Aloysius Martinich

A companion to analytic philosophy

entities of theoretical physics); the third consists of the objects of some other individual’s psychology; and the fourth of cultural objects (geistige Gegenstande), which include historical and sociological phenomena. From Carnap’s point of view, “[a]n object . . . is called epistemically primary relative to another one . . . if the second one is recognized through the mediation of the first and thus presupposes, for its recognition, the recognition of the first” (§54). Autopsychological objects are epistemically primary relative to the others in this sense. Moreover, physical objects are epistemically primary to heteropsychological ones because the latter can only be recognized through the mediation of the former: an expression on a face, a reading in an instrument, etc. Finally, heteropsychological objects are epistemically primary relative to cultural ones for the same reason. The main task of the Aufbau is construction, which Carnap conceives of as the converse of what he regarded as reduction (which is far from what was then – or is now – conceived of as “reduction” in Anglophone philosophy): an object is ‘reducible’ to others . . . if all statements about it can be translated into statements which speak only about these other objects. . . . By constructing a concept from other concepts, we shall mean the indication of its “constructional definition” on the basis of other concepts. By a constructional definition of the concept a on the basis of the concepts b and c, we mean a rule of translation which gives a general indication how any propositional function in which a occurs may be transformed into a coextensive propositional function in which a no longer occurs, but only b and c. If a concept is reducible to others, then it must indeed be possible to construct it from them. (§35) However, construction and reduction present different formal problems because, except in some degenerate cases (such as explicit definition), the transformations in the two directions may not have any simple explicit relation to each other. The question of reducibility/constructibility is distinct from that of epistemic primacy. In an important innovation in an empiricist context, Carnap argues that both the autopsychological and physical domains can be reduced to each other (in his sense). Thus, at the formal level, either could serve as the basis of the construction. It is epistemic primacy that dictates the choice of the former. Carnap’s task, ultimately, is to set up a constructional system that will allow the construction of the cultural domain from the autopsychological through the two intermediate domains. In the Aufbau, there are only informal discussions of how the last two stages of such a construction are to be executed. Only the construction of the physical from the autopsychological is fully treated formally. As the basic units of the constructional system Carnap chose what he calls “elementary experiences” (Elementarerlebnisse) (elex). These are supposed to be instantaneous cross-sections of the stream of experience – or at least bits of that stream in the smallest perceivable unit of time – that are incapable of further analysis. The only primitive relation that Carnap introduces is “recollection of similarity” (Rs). (In the formal development of the system, Rs is introduced first and the elex are defined as the field of Rs.) The asymmetry of Rs is eventually exploited by Carnap to introduce temporal ordering. Since the elex are elementary, they cannot be further analyzed to define what would be regarded as constituent qualities of them, such as partial sensations or intensity SAHOTRA SARKAR

Conversational Maxims and Some Philosophical Problems

Expose de la theorie des maximes conversationnelles de Grice et application de celle-ci a divers problemes concernant la reference, la distinction de re/de dicto pour les croyances, le paradoxe de Moore et celui du Menteur.

Interpreting the Religion of Thomas Hobbes: An Exchange: Hobbes's Erastianism and Interpretation

A. P. Martinichs The Two Gods of Leviathan appeared in 1992, and J. R. Collinss The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes in 2005. Martinich offered a revisionist interpretation of Thomas Hobbess religious commitments. He rebuked the conventional view that Hobbes was an atheist and placed him within particular traditions of reformed Christian theology. Collinss book strongly differed from these conclusions, and reasserted Hobbess hostility to traditional Christianity as part of a general contextualization of his writings within the period of the English Revolution. The following exchange between Martinich and Collins was first aired in 2007 as a debate at the Southwestern Political Science Associations Annual Conference.

Religion, fanaticism, and liberalism

Few people in contemporary democracies have what John Rawls calls fully comprehensive doctrines (FCDs). In particular, mainstream religions are not FCDs; further, most people, including educated, reflective ones, do not have FCDs. I argue that if an FCD conflicts with political liberalism, as Rawls explains it in Political Liberalism, then it is the FCD that must yield. What distinguishes fanatics from most religious people in contemporary democracies is the fact that fanatics (purport to) place all value in things of some transcendent realm. Terrorists are fanatics who, ironically, try to impose their values on the world.

Ideal Interpretation: The Theories of Zhu Xi and Ronald Dworkin

Ideal interpretation is understanding a text in the best possible way. It is usually used when the text has a canonical status, such as the Bible or the U.S. Constitution. We argue that Zhu Xi’s view about interpreting the Four Books and Ronald Dworkin’s view about constitutional interpretation are examples of ideal interpretation and that their basic principles are similar. Each holds, roughly, that their target text contains moral truth; that the author’s mind requires the mediation of learning; that the purpose of interpretation is not only to lead the reader to the moral truth but to become a better person; that all propositions are about the same moral truth or about political justice; that the interpretation ultimately must come from oneself, purged of prejudices; and that the only correct interpretation is one that captures the original meaning.

Egoism, Reason, and the Social Contract

Bernard Gert’s distinctive interpretation of the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes in his recent book may be questioned in at least three areas: (1) Even if Hobbes is not a psychological egoist, he seems to be a desire egoist, which has the consequence, as he understands it, that a person acts at least for his own good in every action. (2) Although there are several senses of reason, it seems that Hobbes uses the idea that reason is calculation of means to ends; while such calculation sets intermediate goals, reason itself does not set ultimate ends. (3) Hobbes’s political theory is best understood as a form of social contract theory because subjects covenant among themselves to authorize the sovereign to protect them; authorization has the consequence that subjects give some of the their rights to the sovereign; but this gifting of rights is not the essence of the origin of the civil state.

Reason and reciprocity in Hobbes's political philosophy: on Sharon Lloyd's "Morality in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes"

Lloyds book, Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, correctly stresses the deductive element in Hobbess proofs of the laws of nature. She believes that “the principle of reciprocity” is the key to these proofs. This principle is effective in getting ego-centric people to recognize moral laws and their moral obligations. However, it is not, I argue, the basic principle Hobbes uses to derive the laws of nature, from definitions. The principle of reason, which dictates that all similar cases be treated similarly, is. It is important not to diminish the centrality of reason for Hobbes because it is essential to understanding his reply to “the fool” and understanding why the state of nature cannot be a continuum.

Reference, Truth, And Fiction

One of the oldest problems in philosophy is also one of the most debated topics in the philosophy of language today. For the philosophers who think that negative existential propositions are puzzling, the intuition about referring is this: Proper names need to hook on to or to attach to something in the world in order to be meaningful. The problem of existentials for proper names would not exist if those names had no meaning. As regards fictional names, they would not exist if there were no short stories, novels, myths, and the like. To have short stories, novels, and myths, is to have stretches of discourse that the speech community accepts. True negative existentials presuppose a more or less substantial body of discourse that indicates what is true about the things that do not exist. The intelligibility of fiction depends on most of the statements of fiction being true. Keywords: fictional names; negative existential propositions; philosophy of language; reference; speech community; truth

Interpretation and Hobbes’s Political Philosophy

The continuing debate over Hobbess views may be explained by the fact that scholars come to his text with different Networks of Beliefs, which include beliefs that vary in their tenacity. These differences are not overcome by some of the properties of a good interpretation, for example, conservatism, frugality, palpability, and generality. Other such properties, consistency, completeness, connectedness and defensibility, are more successful in this regard, and I refer to them to defend my interpretation of Hobbes as a theist.

The Life of Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes was at Magdalen Hall, Oxford, when James VI of Scotland in 1603 initiated the Stuart monarchy in England as James I.1 Hobbes died in 1679, just as the the Popish Plot was beginning to thicken. Therefore, virtually all of his intellectual life coincided with the early and middle Stuart period. He was involved in one way or another with the controversies over Ship Money, Forced Loans, the foundations of the sovereignty of James I and Charles I, the nature and function of their parliaments, the English Civil War, the legitimacy of the Commonwealth, the nature and practice of scientists such as Robert Boyle and William Harvey and mathematicians such as John Wallis. To study Hobbes’s life is to gain a perspective on a large part of Stuart England. Because of his peculiar genius, it is an unconventional one. Although he was on the Continent several times for a total of twenty years, profited greatly from those excursions, and was probably more revered there than in his native land, he was always an Englishman at heart.2 Many of the people he associated with on the Continent were fellow exiles. After being in self-imposed exile from 1640 until 1651, he returned to England after the fighting of the English Civil War had ended and some stability had been achieved.