Amir Horowitz

Computation, External Factors, and Cognitive Explanations

Computational properties, it is standardly assumed, are to be sharply distinguished from semantic properties. Specifically, while it is standardly assumed that the semantic properties of a cognitive system are externally or non-individualistically individuated, computational properties are supposed to be individualistic and internal. Yet some philosophers (e.g., Tyler Burge) argue that content impacts computation, and further, that environmental factors impact computation. Oron Shagrir has recently argued for these theses in a novel way, and gave them novel interpretations. In this paper I present a conception of computation in cognitive science that takes Shagrirs conception as its starting point, but further develops it in various directions and strengthens it. I argue that the explanatory role of computational properties emerges from the idea that syntactical properties and the relevant external factors presented by cognitive systems compose wide computational properties. I also elaborate upon the notion of content that is in play, and argue that it is contents of the kind that are ascribed by transparent interpretations of content ascriptions that impact computation. This fact enables the thesis that external factors impact computation to rebuff the challenge which concerns the claim that psychology must be individualistic.

Putnam, Searle, and externalism

SummaryTo sum up, then, both kinds of Putnams arguments established externalism, though they suffer from several defects. Yet, I think Searles discussion of these arguments contributes to our understanding of what makes externalism true, and forces us to accept a moderate version of externalism. Searles own account of the TE story shows us, within a solipsistic outline, how two identical mental states can be directed towards different objects, and further, that the content-determination of indexical thoughts does not necessarily involve external factors. We are thus led to search elsewhere (i.e., not in the nature of indexical thoughts nor in the mere fact of there being identical thoughts with different intentionalities) for what makes the thoughts in question ‘external’. Searle formulates the thesis that intension determines extension as asserting that intension sets certain conditions that anything has to meet in order to fall under its extension. I showed that this is a trivial and implausible understanding of that thesis. Yet, it leads us to distinguish between an intensions setting conditions for falling under its extension and its fully determining such conditions, and thus to see in what sense externalism is true: in the sense that there are intensions that do not fully determine the conditions for falling under their extensions. Rather, they leave indeterminacies. This version of externalism is a moderate one, since though the intensions do not fully determine extensions, they, so to speak, determine their indeterminacies, by specifying the possible external facts that can complete the determination of extension. (The intensions, as I said, function like open sentences, and can be viewed as narrow contents.) So whats in the head plays a much more important role in determining content than Putnam takes it to play. Searles pointing out that Hilarys concepts ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ are different also contributes to seeing this phenomenon: we realize that in that case the difference between the concepts is what is responsible for the fact that the completions of the extension-determinations are different. I think that this way of viewing the facts shows that ‘the externalist turn’ is not a great revolution, and that with the help of the concept of narrow content we can accept it without abandoning the traditional views about the mind as the source of content, and without being embarrassed by the very idea of (realistic) belief-desire psychology.

The knowledge argument and higher-order properties

The paper argues that Jacksons knowledge argument fails to undermine physicalist ontology. First, it is argued that, as this argument stands, it begs the question. Second, it is suggested that, by supplementing the argument (and taking one of its premises for granted), this flaw can be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against type-physicalism; however, this flaw cannot be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against token-physicalism. The argument cannot be supplemented so as to show that experiences have properties which are illegitimate from a physicalist perspective.

Is There a Problem in Physicalist Epiphenomenalism

Physicalist epiphenomenalism is the conjunction of the doctrine that tokens of mental events are tokens of physical events and the doctrine that mental events do not exert causal powers by virtue of falling under mental types. The purpose of the paper is to show that physicalist epiphenomenalism, contrary to what many have thought, is not subject to the objections that have been raised against classic epiphenomenalism. This is argued with respect to five such objections: that introspection shows that our mental properties are causally efficacious; that concrete existents and their properties necessarily possess causal powers; that the explanatory and predictive success of psychology implies that psychological properties exist and are causally efficacious; that epiphenomenalism cannot deal with the other minds problem, and that it is unlikely that our mentality does not endow us with evolutionary advantages and therefore it is unlikely that mental properties are not causally efficacious.

A PSYCHO-PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF FOULS AND INTENTIONS IN CONTACT SPORTS

This paper examines the notion of fouls in sports. In the first part of the paper, we examine some actual distinctions and classifications between different kinds of fouls. In the second part we examine the significance, validity, and justification of these classifications from a normative perspective.The term ‘foul’ evokes negative connotation; some would say—negative normative connotations. Conventional wisdom suggests that typically to commit fouls is, by definition, to go against the rules or principles of the contest. Since sport contests are constitutive activities—this means that to foul is to go against the essence of the contest. In other words, to commit fouls seems not to play the game; it seems unsporting. Consider the following typical example: in a premiership match in 2014 Hull’s forward Nikica Jelavic spun around Company and had a clear path to the goal. Manchester City’s defender Vincent Kompany then held him back. Although immediately ejected from the game, it is noteworthy that Kompany was later banned from one match, rather than the usual three match suspension, because the foul was not violent or dangerous in any way. Nevertheless, the example shows that some fouls are considered unsporting even though they do not involve violent or dangerous play. If a player gets past her opponent and finds herself in front of the goal, and then her opponent hugs her forcefully from behind, then such a foul falls outside the bounds of play. It amounts to a refusal to accept the rules of the games. We explore this issue from both a philosophical and a psychological perspective. The first half of the paper shows how actual distinctions between fouls depend on awarding a normative role to intentions. In the second part, a difficulty regarding the possibility that intentions play this role is presented, and a solution is proposed. It will emerge that some fouls are a legitimate part of the game. According to the proposed view, some actions that are forbidden by the official rules of football are illegitimate when performed with intention of a certain kind. Specifically, we will argue that it is legitimate for a player to play so as to take the risk of fouling, so long as fouling is not her intention. When fouls are committed with such a state of mind, they are a part of the game. Furthermore, whereas intention is necessary for illegitimate fouls, it is not sufficient. We will argue briefly that there are also legitimate intended fouls, since some deals or exchanges—fouls in return to penalties—are considered an integral part of the game, and that this view of (some) fouls is legitimate.