Amrita Narlikar

Collapse at the WTO: A Cancun post-mortem

This article offers an analysis of the collapse of the WTO talks in Cancun in September 2003. It argues that the collapse of the talks should not be regarded as a victory for the developing world, as many have suggested. Rather, the collapse should be seen as the inevitable result of deep‐seated tensions within the wto s institutional framework, both in terms of the processes that underlie its working and the substance of its agreements. The article argues that these imbalances, if not corrected, will heighten the alienation of developing countries and work to the detriment of the legitimacy and survival of the wto.

Fairness in International Trade Negotiations: Developing Countries in the GATT and WTO

Does fairness matter in the hard bargaining and horse-trading that is associated with trade negotiations? This paper presents a positivist analysis of the particular concepts of fairness that developing countries have appealed to in their trade negotiations within the auspices of the GATT and WTO, how these notions have evolved, and the impact that they have had on negotiated outcomes. Treating the concept of fairness as my central dependent variable, I argue that the notion of fairness can only be understood in terms of the institutional context it is embedded in, which includes institutional structure as well as the participatory processes that underlie it. I advance three hypotheses on the relationship between institutional context: the fairness discourse, and the influence and manoeuvre that member countries can have in shaping that discourse. Focusing on the role of fairness in the negotiation positions of developing countries, I explain its substance and evolution through learning and adaptation by these countries within the very particular institutions of the GATT and the WTO, and the coalitions they form a part of and interact within.

The Strict Distributive Strategy for a Bargaining Coalition: The Like Minded Group in the World Trade Organization, 1998-2001

Developing country delegates in multilateral trade negotiations have become quite active in forming bargaining coalitions. But there has been little research concerning how this has been done, what the results have been, or what influences these results.1 In tackling these questions, this paper identifies strategy choices made by weak-state coalitions as possible influences on their outcomes, the outcome being the primary dependent variable. Our method is to investigate a single case and attempt to generate a potential generalization for further investigation in other cases. From 1998 through the Doha ministerial conference of November 2001, the Like Minded Group of countries (LMG) illustrated what we call the strict distributive strategy in negotiations in the World Trade Organization. This coalition put forward a number of detailed proposals that would have shifted value from North to South and denied any negotiating gain to the North until the North had first granted the group’s demands. Despite a great deal of organized professional effort in Geneva, however, the group sustained a major loss and collected relatively small gains especially on their leading issue compared with the status quo, by the time of the Doha conference as we read the record. The LMG did play a leading role in delaying what they regarded as another serious loss. But this coalition gained less at Doha than others such as the coalition concerned with TRIPS and public health, which used the mixed-distributive strategy, as shown in a companion paper.

Negotiating the rise of new powers

The purpose of this special issue is to analyse the negotiation of power transition in the international system today. This introductory article provides the theoretical frame that guided all the contributors, and serves as the collective starting point for this project. The framework focuses on three sets of issues. First, it highlights the importance of studying the relations between the key actors, rather than focusing solely on the perspective of any one group of players. It identifies five sets of key actors: the rising powers, the established powers, small and marginalized states, private actors (that attempt to harness the ongoing changes to their advantage and are in turn used by various state actors), and, finally, international organizations and other mechanisms of global governance (as loci, objects and also facilitators of international bargaining). Second, the article facilitates an analysis of the relations between these actors; it offers the lens of negotiation analysis that focuses specifically on the variables of negotiation strategy, coalitions and framing. Third, the article suggests potential implications of this collective study. These include new insights into the motivations of the key players, their ability and willingness to assume the responsibilities of international leadership, and how their visions of global order conflict with or reinforce each other. The latter part of the article offers a summary of the findings, suggests how the individual contributions add up and presents some policy recommendations resulting from the analysis.

India rising: Responsible to whom?

This article investigates Indias negotiation behaviour as a rising power and aims to help in the mediation of a polarized scholarly debate that either sees India as a ‘natural ally’ of the West, or as an unreformed and revisionist Third Worldist power. It argues that the key to understanding Indias negotiation behaviour lies in examining with whom it is negotiating. Rising India, even though it has a closer relationship with the West today than it has for many years, remains a negotiating partner that resorts frequently to distributive negotiation strategies, uses moralistic framing and resists bandwagoning. Its relations with the rising powers, too, reveal some degree of distributive bargaining, and it plays hardball with multinational companies and within international organizations. Interestingly, and in contrast to its dominant bargaining behaviour with these different players, Indias pattern of behaviour is different when dealing with smaller players. Here, it has consistently used integrative bargaining strategies, formed southern coalitions and shown willingness to share the burdens of international responsibility. The differences in behaviour suggest that India is perhaps not reluctant to be a responsible power per se, but that it sees itself as owing its responsibility to different constituencies. The conceptualization of these responsibilities is still evolving, opening up some space for negotiation and influence for India and its negotiating partners, with regard to which the article offers some policy recommendations.

All that Glitters is not Gold: India's rise to power

Abstract Recent years have seen a plethora of writings—by scholars, journalists and policy makers alike—on Indias rise to power. This paper argues that this much-vaunted rise needs to be viewed with caution. It examines the case for Indias rise, and operationalises its growing influence by applying and further developing the concept of ‘veto-player’. It highlights ways in which India has indeed acquired the status of a de facto veto-player in international relations. But the paper then presents three sets of reasons for caution. First, even though Indias rise to power might appear dramatic and sudden, it is a product of a long and incremental process. This has policy implications: not all the policies of the preceding era should be carelessly abandoned by India or by other developing countries in similar circumstances. Second, there are still significant hurdles—many of which are domestic—that it must overcome if it is to fully realise its potential and acquire the status of a great power. Third, India may have acquired effective veto-player status in certain crucial negotiations, but this does not automatically translate into an ability to achieve preferred outcomes. Having examined the hurdles that India faces on its pathway to power, the paper goes on to suggest strategies that could be adopted to convert veto-player status into positive influence.

Is India a Responsible Great Power

Abstract To what extent does rising responsibility accompany rising power in international relations? This article focuses on India to address the question: is a responsible great power in the making? Following a brief theoretical discussion on the notion of responsibility and its relationship to rising power, the article offers an empirical overview of Indias achievements thus far, and also the international and domestic challenges that it faces today. It argues that despite the attempts by observers to thrust greatness upon India, the country is yet to achieve greatness. The article further illustrates that Indias record of assuming global responsibility has been lacklustre at best. A central argument of the article is that Indias reluctance to share the burden of providing global public goods is inseparably bound with the nature of its rise to power.

Deadlocks in Multilateral Negotiations: Causes and Solutions

Deadlocks are a feature of everyday life, as well as high politics. This volume focuses on the concept, causes and consequences of deadlocks in multilateral settings, and analyses the types of strategies that could be used to break them. It commences with a definition of deadlock, hypothesises about its occurrence, and proposes solutions. Each chapter then makes an original contribution to the issue of deadlock – theoretical, methodological or empirical – and further tests the original concepts and hypotheses, either theoretically or through case-study analysis, developing or altering them accordingly. This is a unique volume which provides an in-depth examination of the problem of deadlock and a more thorough understanding of specific negotiation problems than has ever been done before. It will be directly relevant to students, researchers, teachers and scholars of negotiation and will also be of interest to practitioners involved in negotiation and diplomacy.

India’s Rise to Power: Where does East Africa fit in?

Considerable uncertainty surrounds the intentions and aspirations of rising powers, particularly the extent to which they are status quo or revisionist. How a new power behaves with some of the weakest members of the international system provides a useful indicator of how it will go on to behave as it emerges as a Great Power. In this paper, Indias engagement with East Africa is analysed. East Africa offers a particularly rich ground for conducting such an analysis: it comprises some of the worlds poorest countries with which India has had a long history of foreign relations, and has also attracted considerable involvement in recent years by China (another major power on the rise). While the central focus of the paper is on Indias East Africa foreign policy, Chinas presence in the region offers an important point of comparison that helps us identify some of the unique features of Indias pathway to power. The analysis generates several interesting findings on Indias negotiation strategy as a rising power, its willingness to provide leadership, and a set of development ideas that it offers as a potential alternative to not just the Washington Consensus but also the Beijing Consensus.

Empowering the poor? The successes and limitations of the Bali Package for the ldcs

After over a decade of languishing in stalemate, the Doha Development Agenda – the first round of trade negotiations launched under the auspices of the World Trade Organization – finally achieved a breakthrough at the Bali ministerial in 2013. Given that the Doha mandate places development – and particularly the concerns of the Least Developed Countries (ldcs) – at the heart of its agenda, our paper focuses on what the Bali outcome means for the world’s poorest countries. As a first step we provide a brief background against which the Bali negotiations took place. In the second section we assess the achievements and limitations of the Bali outcome, focusing on the ldc-specific package and also commenting on other issues that affect the ldcs. In the third section we explain the reasons for some of the achievements at Bali, which include negotiating strategies used by the ldcs themselves. In the fourth and final section we identify a plan of action for the future.