Amy H. Liu

Coalitions and Language Politics: Policy Shifts in Southeast Asia

Why is it that some governments recognize only one language while others espouse multilingualism? Related, why are some governments able to shift language policies, and if there is a shift, what explains the direction? In this article, the authors argue that these choices are the product of coalitional constraints facing the government during critical junctures in history. During times of political change in the state-building process, the effective threat of an alternate linguistic group determines the emergent language policy. If the threat is low, the government moves toward monolingual policies. As the threat increases, however, the government is forced to co-opt the alternate linguistic group by shifting the policy toward a greater degree of multilingualism. The authors test this argument by examining the language policies for government services and the education system in three Southeast Asian countries (Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand).

Nation-Building, Collective Identity, and Language Choices: Between Instrumental and Value Rationalities

The discussion of the place of language in politics has generally revolved around its relationship to nation-building and ethnic conflict. Yet, these are not always causally connected nor is language easily given up for the sake of a greater national or individual good. Attitudes regarding language can be influenced by anticolonialist resentments, memories of past injustice, status paranoia, xenophobia, collective megalomania, religion, ideology, and the desire on the part of a group to base its collective identity on a demarcation from a real or imagined enemy. This applies to many dimensions of language policies, including officialization, alphabetization, gentrification, and glossonym changes. We argue that governments choose language policies for strategic reasons. Whether it is to legitimize or subordinate a language or whether or not the policy is itself the objective, these choices may have unintended consequences.

Linguistic Recognition as a Source of Confidence in the Justice System

How does linguistic recognition in the courtroom affect popular confidence in the justice system among minorities? The authors argue (a) the recognition of either a minority language and/or a third-party’s language (lingua franca) during judicial proceedings increases confidence levels but (b) the use of a lingua franca is more effective. This is because minorities are more likely to favor an arrangement that levels the playing field by having everyone speak a lingua franca (relative fairness) than one that allows them to use their own language in a courtroom that is otherwise dominated by the majority language (absolute fairness). Using original data measuring the linguistic recognition in the judiciary, the authors find a significant and robust relationship between languages of the court and popular confidence in the justice system.

The Language of Economic Growth: A New Measure of Linguistic Heterogeneity

Conventional wisdom holds that languages, as ethnic markers, build communities with shared preferences and strong social networks. Consequently, ethnolinguistic homogeneity can facilitate growth. This article challenges this conception of language as a cultural marker. It argues that language is also a practical vehicle of communication; people can be multilingual, and second languages can be learned. Hence language boundaries are neither (1) congruent with ethnic boundaries nor (2) static. If true, the purported advantages of ethnolinguistic homogeneity should also be evident in countries with large populations of non-native speakers conversant in official languages. The study tests this hypothesis using an original cross-national and time-variant measure that captures both mother-tongue speakers and second-language learners. The empirical results are consistent with the understanding of language as an efficiency-enhancing instrument: countries with exogenously high levels of heterogeneity can avoid the ‘growth tragedy’ 1 by endogenously teaching the official language in schools.

Immigrant threat and national salience: Understanding the "English official" movement in the United States

The passage of (and debate over) immigration laws in Arizona highlights the increasing linguistic diversity of the US. To date, 31 states have passed an English-official bill. In this paper, we test several hypotheses concerning the adoption of such legislation across the states. Using data spanning the past three decades, we present event history models on the timing of adoption since the start of the modern movement in 1980. Like previous works, we find that the timing of adoption in states is structured by immigrant population and the initiative process. However, we find a conditional story that has been overlooked to date: the effects of immigrant threat only increase the likelihood of English-official legislation adoption when the issue of immigration is nationally salient.

Linguistic competition and education spending in Spain 1992–2008

Abstract Linguistic competition occurs when two or more linguistic groups vie against each other for resources from the same state. What are the effects of this competition on education spending? In this paper, we examine two competing explanations. On the one hand, there is the claim that increasing levels of ethno-linguistic diversity can decrease education spending. On the other hand, there is also the argument that education spending is higher when there is electoral competition. Using a newly assembled dataset of education spending at the subnational level for Spain (1992–2008), we test these two arguments. We find (1) while ethno-linguistic diversity matters for spending, the effect is not in the expected direction and (2) electoral competition can affect education spending. We also find that the type of education curriculum (monolingual versus bilingual) can moderate the effects of ethno-linguistic diversity. These results shed light on the commonly held belief that diversity stunts education spending.