Andreas Mattig

Bank Market Structures and Performance Around the World

This paper revisits the old discussion of the applicability of structure-conduct-performance models to the banking industry. In contrast to earlier (single) country studies, we aimed at providing an overview of how it would look like, if the model indeed would be applied over time and across a non-biased selection of a multi-country study. By analyzing 105 countries, we find – in line with parts of the earlier theoretical literature – a large variance, in terms of countries in which the model actually seems to work. This leads us into looking for actual reasons that determine the applicability of the structure-conduct-performance concept and the institutional and legal environment that allow increased profitability through collusion. We find drivers for this applicability more based on the macro level than on the bank-specific level.

Transformation der Wertschöpfung

Veranderte Rahmenbedingungen in der Finanzdienstleistungsbranche zwingen die Marktteilnehmer zum Uberdenken ihrer Wertschopfungs- und Geschaftsmodelle. Neben Uberlegungen zur Funktionalitat gewinnen im Rahmen der strategischen Steuerung der Finanzinstitution vor allem Flexibilitatsaspekte an Bedeutung. Die Schaffung und Nutzung strategischer oder operativer Realoptionen setzt die Flexibilisierung von Geschaftsmodell und Geschaftsarchitektur voraus. Sowohl aus betriebswirtschaftlicher wie aus technologischer Sicht wird dabei seit einigen Jahren verstarkt uber sogenannte offene Architekturen nachgedacht.

Financial Crises and Regulatory Response

This paper focuses on the nature and intensity of regulatory responses to crises. It highlights the role of mediation played by capital markets and banks in transmitting the action to economic and the time effect this intermediation activity as on the final outcome. In this context, we argue that actions undertaken both by regulatory authorities in order to encounter a financial crisis are subject to lag-structures which in turn are (negatively) correlated with the intensity level of undertaken actions. Intensity of regulatory activity in turn is a function of actions undertaken by regulatory authorities in order to encounter a crisis. We show that a higher degree of intensity with regard to regulatory responses is not always positively correlated with better economic conditions. On the basis of 38 different crises (1990-2003) we find empirical prove that different intensity levels of crisis-response strategies indeed lead to different economic scenarios also impacting lag structures of economic variables in the wave of a crisis. However, response strategies seem additionally to display some learning effects within a country that has already suffered a crisis recently, leading to the then applied measures being the minimum from which response strategies are gradually escalated. Our main contribution stresses that the response in times of crisis is not only more intense, but interestingly (and somewhat contra dictionary to the increased intensity) requires longer lime lags to become effective. Liquidity arguments and velocity of the monetary transmission system thereby do not seem to be the crucial elements that mitigate these effects. Second round effects and disruptions in the financial intermediation system rather than at central bank level might thus need to be given additional attention in future research.

From Wall Street to Main Street – A European perspective

Starting in 2007 financial markets experienced a time of serious crisis that spread from the United States housing market and affected banks worldwide. In this article, we analyze the spreading of the crisis from Wall Street to Main Street in the specific context of the different European Markets and based on reactions of deposit holders. We show how elements of crisis affect Main Street and discuss the policy moderation of that transmission. This allows to collect evidence for the implication of the described moderation in an integrated financial market and the role of deposit insurances in financial turmoil.