation of local offices. The study demonstrates that this top-down territorial targeting produced considerable electoral gains for PT candidates across federal and state races.

Comparative Politics and the Liberal Arts College: A Fragile Symbiosis

Comparative politics offers the integration of social scientific methods with knowledge of regions, history, culture, language, and foreign experience. This places comparative politics in a strategic position as liberal arts colleges redouble their efforts to internationalize the curriculum and promote the skills of “global citizenship.” But this symbiosis is fragile as comparativists at liberal arts colleges struggle to keep up with the fieldwork done by colleagues at research institutions. The essay concludes with some suggestions for repositioning comparative politics at liberal arts colleges so that it can fulfill its strategic potential.

Politics after Neoliberalism: Reregulation in Mexico

Part I. The Framework and Comparative Analysis: 1. Rethinking the consequences of Neoliberalism 2. From deregulation to regulation in the Mexican coffee sector Part II. The Cases: 3. Remaking corporatism from below: a participatory policy framework in Oaxaca 4. When corporatism and democracy collide: an exclusionary policy framework in Guerrero 5. Peasants and oligarchs: stalemate and transition to a participatory policy framework in Chiapas 6. Oligarchs as the dominant force: an exclusionary policy framework in Puebla Part III. The Conclusion: 7. After neoliberalism: what next?