Andreas Kalckert

Moving a rubber hand that feels like your own: a dissociation of ownership and agency

During voluntary hand movement, we sense that we generate the movement and that the hand is a part of our body. These feelings of control over bodily actions, or the sense of agency, and the ownership of body parts are two fundamental aspects of the way we consciously experience our bodies. However, little is known about how these processes are functionally linked. Here, we introduce a version of the rubber hand illusion in which participants control the movements of the index finger of a model hand, which is in full view, by moving their own right index finger. We demonstrated that voluntary finger movements elicit a robust illusion of owning the rubber hand and that the senses of ownership and agency over the model hand can be dissociated. We systematically varied the relative timing of the finger movements (synchronous versus asynchronous), the mode of movement (active versus passive), and the position of the model hand (anatomically congruent versus incongruent positions). Importantly, asynchrony eliminated both ownership and agency, passive movements abolished the sense of agency but left ownership intact, and incongruent positioning of the model hand diminished ownership but did not eliminate agency. These findings provide evidence for a double dissociation of ownership and agency, suggesting that they represent distinct cognitive processes. Interestingly, we also noted that the sense of agency was stronger when the hand was perceived to be a part of the body, and only in this condition did we observe a significant correlation between the subjects’ ratings of agency and ownership. We discuss this in the context of possible differences between agency over owned body parts and agency over actions that involve interactions with external objects. In summary, the results obtained in this study using a simple moving rubber hand illusion paradigm extend previous findings on the experience of ownership and agency and shed new light on their relationship.

The moving rubber hand illusion revisited: Comparing movements and visuotactile stimulation to induce illusory ownership

The rubber hand illusion is a perceptual illusion in which a model hand is experienced as part of ones own body. In the present study we directly compared the classical illusion, based on visuotactile stimulation, with a rubber hand illusion based on active and passive movements. We examined the question of which combinations of sensory and motor cues are the most potent in inducing the illusion by subjective ratings and an objective measure (proprioceptive drift). In particular, we were interested in whether the combination of afferent and efferent signals in active movements results in the same illusion as in the purely passive modes. Our results show that the illusion is equally strong in all three cases. This demonstrates that different combinations of sensory input can lead to a very similar phenomenological experience and indicates that the illusion can be induced by any combination of multisensory information.

The spatial distance rule in the moving and classical rubber hand illusions

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is a perceptual illusion in which participants perceive a model hand as part of their own body. Here, through the use of one questionnaire experiment and two proprioceptive drift experiments, we investigated the effect of distance (12, 27.5, and 43cm) in the vertical plane on both the moving and classical RHI. In both versions of the illusion, we found an effect of distance on ownership of the rubber hand for both measures tested. Our results further suggested that the moving RHI might follow a narrower spatial rule. Finally, whereas ownership of the moving rubber hand was affected by distance, this was not the case for agency, which was present at all distances tested. In sum, the present results generalize the spatial distance rule in terms of ownership to the vertical plane of space and demonstrate that also the moving RHI obeys this rule.

Priming letters by colors: Evidence for the bidirectionality of grapheme-color synesthesia

In synesthesia, stimulation of one sensory modality leads to a percept in another nonstimulated modality, for example, graphemes trigger an additional color percept in grapheme–color synesthesia, which encompasses the variants letter–color and digit–color synesthesia. Until recently, it was assumed that synesthesia occurs strictly unidirectional: Although the perception of a letter induces a color percept in letter–color synesthetes, they typically do not report that colors trigger the percept of a letter. Recent data on number processing in synesthesia suggest, however, that colors can implicitly elicit numerical representations in digit–color synesthetes, thereby questioning unidirectional models of synesthesia. Using a word fragment completion paradigm in 10 letter–color synesthetes, we show here for the first time that colors can implicitly influence lexical search. Our data provide strong support for a bidirectional nature of grapheme–color synesthesia and, in general, may allude to the mechanisms of cross-modality interactions in the human brain.

Neural correlates of the rubber hand illusion in amputees: a report of two cases.

One of the current challenges in the field of advanced prosthetics is the development of artificial limbs that provide the user with detailed sensory feedback. Sensory feedback from our limbs is not only important for proprioceptive awareness and motor control, but also essential for providing us with a feeling of ownership or simply put, the sensation that our limbs actually belong to ourselves. The strong link between sensory feedback and ownership has been repeatedly demonstrated with the so-called rubber hand illusion (RHI), during which individuals are induced with the illusory sensation that an artificial hand is their own. In healthy participants, this occurs via integration of visual and tactile signals, which is primarily supported by multisensory regions in premotor and intraparietal cortices. Here, we describe a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study with two upper limb amputees, showing for the first time that the same brain regions underlie ownership sensations of an artificial hand in this population. Albeit preliminary, these findings are interesting from both a theoretical as well as a clinical point of view. From a theoretical perspective, they imply that even years after the amputation, a few seconds of synchronous visuotactile stimulation are sufficient to activate hand-centered multisensory integration mechanisms. From a clinical perspective, they show that a very basic sensation of touch from an artificial hand can be obtained by simple but precisely targeted stimulation of the stump, and suggest that a similar mechanism implemented in prosthetic hands would greatly facilitate ownership sensations and in turn, acceptance of the prosthesis.

The onset time of the ownership sensation in the moving rubber hand illusion

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is a perceptual illusion whereby a model hand is perceived as part of one’s own body. This illusion has been extensively studied, but little is known about the temporal evolution of this perceptual phenomenon, i.e., how long it takes until participants start to experience ownership over the model hand. In the present study, we investigated a version of the rubber hand experiment based on finger movements and measured the average onset time in active and passive movement conditions. This comparison enabled us to further explore the possible role of intentions and motor control processes that are only present in the active movement condition. The results from a large group of healthy participants (n = 117) showed that the illusion of ownership took approximately 23 s to emerge (active: 22.8; passive: 23.2). The 90th percentile occurs in both conditions within approximately 50 s (active: 50; passive: 50.6); therefore, most participants experience the illusion within the first minute. We found indirect evidence of a facilitatory effect of active movements compared to passive movements, and we discuss these results in the context of our current understanding of the processes underlying the moving RHI.

When Passive Feels Active - Delusion-Proneness Alters Self-Recognition in the Moving Rubber Hand Illusion

Psychotic patients have problems with bodily self-recognition such as the experience of self-produced actions (sense of agency) and the perception of the body as their own (sense of ownership). While it has been shown that such impairments in psychotic patients can be explained by hypersalient processing of external sensory input it has also been suggested that they lack normal efference copy in voluntary action. However, it is not known how problems with motor predictions like efference copy contribute to impaired sense of agency and ownership in psychosis or psychosis-related states. We used a rubber hand illusion based on finger movements and measured sense of agency and ownership to compute a bodily self-recognition score in delusion-proneness (indexed by Peters’ Delusion Inventory - PDI). A group of healthy subjects (n=71) experienced active movements (involving motor predictions) or passive movements (lacking motor predictions). We observed a highly significant correlation between delusion-proneness and self-recognition in the passive conditions, while no such effect was observed in the active conditions. This was seen for both ownership and agency scores. The result suggests that delusion-proneness is associated with hypersalient external input in passive conditions, resulting in an abnormal experience of the illusion. We hypothesize that this effect is not present in the active condition because deficient motor predictions counteract hypersalience in psychosis proneness.

Commentary: Embodying Others in Immersive Virtual Reality: Electro-Cortical Signatures of Monitoring the Errors in the Actions of an Avatar Seen from a First-Person Perspective

Imagine a situation where you are uncertain if you see yourself, for example on a shady screen recording. In this situation many people do instinctively the same: e.g., they wave their hands, and see if that other hand moves the same way. However when you look down yourself instead of the screen, you simply sense it is your body. The body you feel and the body you see naturally coincide and gives you a sense that this body right there is yours. It has been suggested that this sense of voluntarily control (Sense of agency) and the sense that the body I experience is my own (Sense of ownership) are important contributors to the experience of the self (Gallagher, 2000). Only in rare occasions we feel the need the check if that body is really me. In those rare moments though the recognition of an action error, a discrepancy between the intended action and the feedback is an important process in determining whether that what you see is you or not.

A body illusion by movements or by touch: Comparing different ways of inducing the rubber hand illusion

The rubber hand illusion is a bodily illusion where a model hand is experienced as part of the own body. The classical version of this illusion is based on synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation applied to the model in view and the person’s real real hand, which is hidden from view. However it has been also shown that the illusion can be induced by passive or active finger movements, without any tactile stimulation by an external object. In the present study participants experience active movements, passive movements and visuo-tactile stimulation of a model hand. Although these situations represent different combinations of sensory information, they all create a sense of ownership towards the model hand. This raises the question which of these combinations is most potent in eliciting the illusion. In particular one may ask if the combination of afferent and efferent signals in active movements would result in the same experience as passive visuo-tactile stimulation. We present data from subjective and objective measures of the illusion and show here that the illusion seems to be similar, regardless if it is induced by synchronized visuo-tactile stroking, active finger movements or passive finger movements. These observations show that different combinations of sensory input can all lead to a very similar phenomenological experience and exemplify again that the illusion can be induced by any combination of multisensory information, and not by a specific combination alone.