David Sosa

A companion to analytic philosophy

entities of theoretical physics); the third consists of the objects of some other individual’s psychology; and the fourth of cultural objects (geistige Gegenstande), which include historical and sociological phenomena. From Carnap’s point of view, “[a]n object . . . is called epistemically primary relative to another one . . . if the second one is recognized through the mediation of the first and thus presupposes, for its recognition, the recognition of the first” (§54). Autopsychological objects are epistemically primary relative to the others in this sense. Moreover, physical objects are epistemically primary to heteropsychological ones because the latter can only be recognized through the mediation of the former: an expression on a face, a reading in an instrument, etc. Finally, heteropsychological objects are epistemically primary relative to cultural ones for the same reason. The main task of the Aufbau is construction, which Carnap conceives of as the converse of what he regarded as reduction (which is far from what was then – or is now – conceived of as “reduction” in Anglophone philosophy): an object is ‘reducible’ to others . . . if all statements about it can be translated into statements which speak only about these other objects. . . . By constructing a concept from other concepts, we shall mean the indication of its “constructional definition” on the basis of other concepts. By a constructional definition of the concept a on the basis of the concepts b and c, we mean a rule of translation which gives a general indication how any propositional function in which a occurs may be transformed into a coextensive propositional function in which a no longer occurs, but only b and c. If a concept is reducible to others, then it must indeed be possible to construct it from them. (§35) However, construction and reduction present different formal problems because, except in some degenerate cases (such as explicit definition), the transformations in the two directions may not have any simple explicit relation to each other. The question of reducibility/constructibility is distinct from that of epistemic primacy. In an important innovation in an empiricist context, Carnap argues that both the autopsychological and physical domains can be reduced to each other (in his sense). Thus, at the formal level, either could serve as the basis of the construction. It is epistemic primacy that dictates the choice of the former. Carnap’s task, ultimately, is to set up a constructional system that will allow the construction of the cultural domain from the autopsychological through the two intermediate domains. In the Aufbau, there are only informal discussions of how the last two stages of such a construction are to be executed. Only the construction of the physical from the autopsychological is fully treated formally. As the basic units of the constructional system Carnap chose what he calls “elementary experiences” (Elementarerlebnisse) (elex). These are supposed to be instantaneous cross-sections of the stream of experience – or at least bits of that stream in the smallest perceivable unit of time – that are incapable of further analysis. The only primitive relation that Carnap introduces is “recollection of similarity” (Rs). (In the formal development of the system, Rs is introduced first and the elex are defined as the field of Rs.) The asymmetry of Rs is eventually exploited by Carnap to introduce temporal ordering. Since the elex are elementary, they cannot be further analyzed to define what would be regarded as constituent qualities of them, such as partial sensations or intensity SAHOTRA SARKAR

The Import of the Puzzle About Belief

We may suppose that Pierre ... is a leading philosopher and logician. He would never let contradictory beliefs pass. And surely anyone, lead- ing logician or no, is in principle in a position to notice and correct contradictory beliefs if he has them. Precisely for this reason, we re- gard individuals who contradict themselves as subject to greater cen- sure than those who merely have false beliefs. But it is clear that Pierre ... is in no position to see, by logic alone, that at least one of his beliefs must be false. He lacks information, not logical acumen. He cannot be convicted of inconsistency: to do so is incorrect. (Kripke 1988, 122) Kripke speaks of acumen, of epistemic censure, and of being convicted of inconsistency: it is clear that he has a normative epistemic notion in mind. The idea is that if Pierre had logically contradictory be- liefs, he would be violating norms of theoretical rationality. In spite of the connection Kripke establishes, relations between these epi- stemic norms and theories of propositional attitudes have been underappreciated. I here return to Kripkes puzzle with special attention to the role of rationality. My investigation will focus on three areas. First, in what does the

WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A GROUP

Consequentialist and Kantian theories differ over the ethical relevance of consequences of actions. I investigate how they might differ too over the relevance of what actions are consequence of. Focusing on the case of group action and collective responsibility, I argue that theres a kind of analog to the problem of aggregating the value of consequences—about aggregating responsibility with respect to the roles of cooperating agents—that Kantian theories will not confront and consequentialist theories will. The issue provides a useful way to characterize a deep difference between Kantian and consequentialist theories and points, ironically, toward a way of making those views compatible.

Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes From the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim

1. Reality and reduction: whats really at stake in the causal exclusion debate Louise Antony 2. Two property theories and the causal conundrum for physicalism Frank Jackson 3. Mental causation: the free lunch Barry Loewer 4. Does mental causation require psychophysical identities? Brian McLaughlin 5. The Canberra plan neglects ground Ned Block 6. Microrealization and the mental Sydney Shoemaker 7. Supervenience and the causal explanation of behavior Fred Dretske 8. Visual awareness and visual qualia Christopher Hill 9. Phenomenal externalism, Lolita, and the planet Xenon Michael Tye 10. Troubles for radical transparency James Van Cleve 11. How theories work: open questions for methodological philosophy of science Lawrence Sklar.

Two Forms of Dualism

I distinguish two sorts of motivation for dualism. One motivation is driven by the distinctive character of conscious phenomenology. The other is driven by the special character of normativity: Is rationality an even “harder” problem than consciousness? There is no dramatic climax in which I show that these two dualist currents have a common source; in fact, I think they are relatively independent. RÉSUMÉ: Je distingue deux sortes de motivations pour le dualisme. La première de ces motivations est entraînée par le caractère distinctif de la phénoménologie consciente. La seconde est entraînée par le caractère particulier de la normativité : le problème de la rationalité serait-il un problème “plus diffi cile” que celui de la conscience? Il n’y a pas de point culminant où je montre qu’il existe une source commune à ces deux courants dualistes; en fait, je pense qu’ils sont relativement indépendants. There are two forms of dualism. The difference between these forms responds to two sorts of motivation. One motivation is driven by the distinctive character of conscious phenomenology, by what it’s like to undergo conscious experience. The other motivation is driven by the special normative character of cognition, by the essential susceptibility to rational evaluation of our intentional attitudes. I promise no dramatic climax in which I show that these two dualist currents have a common source; in fact, I think they are relatively independent. In one respect, however, the two motivations show an interesting reversal of prioritizations, with respect to an independent expectation, and I will try to bring that out too. So one sort of motivation is relatively familiar, I think. Let’s call it the “what it’s like” source of dualism. This source is well captured by Thomas Nagel’s classic piece: 1 consciousness is a subjective phenomenon, essentially encapsulating a perspective, a fi rst-person point of view. And consciousness is

Reference from a Perspective versus Reference

Loar is concerned with two questions about reference. First: what makes different external (e.g. causal) relations count as semantic relations, count as reference? Second: if reference is objectively indeterminate or inscrutable, does this subvert our commonsense conception of semantic facts? The first is a question about the different relations (which he takes to be different kinds of causal relation) that constitute reference. What picks those relations out, from among all the possible causal relations, as the relations that constitute reference? What gives them their semantic character? According to Loar, one popular response, that their semantic force derives from their role in determining truth-conditions, does not answer the question. For it would seem that truth-conditions themselves can be understood