David J. Samuels

The Value of a Vote: Malapportionment in Comparative Perspective

Comparative studies of electoral institutions have largely neglected a fundamental characteristic of most of the worlds electoral systems: malapportionment. This article provides a method for measuring malapportionment in different types of electoral systems, calculates levels of malapportionment in seventy-eight countries, and employs statistical analysis to explore the correlates of malapportionment in both upper and lower chambers. The analysis shows that the use of single-member districts is associated with higher levels of malapportionment in lower chambers and that federalism and country size account for variation in malapportionment in upper chambers. Furthermore, African and especially Latin American countries tend to have electoral systems that are highly malapportioned. The article concludes by proposing a broad, comparative research agenda that focuses on the origins, evolution and consequences of malapportionment.

Presidentialism and accountability for the economy in comparative perspective

To what extent do the institutions of presidentialism allow voters to hold governments accountable? Powell and Whitten (1993) suggested that voter capacity to sanction is strong when “clarity of government responsibility” for outcomes is clear, and vice versa. I argue that clarity of responsibility functions differently under presidentialism and that presidentialism generates particular forms of accountability. In general, electoral sanctioning is weak in nonconcurrent elections, which do not occur under parliamentarism, but is stronger in concurrent elections. In concurrent executive elections the clarity of responsibility does not attenuate the economys impact on the vote. Yet in concurrent legislative elections both partisan and institutional variables diffuse responsibility for economic performance. Thus under many common institutional and partisan formats, voters sanction presidents to a greater degree than legislators for the same phenomenon. These findings elucidate the conditions under which we might observe accountability similar to what we find in some parliamentary systems or a more uniquely presidentialist “dual democratic legitimacies” of the kind Linz (1994) imagined.

Voting in Open Economies: The Electoral Consequences of Globalization

What are the electoral consequences of global market integration? Although recent discussions of politics and markets have much to say on globalization’s implications for policy outcomes, the impact of market integration on representative democracy has received scant attention. This article addresses this omission. We extend the globalization literature to develop two competing hypotheses regarding the influence of open economies on electoral accountability. Predictions are tested using a new data set covering elections from 75 countries over 27 years. Results support a government constraint hypothesis: Exposure to the world economy weakens connections between economic performance and support for political incumbents. By redirecting concerns from the policy implications of globalization and toward its electoral consequences, findings highlight the influence of voter perceptions and of vote-seeking politicians in the politics of globalization.

Decentralization and democracy in Latin America

The nine essays in this collection represent the first book-length treatment of one of the major changes that have shaped Latin America since independence: decentralization of the state. Contributors argue that though the assignment of political, fiscal, and administrative duties to subnational governments has been one of the most important political developments in Latin America, it is also one of the most overlooked. This volume is divided into three sections. Part one presents an overview of the topic by the editors; part two considers the political origins of decentralization; and part three examines decentralization and economic reforms. Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America explores the causes of decentralization in six significant case studies: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela. Shorter analyses of Uruguay and Peru are also included. The essays in this volume find substantial common ground across regime types, historical periods, and countries, and yield several substantive conclusions.

From Socialism to Social Democracy Party Organization and the Transformation of the Workers’ Party in Brazil

Luis Inácio Lula da Silva’s victory in Brazil’s 2002 presidential election brought to power Latin America’s largest leftist party, the Workers’Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores [PT]). The PTwon because it moved to the center, and voters regarded this shift as credible. The party’s transformation is puzzling, because political scientists do not expect strategic flexibility in “mass bureaucratic” parties, which the PT resembles. Although exogenous factors are important, the key to understanding the party’s strategic adaptation lies with its internal institutions, which generate substantial leadership accountability. The weight of pragmatists in the rank and file grew in the 1990s following the party’s success in subnational executive elections and its consequent need to demonstrate results in office. These rank-and-file members could influence the party’s direction because of the party’s internally democratic institutions. The PT’s transformation reveals that strategic flexibility can emerge in mass parties even when the leadership lacks autonomy.

Sources of Mass Partisanship in Brazil

Scholars believe that mass partisanship in Brazil is comparatively weak. Using evidence from a 2002 national survey, however, this study finds that the aggregate level of party identification actually falls only slightly below the world average and exceeds levels found in many newer democracies. Yet this finding is misleading, because the distribution of partisanship is skewed toward only one party, the PT. This trend results from a combination of party organization and recruitment efforts and individual motivation to acquire knowledge and become involved in politicized social networks. Partisanship for other parties, however, derives substantially from personalistic attachments to party leaders. This finding has implications for current debates about the status of parties in Brazil. Also important is the impact of the 2005 corruption scandal implicating the PT and President Lula da Silvas administration.

Incumbents and Challengers on a Level Playing Field: Assessing the Impact of Campaign Finance in Brazil

This article assesses the impact of campaign spending on incumbent and challenger vote shares in elections to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. I argue that incumbents and challengers gain equally from campaign spending. This contrasts with the prominent argument about U.S. House elections that incumbents gain little from spending while challengers gain a great deal. In the U.S., incumbents gain little because being in office generates significant name recognition and additional spending suffers quickly from diminishing returns. In contrast, challengers gain a lot because they start the campaign from scratch. In Brazil, because incumbency provides fewer benefits than in the U.S., both incumbents and challengers must spend money to increase their name recognition and both benefit from spending. My findings imply that campaign spending limits in Brazil would encourage rather than restrict competition, and they point to the importance of assessing the relative advantages of incumbency when assessing the impact of campaign spending.

Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach

Scholars continue to grapple with the question of the relationship between economic development and democratization; prominent recent research has focused on the effects of economic inequality. Boix suggests that democratization is likelier when inequality is low, whereas Acemoglu and Robinson argue that democratization is likelier when inequality is at middling levels. Both assume that democratization is a function of autocratic elites’ fear of the extent to which a future median voter would redistribute under different levels of inequality. Drawing on contractarian political theory, the authors suggest that democratization is instead a function of demands by rising economic groups for protection from the state. This alternative approach suggests that land and income inequality affect democratization differently: Autocracies with equal land distribution are indeed more likely to democratize, but contrary to the conventional wisdom, income inequality is more likely to promote democratization.

Presidentialism, Elections and Representation:

How does presidentialism affect various forms of representation? All else being equal, presidentialism is likely to impede the prospects for ‘mandate’ representation but enhance the prospects for ‘accountability’ representation. The degree of mandate or accountability representation is a function of the balance of powers and the degree of separation of purpose between the branches. Strong presidentialism works against mandate representation by freeing the president from his/her legislative copartisans and promoting ‘policy switching’. In contrast, a high ‘separation of purpose’, defined primarily by a country’s electoral institutions, clarifies for voters the responsibility of each branch for policy. Thus presidentialism - under certain common institutional configurations - provides accountability representation to a degree overlooked by existing research.

Devaluing the Vote in Latin America

Abstract:Malapportionment poses a serious, yet hitherto neglected, challenge to the quality and fairness of democracy in many Latin American countries.