John S. Odell

Case Study Methods in International Political Economy

IPE scholars frequently use qualitative methods to contribute to theory-building, but we could get greater value from them. Single case studies are actually a family of research designs: the disciplined interpretive case study, the hypothesis-generating case study, the least-likely, most-likely, and deviant case studies. The method of difference employs comparison and attempts to eliminate rival interpretation by choosing two or more cases that match in important respects. These methods enjoy several inherent advantages relative to statistical methods, and they suffer from several disadvantages. Neither family of methods is sufficient. The two complement one another and ultimately must be combined.

Understanding International Trade Policies: An Emerging Synthesis

The international trade problems of the 1980s stimulated an expansion of scholarship on trade policies by economists and political scientists. At least four distinct theoretical perspectives weave their way through recent literature that concentrates on the United States—emphasizing market conditions, policy beliefs and values, national political institutions, and global structures, respectively. New studies in each of these traditions advance beyond the work of their predecessors, but none of the perspectives has yet proved adequate as a single unifying vehicle. Nevertheless, we can also see clear movement toward a synthesis, with single works blending insights from several traditions. Thus, the books under review do not all fall neatly into the familiar exclusive categories of “economics” or “political science.” The emerging synthesis needs strengthening in several ways, including the development of “conditioning hypotheses” that will reduce remaining apparent confusions.

The Strict Distributive Strategy for a Bargaining Coalition: The Like Minded Group in the World Trade Organization, 1998-2001

Developing country delegates in multilateral trade negotiations have become quite active in forming bargaining coalitions. But there has been little research concerning how this has been done, what the results have been, or what influences these results.1 In tackling these questions, this paper identifies strategy choices made by weak-state coalitions as possible influences on their outcomes, the outcome being the primary dependent variable. Our method is to investigate a single case and attempt to generate a potential generalization for further investigation in other cases. From 1998 through the Doha ministerial conference of November 2001, the Like Minded Group of countries (LMG) illustrated what we call the strict distributive strategy in negotiations in the World Trade Organization. This coalition put forward a number of detailed proposals that would have shifted value from North to South and denied any negotiating gain to the North until the North had first granted the group’s demands. Despite a great deal of organized professional effort in Geneva, however, the group sustained a major loss and collected relatively small gains especially on their leading issue compared with the status quo, by the time of the Doha conference as we read the record. The LMG did play a leading role in delaying what they regarded as another serious loss. But this coalition gained less at Doha than others such as the coalition concerned with TRIPS and public health, which used the mixed-distributive strategy, as shown in a companion paper.

From London to Bretton Woods; Sources of Change in Bargaining Strategies and Outcomes

Our most prominent theories of international bargaining miss elements essential for understanding national bargaining strategies and international outcomes. In particular they lack sufficient mechanisms of change over time. A focused contrast between the London economic and monetary conference of 1933 and the Bretton Woods conference of 1944 suggests three new dynamic hypotheses. (1) Changes, especially extreme ones, in national market conditions are likely to shift the states bargaining strategy sharply even if its relative international position has not changed. A slump will produce a more exploitative strategy, while a boom will encourage either a passive or an expansive strategy. (2) Painful national experience running contrary to prevailing policy ideas is likely to discredit those ideas among politicians and officials, turn them toward alternative doctrines, and lead to corresponding strategy changes. The ideas most likely to spread politically are ones which had predicted the currrent problem, and those whose advocates mount the most sophisticated publicity campaign. (3) International technical disagreement can pose a decisive impediment to intergovernmental agreement, while in some conditions at least technical convergence facilitates official agreement.

Developing Country Coalition-Building and International Trade Negotiations

For much of the post-war era, the stance of developing countries towards international trade negotiations has encompassed two somewhat contradictory strategies: on the one hand, considerable energy in maintaining the unity of a developing country bloc that vocally expressed concern over the existing trading system and demanded changes in it; on the other, a relatively passive attitude toward the negotiation rounds themselves.1 This strategy has long been criticized by Northern sceptics, and preparations for the Uruguay Round demonstrated discontent among some of the developing countries themselves. Arguments for a more active participation by developing countries in trade negotiations have seldom dealt specifically with the other strategies that could be pursued more successfully, however. Our examination of possible coalition strategies for the developing countries in the Uruguay Round and other international economic negotiations is motivated by an awareness of both the existing criticisms of the bloc strategy previously endorsed by G-77 and the underlying logic of that strategy: individually, the developing countries are not major powers in the international trading system. For those with less power, skilful strategies of coalition formation are a major implement for increasing success in such negotiations.

Latin American trade negotiations with the United States

The traditional relation between richer and poorer countries, whereby the former exported manufactures and the latter exported primary products, has been undergoing an accelerating transformation in recent years. Developing countries are emerging as serious competitors in the world economy in a widening range of manufactured products, and increasing industrial exports is one of the highest foreign-policy priorities of their governments. At the same time, demands for import restrictions have been increasingly heard in the older industrial countries. The result is that bilateral bargaining to regulate trade and market shares has become a common but understudied element of the North-South diplomatic agenda. Despite all our recent discussion of the international economic order, our knowledge of this type of bilateral conflict is quite sketchy. Industrial trade issues touch several often-conflicting policy objectives of the country involved, including employment and growth, price stability, debt servicing, domestic political power and stability, and the strength of bilateral political ties. Latin American countries and the United States have historically been mutually important as trade partners, and some

The Outcomes of International Trade Conflicts: The US and South Korea, 1960–1981

Since 1960 national governments have increasingly found themselves in international trade disputes. Yet little research has attempted to analyze this important form of conflict comparatively. Here four general hypotheses are proposed for explaining variations in bilateral conflict outcomes, and a technique for comparing outcomes is devised. A study of one bilateral North-South relationship, that of South Korea and the US, shows that 13 significant commercial disputes occurred between 1960 and 1981, spanning three industrial sectors. The outcomes varied in the degree to which each government achieved its initial objectives. The pattern of variations is explained by the interstate power structure, the domestic distribution of power among industries in the US, the international bargaining process, and to some extent by sectoral market conditions. Conclusions are based on interviews conducted in Seoul, Hong Kong and Washington, as well as on other data.

How Should the WTO Launch and Negotiate a Future Round

If WTO members wish to launch a new round to follow Doha, setting the agenda will require a complex negotiation as in the past, however Doha ends. To reduce the serious information problems they face and prepare the way, advocates should commission an independent research team to produce a comprehensive negotiation analysis before they decide to move further. Reaching an agreement on an agenda will depend on the procedural rules that apply in the agenda negotiation and the subsequent Round. They should consider four rules that seem legitimate today and most likely to help members find a joint-gain agenda. Reaching an agenda agreement could also depend in part on decisions by WTO chairs during this negotiation. Experience illustrates the potentials and possible pitfalls for them to avoid.