Anand Jayprakash Vaidya

THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION OF LOGIC

In the philosophy of modality there are three positions concerning the relation between the set of metaphysically necessary truths and the set of logically necessary truths. Modal Monism (MM), states that the set of metaphysically necessary truths is identical to the set of logically necessary truths. (MM) has been advocated by Chalmers (1999). Modal Pluralism (MP), states that the set of metaphysically necessary truths is a proper subset of the set of logically necessary truths. (MP) has been advocated by Salmon (1989). Metaphysical Determinism (MD), states that the set of logically necessary truths is in part determined by metaphysical truths and necessities. (MD) has recently been gestured at by Lowe (1998), and Shalkowski (2004). In what follows, I want to offer an argument and some considerations in favor of the conclusion that logically necessity is in part determined by metaphysical truths and necessities. The argument below concerns what can be appealed to in judging or choosing which formalization of logic is correct.

Modal Knowledge: Beyond Rationalism and Empiricism

The terms ‘modal’ and ‘modality’ admit of two kinds of qualification. On the one hand, the terms can be qualified by being restricted to the alethic range or to the non-alethic range, such as in the cases of deontic modality and epistemic modality. On the other hand, within the range of alethic uses, the terms can be restricted to the logical, metaphysical, or physical domains. Where the restriction is on alethic metaphysical modality, the two central questions in the epistemology of modality are:The first question admits of four potential answers. It might be the case that we can and do possess knowledge of: (a) the possible, which is also actual; (b) the possible, which is non-actual; (c) the necessary and the impossible; and (d) the essential. A global skeptic argues that we don’t have modal knowledge of any of (a)–(d). A local skeptic only argues that we don’t have knowledge in some of (a)–(d). The second question, both historically and in the contemporary literature, admits of many different responses.

Philosophical methodology: The current debate

In this paper I investigate current issues in the methodology of philosophy. In particular, the epistemology of intuition and the status of empirical work on the use of intuition in philosophy.

The Nyāya Misplacement Theory of Illusion & the Metaphysical Problem of Perception

Tim Crane (The problem of perception. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2011 ed). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/perception-problem/, 2011) distinguishes between the metaphysical problem of perception and the epistemological problem of perception. The metaphysical problem can be articulated as a function of the joint inconsistency between several theses concerning the nature of perception, such as the openness to the world thesis and the transparency of experience thesis. Disjunctivism holds that veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences are distinct in some important way. Disjunctivism is often offered as a solution to the metaphysical problem of perception as well as a response to scepticism. In this comparative-philosophical-exploratory essay, I argue that on the basis of a specific reading of the Nyāya misplacement theory of illusion one can generate a specific kind of disjunctivism about perception, which I call causal disjunctivism. Causal disjunctivism is distinct from Duncan Pritchard’s epistemic disjunctivism, and John McDowell’s metaphysical disjunctivism. The core idea of causal disjunctivism is that the processes that bring about veridical perception are distinct from the process that bring about non-veridical perception at the level of causal generation. Second, on the basis of causal disjunctivism, I go on to show that it offers a plausible solution to the metaphysical problem of perception.

Nyāya Perceptual Theory: Disjunctivism or Anti-Individualism?

The thesis that error asymmetrically depends on truth is the thesis that veridicality and truth is conceptually prior to non-veridicality and error with respect to cognition and perception. Epistemic disjunctivism is the thesis that there is no common kind of experience between veridical and non-veridical states that is of robust explanatory value for the purposes of philosophical investigation into perception. In what follows the issue is explored whether Nyāya perceptual theory endorses epistemic disjunctivism or anti-individualism. It is explored against the background of examining Matthew Dasti’s (2012) argument for the view that Nyāya perceptual theory does anticipate contemporary epistemic disjunctivism on the basis of its endorsement of the parasitism of error on truth. In the present account, exploration of the issue is enhanced and better situated for further investigation by paying attention to the intricate debate between Tyler Burge and John McDowell on epistemic disjunctivism, perceptual antiindividualism, and the relevance of the vision sciences to the philosophy of perception. Following Dasti, the view is accepted that Nyāya perceptual theory endorses the idea that error is asymmetrically dependent on truth. However, the claim is drawn into question that they would genuinely accept McDowell’s form of epistemic disjunctivism. Instead, it is argued that Nyāya perceptual theory is amenable to Tyler Burge’s (2005) Perceptual Anti-individualism. The present investigation discusses the Nyāya Misplacement Theory of Illusion and closes with how this account could enhance contemporary research in epistemology and perceptual theory.

*Intuition* in Classical Indian Philosophy: Laying the Foundation for a Cross-Cultural Study

There are three main questions one can ask about *intuition*. The analytical—phenomenological question is: what is the correct conceptual analysis and phenomenological account of intuition? The empirical-cognitive question is: what is the correct process-wise robust account of *intuition* phenomenon? In this paper we provide an answer to a third question, the cross-cultural question concerning sufficiently similar, yet distinct, uses of *intuition* in classical Indian philosophy. Our aim is to compare these uses of *intuition* to some conceptions of *intuition* in Western philosophy. We conceive of our project here as an attempt to fill a gap in current research on *intuition*, which focuses predominantly on Western conceptions of rational intuition.