Alison M. Jaggar

Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology

This paper argues that, by construing emotion as epistemologically subversive, the Western tradition has tended to obscure the vital role of emotion in the construction of knowledge. The paper begins with an account of emotion that stresses its active, voluntary, and socially constructed aspects, and indicates how emotion is involved in evaluation and observation. It then moves on to show how the myth of dispassionate investigation has functioned historically to undermine the epistemic authority of women as well as other social groups associated culturally with emotion. Finally, the paper sketches some ways in which the emotions of underclass groups, especially women, may contribute to the development of a critical social theory.

Vulnerable women and neo-liberal globalization: Debt burdens undermine women's health in the global South

Contemporary processes of globalization havebeen accompanied by a serious deterioration inthe health of many women across the world. Particularly disturbing is the drastic declinein the health status of many women in theglobal South, as well as some women in theglobal North. This paper argues that thehealth vulnerability of women in the globalSouth is inseparable from their political andeconomic vulnerability. More specifically, itlinks the deteriorating health of many Southernwomen with the neo-liberal economic policiesthat characterize contemporary economicglobalization and argues that this structure issustained by the heavy burden of debtrepayments imposed on many Southern countries. In conclusion, it argues that many Southerndebt obligations are not morally bindingbecause they are not democraticallylegitimate.

Ethics Naturalized: Feminism's Contribution to Moral Epistemology

A survey of Western feminist ethics over the past thirty years reveals considerable diversity; nonetheless, much recent work in this area is characterized by its adoption of a naturalistic approach. Such an approach is similar to that found in contemporary naturalized epistemology and philosophy of science, yet feminist naturalism has a unique focus. This paper explains what feminist naturalism can contribute to moral philosophy, both by critiquing moral concepts that obscure or rationalize women’s subordination and by paying attention to real-life practices of moral inquiry, including those used by women.

L’Imagination au Pouvoir: Comparing John Rawls’s Method of Ideal Theory with Iris Marion Young’s Method of Critical Theory

This chapter compares the philosophical methods used respectively by John Rawls and Iris Marion Young. Rawls’s theory is ideal in several interrelated methodological respects: he emphasizes principle over practice; he relies on a fictional reasoning process; and his theory is designed for an imagined world that lacks many problematic aspects of the real world. Young’s method, which she characterizes as critical theory, is non-ideal in all the respects that Rawls’s method is ideal. Young emphasizes practice; she respects the reasoning of actual people; and she directly addresses existing injustices. If Young has been able to develop philosophical ideals of justice that are more comprehensive, relevant, and substantively acceptable than Rawls’s, I suggest that one reason may be the non-ideal aspects of her methodology. In the end, however, Young’s philosophical contributions cannot be attributed only to her method; they are also the product of her unique political passion and creative imagination.

We fight for roses too: time-use and global gender justice

The World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development has recently confirmed the widely held belief that women across the world tend to perform different work from men who otherwise are situated similarly. Women also work longer hours than similarly situated men. In analyzing the justice of these gendered disparities in time-use, WDR 2012 uses a moral framework that is largely distributive. Although this framework illuminates some aspects of the injustice of the situation, I contend that it obscures other crucial aspects, making the analysis inadequate overall. I argue that a more comprehensive and illuminating moral understanding can be reached by analyzing these time-use disparities in terms of global gendered exploitation. This alternative framework also better enables identifying those politically responsible for the injustice and points toward a vision of global gender justice that is morally more plausible.

On Susan Moller Okin’s “Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice”*

Okin’s article focuses on the original position, which she considers to be Rawls’s “most important contribution to moral and political theory” ð238Þ. Thinking from the original position is a method of philosophical reasoning intended to explain and justify our sense of justice. Philosophers using the method imagine ourselves among several parties meeting to discuss the fundamental and permanent principles of justice that will regulate our future society. The parties meet behind a “veil of ignorance,” which conceals particulars of our own situations and those of others. Rawls’s characterization of the original position is intended to ensure that the principles agreed on are freely accepted, impartial, and sustainable. Okin’s discussion of his method has two aims. First, she re-reads the original position to show that it can withstand several criticisms influential among feminists in the 1980s. Second, she argues that, if some modifications are made to Rawls’s account, original position reasoning is a valuable method for developing an “acceptable” moral and political theory in a world where “gender is becoming increasingly an indefensible mode of social organization” ð229Þ.

Moral Justification, Philosophy, and Critical Social Theory

Marxism-bashing is currently as popular in the academies of North America as the mainstream media tell us it is in the streets of Eastern Europe. In the introduction to The Ethical Dimensions of Marxist Thought , Cornel West tells us that Marxism-bashers in the academy include not only the predictable conservatives but also trendy intellectuals who find epistemological and methodological reasons to discredit the entire Marxist enterprise of critical social theory. The book was written over a decade ago by a self-described American democratic socialist of American descent then in his mid-twenties. It is published at this time not just with the scholarly intention of countering vulgar reductionist readings of Marx but with the directly political intention of rehabilitating the Marxist project of understanding the world in order to change it. This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website , where most recent articles are published in full. Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.