André Bank

The Ba‘athist blackout? Selective goods provision and political violence in the Syrian civil war

Many authoritarian regimes selectively provide critical segments of the population with privileged access to goods and services, expecting political support in return. This article is interested in the effects of this regime strategy: Is violent opposition less likely to occur in subnational regions bound to the ruling elite through such patron–client networks? For its empirical analysis, the article makes use of crowdsourcing data on the number and geospatial distribution of fatalities in the Syrian civil war from March 2011 to November 2012. In terms of selective goods provision, the focus is on the electricity sector. Satellite images of the earth at night are used to proxy spatial variations in the public distribution of electricity in times of power shortages. These data are complemented with information from the last Syrian population census of 2004. Estimations from fixed effect logit models lend support to the hypothesis that the risk of violence has been lower in subdistricts that have been favored by the ruling regime in terms of preferential access to material goods. This hypothesis is further corroborated with qualitative evidence from Syrian localities.

The ‘Ankara Moment’: the politics of Turkey’s regional power in the Middle East, 2007–11

Abstract Around 2007 Turkey became a regional power in the Middle East, a status it has maintained at least until the outset of the Arab Revolt in 2011. To understand why Turkey only became a regional power under the Muslim akp government and why this happened at the specific point in time that it did, this article highlights the self-reinforcing dynamics between Turkey’s domestic political-economic transformation in the first decade of this century and the advantageous regional developments in the Middle East at the same time. It holds that this specific linkage—the ‘Ankara Moment’—and its regional resonance in the neighbouring Middle East carries more transformative potential than the ‘Washington Consensus’ or the ‘Beijing Consensus’ so prominently discussed in current global South politics.

Durable, Yet Different: Monarchies in the Arab Spring

Abstract Over three years into the Arab Spring, the Middle East is characterized by a striking difference in durability between monarchies and republics. Beyond this difference, some significant gaps within the group of the eight Middle East monarchies have so far been overlooked. Drawing on the existing monarchy research, we first make the case that there were three distinct types of durable monarchies prior to the Arab Spring. Confronted with social and political crises, each type reacted differently to the challenges presented to them after 2011. While five “rentier” and “dynastic” Gulf monarchies (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (United Arab Emirates)) mainly rely on material distribution and family rule, the non-oil “linchpins” of Jordan and Morocco, attracting additional external funds, undertook constitutional changes in an attempt at procedural legitimation. The Sultanate of Oman, however, falls in between. This “linchtier” monarchy used modest material cooptation, a selected personal reshuffling at the top of the regime as well as targeted institutional adaptations. We illustrate our findings with similarly structured brief case studies of the three prototypes of Qatar, Jordan and Oman.

The Political Economy of Regional Power: Turkey under the AKP

In 2006/2007 Turkey became a regional power in the Middle East, a status it has continued to maintain in the context of the Arab Spring. To understand why Turkey only became a regional power under the Muslim AKP government and why this happened at the specific point in time that it did, the paper highlights the self-reinforcing dynamics between Turkey’s domestic political-economic transformation in the first decade of this century and the advantageous regional developments in the Middle East at the same time. It concludes that this specific linkage – the “Ankara Moment” – and its regional resonance in the neighboring Middle East carries more transformative potential than the “Washington Consensus” or the “Beijing Consensus” so prominently discussed in current Global South politics.

The study of authoritarian diffusion and cooperation: comparative lessons on interests versus ideology, nowadays and in history

ABSTRACT This article outlines and discusses the central comparative findings on the role of interest versus ideology in the study of authoritarian diffusion and cooperation. It highlights the primacy of pragmatic interests in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, a finding that holds in diverse cases in Eastern Central Europe, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Of particular importance here are negative findings that reflect the absence of ideological appeal. At the same time, the primacy of interest-based accounts needs to be qualified, both today (Bolivarianism in Latin America) and especially considering a longer historical perspective. As the experiences of fascism and communism suggest, there used to be autocracies with missionary ideologies that inspired emulation in a wide range of countries. Against this background, the article advocates a “moving back” to history to better account for the context-bound nature of authoritarian diffusion and cooperation. It also calls for a “moving down” the ladder of abstraction to study the more concrete mechanisms in which authoritarian diffusion and cooperation unfold.

The Political Dynamics of Human Mobility: Migration out of, as and into Violence

Simplistic correlations between human mobility and political violence are on the rise in the European discourse on immigration, especially – but not only – in populist rhetoric. This not only lacks an empirical foundation, but also leads to simplistic solutions for a major political and humanitarian challenge of our time. However, we still lack comprehensive knowledge on the migration-violence nexus. By bringing insights from migration studies and peace and conflict studies into fruitful dialogue, this contribution aims to fill this gap. It first maps some of the central questions regarding the migration-violence nexus. Second, and on this basis, it proposes an analytical framework for future research which encompasses the interdependence of violence-migration dynamics on and between the macro, meso and micro levels by examining human mobility as: (1) a movement out of (physical and structural) violence; (2) a violent process in and of itself; (3) a path into (physical and structural) violence; and (4) it formulates some recommendations that can provide a more holistic basis for policy programmes regarding human mobility.

Die politische Ökonomie regionaler Macht. Die Türkei unter der AKP

Im letzten Jahrzehnt konnte die Turkei zu einer neuen Regionalmacht im Nahen Osten aufsteigen. Wahrend dieser Prozess bislang hauptsachlich auf die neue wirtschaftspolitische Ausrichtung unter Ministerprasident Recep Tayyip Erdogan und die ideelle Einbettung des Ausenministers Ahmet Davutoglu zuruckgefuhrt wird, verweist dieser Beitrag auf sich verstarkende Wechselwirkungen zwischen innen- und regionalpolitischen Faktoren und Konfliktstrukturen. Die Turkei wirkte in den letzten Jahren als besondere Regionalmacht, da sie wichtige Vermittlerpositionen im regionalen Kraftefeld einnahm und weil die Regierung die externen, ideell aufgeladenen Zuschreibungen innenpolitisch als Machtressource im Wettstreit mit dem kemalistischen Militar nutzen konnte. Mit den arabischen Umbruchen ab 2011 stehen turkische Eliten nun vor der fur sie neuen Herausforderung, diese Macht in einem veranderten regionalen Umfeld anzuwenden.

Before the Arab Revolts and After: Turkey’s Transformed Regional Power Status in the Middle East

At the outset of the Arab revolts in late 2010 and early 2011, Turkey seemed to be the most likely contender for regional leadership in the Middle East. The signs for this development were all too obvious at the time: Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) were hailed as having, at last, successfully reconciled Muslim-conservative values, political liberalism, and economic developmentalism, as Erdogan held mass rallies in post-uprising Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia in September 2011. The fact that Turkey could accomplish all that while, at the same time, being able to follow its own interests independently and not being bound by extra-regional superpowers—at least less so than other relevant regional players, such as Israel or Saudi Arabia—contributed even more to Turkey’s positive image in Arab societies. While some splits in the self-assigned “zero problems” framework of then foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu became visible after the uprisings, Turkey still maneuvered quite effectively between new Arab societal aspirations and its own material interests (cf. Bank 2011; Onis 2012; Tugal 2012). However, in 2014, Turkey does not look as promising a regional power as it did three years ago. The AKP’s assertiveness in actively promoting a regime change in Syria could no longer be resolved with the aim to maintain good relations with Iran, the then Maliki government in Iraq, and with its crucial energy partner Russia.

Die syrische Revolte

Der syrische Aufstand als Teil der regionalen, arabischen Revolte begann im Marz 2011. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt waren die Prasidenten in Tunesien und Agypten bereits gesturzt, der Aufstand in Bahrain gewaltsam niedergeschlagen und die NATO-Intervention in Libyen angelaufen.