Andrei Cimpian

Expectations of brilliance underlie gender distributions across academic disciplines

Womens participation and attitudes to talent Some scientific disciplines have lower percentages of women in academia than others. Leslie et al. hypothesized that general attitudes about the discipline would reflect the representation of women in those fields (see the Perspective by Penner). Surveys revealed that some fields are believed to require attributes such as brilliance and genius, whereas other fields are believed to require more empathy or hard work. In fields where people thought that raw talent was required, academic departments had lower percentages of women. Science, this issue p. 262; see also p. 234 General opinions about talent versus effort hold sway over representation of women in academic departments. [Also see Perspective by Penner] The gender imbalance in STEM subjects dominates current debates about women’s underrepresentation in academia. However, women are well represented at the Ph.D. level in some sciences and poorly represented in some humanities (e.g., in 2011, 54% of U.S. Ph.D.’s in molecular biology were women versus only 31% in philosophy). We hypothesize that, across the academic spectrum, women are underrepresented in fields whose practitioners believe that raw, innate talent is the main requirement for success, because women are stereotyped as not possessing such talent. This hypothesis extends to African Americans’ underrepresentation as well, as this group is subject to similar stereotypes. Results from a nationwide survey of academics support our hypothesis (termed the field-specific ability beliefs hypothesis) over three competing hypotheses.

Subtle Linguistic Cues Affect Children's Motivation

Are preschoolers’ reactions to setbacks influenced by whether their successes are rewarded with generic or nongeneric praise? Previous research has focused on the role of category-referring generics (e.g., ‘‘Dogs are friendly’’) in shaping children’s knowledge about natural kinds (see Gelman, 2004). Generic sentences can, however, refer to individuals as well as categories. For example, ‘‘John is friendly’’ is generic because it reports a general regularity—albeit about a single person—rather than a particular fact or episode (Carlson & Pelletier, 1995). In contrast, the nongeneric ‘‘John was friendly at the party’’ refers to a specific past event. Generic sentences about an individual imply that the particular behavior commented on (e.g., John smiling warmly) stems from a stable trait (e.g., friendliness) or skill (see Gelman & Heyman, 1999). Are children sensitive to this subtle connotation with respect to their own behavior? If so, then generic praise may lead children to think in trait terms, such that later mistakes could signal a negative trait or low ability and therefore undermine motivation (Dweck, 1999, 2006). Preliminary support for this claim comes from a study by Kamins and Dweck (1999). Praising the whole person (e.g., ‘‘You are a good boy/girl’’) after success on a task fostered helpless responses to subsequent mistakes more than praising the process through which success was achieved (e.g., ‘‘You found a good way to do it’’). We suggest that children’s behavior was in part driven by the fact that the person praise was generic, connoting a stable trait of the child, while the process praise was nongeneric, focusing on one specific episode. Would manipulating only the genericness of the praise result in similar patterns of coping? For example, would children’s motivation be affected differently by ‘‘You are a good drawer’’ (generic) than by ‘‘You did a good job drawing’’ (nongeneric)? Note that these sentences are much more similar than the person-process pairs used by Kamins and Dweck—so similar, in fact, that adults may not be aware of their contrasting implications and are thus likely to use them interchangeably in interactions with children. Demonstrating that children praised in these two ways react differently to a challenge would be evidence for the importance of the generic/nongeneric distinction in shaping young children’s conceptions of their abilities.

The inherence heuristic: An intuitive means of making sense of the world, and a potential precursor to psychological essentialism

We propose that human reasoning relies on an inherence heuristic, an implicit cognitive process that leads people to explain observed patterns (e.g., girls wear pink) predominantly in terms of the inherent features of their constituents (e.g., pink is a delicate color). We then demonstrate how this proposed heuristic can provide a unified account for a broad set of findings spanning areas of research that might at first appear unrelated (e.g., system justification, nominal realism, is-ought errors in moral reasoning). By revealing the deep commonalities among the diverse phenomena that fall under its scope, our account is able to generate new insights into these phenomena, as well as new empirical predictions. A second main goal of this article, aside from introducing the inherence heuristic, is to articulate the proposal that the heuristic serves as a foundation for the development of psychological essentialism. More specifically, we propose that essentialism - which is the common belief that natural and social categories are underlain by hidden, causally powerful essences - emerges over the first few years of life as an elaboration of the earlier, and more open-ended, intuitions supplied by the inherence heuristic. In the final part of the report, we distinguish our proposal from competing accounts (e.g., Strevenss K-laws) and clarify the relationship between the inherence heuristic and related cognitive tendencies (e.g., the correspondence bias). In sum, this article illuminates a basic cognitive process that emerges early in life and is likely to have profound effects on many aspects of human psychology.

Gender stereotypes about intellectual ability emerge early and influence children’s interests

Emergent attitudes toward brilliance The distribution of women and men across academic disciplines seems to be affected by perceptions of intellectual brilliance. Bian et al. studied young children to assess when those differential perceptions emerge. At age 5, children seemed not to differentiate between boys and girls in expectations of “really, really smart”—childhoods version of adult brilliance. But by age 6, girls were prepared to lump more boys into the “really, really smart” category and to steer themselves away from games intended for the “really, really smart.” Science, this issue p. 389 By age 6, girls become less likely to associate brilliance with their own gender and tend to avoid intellectually challenging activities. Common stereotypes associate high-level intellectual ability (brilliance, genius, etc.) with men more than women. These stereotypes discourage women’s pursuit of many prestigious careers; that is, women are underrepresented in fields whose members cherish brilliance (such as physics and philosophy). Here we show that these stereotypes are endorsed by, and influence the interests of, children as young as 6. Specifically, 6-year-old girls are less likely than boys to believe that members of their gender are “really, really smart.” Also at age 6, girls begin to avoid activities said to be for children who are “really, really smart.” These findings suggest that gendered notions of brilliance are acquired early and have an immediate effect on children’s interests.

The absence of a shape bias in children's word learning

There is debate about whether preschool-age children interpret words as referring to kinds or to classes defined by shape similarity. The authors argue that the shape bias reported in previous studies is a task-induced artifact rather than a genuine word-learning strategy. In particular, children were forced to extend an objects novel label to one of several stand-alone, simple-shaped items, including a same-shape option from a different category and a different-shape option from the same superordinate category. Across 6 experiments, the authors found that the shape bias was eliminated (a) when the objects were more complex, (b) when they were presented in context, or (c) when children were no longer forced to choose. Moreover, children preferred the different-shape category alternatives when these were part of the same basic-level category as the target. The present experiments suggest that children seek out objects of the same kind when presented with a novel label, even if they are sometimes unable to identify the relevant kinds on their own.

The Impact of Generic Language About Ability on Children's Achievement Motivation

Nuances in how adults talk about ability may have important consequences for childrens sustained involvement and success in an activity. In this study, I tested the hypothesis that children would be less motivated while performing a novel activity if they were told that boys or girls in general are good at this activity (generic language) than if they were told that a particular boy or girl is good at it (non-generic language). Generic language may be detrimental because it expresses normative societal expectations regarding performance. If these expectations are negative, they may cause children to worry about confirming them; if positive, they may cause worries about failing to meet them. Moreover, generic statements may be threatening because they imply that performance is the result of stable traits rather than effort. Ninety-seven 4- to 7-year-olds were asked to play a game in which they succeeded at first but then made a few mistakes. Since young children remain optimistic in achievement situations until the possibility of failure is made clear, I hypothesized that 4- and 5-year-olds would not be affected by the implications of generic language until after they made mistakes; 6- and 7-year-olds, however, may be susceptible earlier. As expected, the older children who heard that boys or girls are good at this game displayed lower motivation (e.g., more negative emotions, lower perceived competence) from the start, while they were still succeeding and receiving praise. Four- and 5-year-olds who heard these generic statements had a similar reaction, but only after they made mistakes. These findings demonstrate that exposure to generic language about ability can be an obstacle to childrens motivation and, potentially, their success.

Women are underrepresented in fields where success is believed to require brilliance

Women’s underrepresentation in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields is a prominent concern in our society and many others. Closer inspection of this phenomenon reveals a more nuanced picture, however, with women achieving parity with men at the Ph.D. level in certain STEM fields, while also being underrepresented in some non-STEM fields. It is important to consider and provide an account of this field-by-field variability. The field-specific ability beliefs (FAB) hypothesis aims to provide such an account, proposing that women are likely to be underrepresented in fields thought to require raw intellectual talent—a sort of talent that women are stereotyped to possess less of than men. In two studies, we provide evidence for the FAB hypothesis, demonstrating that the academic fields believed by laypeople to require brilliance are also the fields with lower female representation. We also found that the FABs of participants with college-level exposure to a field were more predictive of its female representation than those of participants without college exposure, presumably because the former beliefs mirror more closely those of the field’s practitioners (the direct “gatekeepers”). Moreover, the FABs of participants with college exposure to a field predicted the magnitude of the field’s gender gap above and beyond their beliefs about the level of mathematical and verbal skills required. Finally, we found that beliefs about the importance of brilliance to success in a field may predict its female representation in part by fostering the impression that the field demands solitary work and competition with others. These results suggest new solutions for enhancing diversity within STEM and across the academic spectrum.

Who Is Good at This Game? Linking an Activity to a Social Category Undermines Children’s Achievement

Children’s achievement-related theories have a profound impact on their academic success. Children who adopt entity theories believe that their ability to perform a task is dictated by the amount of natural talent they possess for that task—a belief that has well-documented adverse consequences for their achievement (e.g., lowered persistence, impaired performance). It is thus important to understand what leads children to adopt entity theories. In the experiments reported here, we hypothesized that the mere act of linking success at an unfamiliar, challenging activity to a social group gives rise to entity beliefs that are so powerful as to interfere with children’s ability to perform the activity. Two experiments showed that, as predicted, the performance of 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 192) was impaired by exposure to information that associated success in the task at hand with membership in a certain social group (e.g., “boys are good at this game”), regardless of whether the children themselves belonged to that group.

Theory-based considerations influence the interpretation of generic sentences

Under what circumstances do people agree that a kind-referring generic sentence (e.g., ‘Swans are beautiful’) is true? We hypothesised that theory-based considerations are sufficient, independently of prevalence/frequency information, to lead to acceptance of a generic statement. To provide evidence for this general point, we focused on demonstrating the impact of a specific theory-based, essentialist expectation – that the physical features characteristic of a biological kind emerge as a natural product of development – on participants’ reasoning about generics. Across three studies, adult participants (N=99) confirmed our hypothesis, preferring to map generic sentences (e.g., ‘Dontrets have long tails’) onto novel categories for which the key feature (e.g., long tails) was absent in all the young but present in all the adults rather than onto novel categories for which the key feature was at least as prevalent but present in some of the young and in some of the adults. Control conditions using ‘some’- and ‘most’-quantified sentences demonstrated that this mapping is specific to generic meaning. These results suggest that generic meaning does not reduce to quantification and is sensitive to theory-based expectations.

The Frequency of “Brilliant” and “Genius” in Teaching Evaluations Predicts the Representation of Women and African Americans across Fields

Women and African Americans—groups targeted by negative stereotypes about their intellectual abilities—may be underrepresented in careers that prize brilliance and genius. A recent nationwide survey of academics provided initial support for this possibility. Fields whose practitioners believed that natural talent is crucial for success had fewer female and African American PhDs. The present study seeks to replicate this initial finding with a different, and arguably more naturalistic, measure of the extent to which brilliance and genius are prized within a field. Specifically, we measured field-by-field variability in the emphasis on these intellectual qualities by tallying—with the use of a recently released online tool—the frequency of the words “brilliant” and “genius” in over 14 million reviews on RateMyProfessors.com, a popular website where students can write anonymous evaluations of their instructors. This simple word count predicted both women’s and African Americans’ representation across the academic spectrum. That is, we found that fields in which the words “brilliant” and “genius” were used more frequently on RateMyProfessors.com also had fewer female and African American PhDs. Looking at an earlier stage in students’ educational careers, we found that brilliance-focused fields also had fewer women and African Americans obtaining bachelor’s degrees. These relationships held even when accounting for field-specific averages on standardized mathematics assessments, as well as several competing hypotheses concerning group differences in representation. The fact that this naturalistic measure of a field’s focus on brilliance predicted the magnitude of its gender and race gaps speaks to the tight link between ability beliefs and diversity.