H. Henrik Ehrsson

The Experimental Induction of Out-of-Body Experiences

I report an illusion in which individuals experience that they are located outside their physical bodies and looking at their bodies from this perspective. This demonstrates that the experience of being localized within the physical body can be determined by the visual perspective in conjunction with correlated multisensory information from the body.

Touching a Rubber Hand: Feeling of Body Ownership Is Associated with Activity in Multisensory Brain Areas

In the “rubber-hand illusion,” the sight of brushing of a rubber hand at the same time as brushing of the persons own hidden hand is sufficient to produce a feeling of ownership of the fake hand. We shown previously that this illusion is associated with activity in the multisensory areas, most notably the ventral premotor cortex (Ehrsson et al., 2004). However, it remains to be demonstrated that this illusion does not simply reflect the dominant role of vision and that the premotor activity does not reflect a visual representation of an object near the hand. To address these issues, we introduce a somatic rubber-hand illusion. The experimenter moved the blindfolded participants left index finger so that it touched the fake hand, and simultaneously, he touched the participants real right hand, synchronizing the touches as perfectly as possible. After ∼9.7 s, this stimulation elicited an illusion that one was touching ones own hand. We scanned brain activity during this illusion and two control conditions, using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Activity in the ventral premotor cortices, intraparietal cortices, and the cerebellum was associated with the illusion of touching ones own hand. Furthermore, the rated strength of the illusion correlated with the degree of premotor and cerebellar activity. This finding suggests that the activity in these areas reflects the detection of congruent multisensory signals from ones own body, rather than of visual representations. We propose that this could be the mechanism for the feeling of body ownership.

Threatening a rubber hand that you feel is yours elicits a cortical anxiety response

The feeling of body ownership is a fundamental aspect of self-consciousness. The underlying neural mechanisms can be studied by using the illusion where a person is made to feel that a rubber hand is his or her own hand by brushing the persons hidden real hand and synchronously brushing the artificial hand that is in full view. Here we show that threat to the rubber hand can induce a similar level of activity in the brain areas associated with anxiety and interoceptive awareness (insula and anterior cingulate cortex) as when the persons real hand is threatened. We further show that the stronger the feeling of ownership of the artificial hand, the stronger the threat-evoked neuronal responses in the areas reflecting anxiety. Furthermore, across subjects, activity in multisensory areas reflecting ownership predicted the activity in the interoceptive system when the hand was under threat. Finally, we show that there is activity in medial wall motor areas, reflecting an urge to withdraw the artificial hand when it is under threat. These findings suggest that artificial limbs can evoke the same feelings as real limbs and provide objective neurophysiological evidence that the rubber hand is fully incorporated into the body. These findings are of fundamental importance because they suggest that the feeling of body ownership is associated with changes in the interoceptive systems.

Towards a digital body: the virtual arm illusion

The integration of the human brain with computers is an interesting new area of applied neuroscience, where one application is replacement of a persons real body by a virtual representation. Here we demonstrate that a virtual limb can be made to feel part of your body if appropriate multisensory correlations are provided. We report an illusion that is invoked through tactile stimulation on a persons hidden real right hand with synchronous virtual visual stimulation on an aligned 3D stereo virtual arm projecting horizontally out of their shoulder. An experiment with 21 male participants showed displacement of ownership towards the virtual hand, as illustrated by questionnaire responses and proprioceptive drift. A control experiment with asynchronous tapping was carried out with a different set of 20 male participants who did not experience the illusion. After 5u2009min of stimulation the virtual arm rotated. Evidence suggests that the extent of the illusion was also correlated with the degree of muscle activity onset in the right arm as measured by EMG during this period that the arm was rotating, for the synchronous but not the asynchronous condition. A completely virtual object can therefore be experienced as part of ones self, which opens up the possibility that an entire virtual body could be felt as ones own in future virtual reality applications or online games, and be an invaluable tool for the understanding of the brain mechanisms underlying body ownership.

Moving a rubber hand that feels like your own: a dissociation of ownership and agency

During voluntary hand movement, we sense that we generate the movement and that the hand is a part of our body. These feelings of control over bodily actions, or the sense of agency, and the ownership of body parts are two fundamental aspects of the way we consciously experience our bodies. However, little is known about how these processes are functionally linked. Here, we introduce a version of the rubber hand illusion in which participants control the movements of the index finger of a model hand, which is in full view, by moving their own right index finger. We demonstrated that voluntary finger movements elicit a robust illusion of owning the rubber hand and that the senses of ownership and agency over the model hand can be dissociated. We systematically varied the relative timing of the finger movements (synchronous versus asynchronous), the mode of movement (active versus passive), and the position of the model hand (anatomically congruent versus incongruent positions). Importantly, asynchrony eliminated both ownership and agency, passive movements abolished the sense of agency but left ownership intact, and incongruent positioning of the model hand diminished ownership but did not eliminate agency. These findings provide evidence for a double dissociation of ownership and agency, suggesting that they represent distinct cognitive processes. Interestingly, we also noted that the sense of agency was stronger when the hand was perceived to be a part of the body, and only in this condition did we observe a significant correlation between the subjects’ ratings of agency and ownership. We discuss this in the context of possible differences between agency over owned body parts and agency over actions that involve interactions with external objects. In summary, the results obtained in this study using a simple moving rubber hand illusion paradigm extend previous findings on the experience of ownership and agency and shed new light on their relationship.

Upper limb amputees can be induced to experience a rubber hand as their own.

We describe how upper limb amputees can be made to experience a rubber hand as part of their own body. This was accomplished by applying synchronous touches to the stump, which was out of view, and to the index finger of a rubber hand, placed in full view (26 cm medial to the stump). This elicited an illusion of sensing touch on the artificial hand, rather than on the stump and a feeling of ownership of the rubber hand developed. This effect was supported by quantitative subjective reports in the form of questionnaires, behavioural data in the form of misreaching in a pointing task when asked to localize the position of the touch, and physiological evidence obtained by skin conductance responses when threatening the hand prosthesis. Our findings outline a simple method for transferring tactile sensations from the stump to a prosthetic limb by tricking the brain, thereby making an important contribution to the field of neuroprosthetics where a major goal is to develop artificial limbs that feel like a real parts of the body.

Listening to rhythms activates motor and premotor cortices

We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to identify brain areas involved in auditory rhythm perception. Participants listened to three rhythm sequences that varied in temporal predictability. The most predictable sequence was an isochronous rhythm sequence of a single interval (ISO). The other two sequences had nine intervals with unequal durations. One of these had interval durations of integer ratios relative to the shortest interval (METRIC). The other had interval durations of non-integer ratios relative to the shortest interval (NON-METRIC), and was thus perceptually more complex than the other two. In addition, we presented unpredictable sequences with randomly distributed intervals (RAN). We tested two hypotheses. Firstly, that areas involved in motor timing control would also process the temporal predictability of sensory cues. Therefore, there was no active task included in the experiment that could influence the participant perception or induce motor preparation. We found that dorsal premotor cortex (PMD), SMA, preSMA, and lateral cerebellum were more active when participants listen to rhythm sequences compared to random sequences. The activity pattern in supplementary motor area (SMA) and preSMA suggested a modulation dependent on sequence predictability, strongly suggesting a role in temporal sensory prediction. Secondly, we hypothesized that the more complex the rhythm sequence, the more it would engage short-term memory processes of the prefrontal cortex. We found that the superior prefrontal cortex was more active when listening to METRIC and NON-METRIC compared to ISO. We argue that the complexity of rhythm sequences is an important factor in modulating activity in many of the rhythm areas. However, the difference in complexity of our stimuli should be regarded as continuous.

Bodily Illusions Modulate Tactile Perception

Touch differs from other exteroceptive senses in that the body itself forms part of the tactile percept. Interactions between proprioception and touch provide a powerful way to investigate the implicit body representation underlying touch. Here, we demonstrate that an intrinsic primary quality of a tactile object, for example its size, is directly affected by the perceived size of the body part touching it. We elicited proprioceptive illusions that the left index finger was either elongating or shrinking by vibrating the biceps or triceps tendon of the right arm while subjects grasped the tip of their left index finger. Subjects estimated the distance between two simultaneous tactile contacts on the left finger during tendon vibration. We found that tactile distances feel bigger when the touched body part feels elongated. Control tests showed that the modulation of touch was linked to the perceived index-finger size induced by tendon vibration. Vibrations that did not produce proprioceptive illusion had no effect on touch. Our results show that the perception of tactile objects is referenced to an implicit body representation and that proprioception contributes to this body representation. We also provide, for the first time, a quantitative, implicit measure of distortions of body size.

The moving rubber hand illusion revisited: Comparing movements and visuotactile stimulation to induce illusory ownership

The rubber hand illusion is a perceptual illusion in which a model hand is experienced as part of ones own body. In the present study we directly compared the classical illusion, based on visuotactile stimulation, with a rubber hand illusion based on active and passive movements. We examined the question of which combinations of sensory and motor cues are the most potent in inducing the illusion by subjective ratings and an objective measure (proprioceptive drift). In particular, we were interested in whether the combination of afferent and efferent signals in active movements results in the same illusion as in the purely passive modes. Our results show that the illusion is equally strong in all three cases. This demonstrates that different combinations of sensory input can lead to a very similar phenomenological experience and indicates that the illusion can be induced by any combination of multisensory information.