Amanda C. Brandone

Theory-based considerations influence the interpretation of generic sentences

Under what circumstances do people agree that a kind-referring generic sentence (e.g., ‘Swans are beautiful’) is true? We hypothesised that theory-based considerations are sufficient, independently of prevalence/frequency information, to lead to acceptance of a generic statement. To provide evidence for this general point, we focused on demonstrating the impact of a specific theory-based, essentialist expectation – that the physical features characteristic of a biological kind emerge as a natural product of development – on participants’ reasoning about generics. Across three studies, adult participants (N=99) confirmed our hypothesis, preferring to map generic sentences (e.g., ‘Dontrets have long tails’) onto novel categories for which the key feature (e.g., long tails) was absent in all the young but present in all the adults rather than onto novel categories for which the key feature was at least as prevalent but present in some of the young and in some of the adults. Control conditions using ‘some’- and ‘most’-quantified sentences demonstrated that this mapping is specific to generic meaning. These results suggest that generic meaning does not reduce to quantification and is sensitive to theory-based expectations.

Infants' goal anticipation during failed and successful reaching actions.

The ability to interpret and predict the actions of others is crucial to social interaction and to social, cognitive, and linguistic development. The current study provided a strong test of this predictive ability by assessing (1) whether infants are capable of prospectively processing actions that fail to achieve their intended outcome, and (2) how infants respond to events in which their initial predictions are not confirmed. Using eye tracking, 8-month-olds, 10-month-olds, and adults watched an actor repeatedly reach over a barrier to either successfully or unsuccessfully retrieve a ball. Ten-month-olds and adults produced anticipatory looks to the ball, even when the action was unsuccessful and the actor never achieved his goal. Moreover, they revised their initial predictions in response to accumulating evidence of the actors failure. Eight-month-olds showed anticipatory looking only after seeing the actor successfully grasp and retrieve the ball. Results support a flexible, prospective social information processing ability that emerges during the first year of life.

Early intention understandings that are common to primates predict children's later theory of mind

Intention understanding emerges early in human development, manifest in deep and robust fashions even in infants. Overlapping intention understandings, encompassing agents as intentional actors and experiencers, are evident in nonhuman primates in more limited fashions. Intention understandings, of the sort shared by infants and nonhuman primates, predict the more comprehensive theory-of-mind understandings of older children. Those early understandings provide a platform for the ontogenesis of further, deeper achievements in the human case.

Three-year-olds' theories of mind in actions and words.

Understanding observable behavior by considering mental representations is central to social cognition. Research reveals quite different developmental trajectories for this ability depending on whether tasks assess implicit or explicit theory of mind (ToM). Yet, how to define implicit vs. explicit ToM, the tasks that elicit each, and the types of behavior that each can support, have remained unclear. The present study (n = 47) found that 3-year-olds incorporate predictions based on false beliefs into their intentional actions, but not – following identical scenarios – into their verbal responses. These data show that implicit ToM supports a broader range of behaviors than previously indicated and further illustrates the entrenched nature of the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge in early conceptual development.

Children's Developing Intuitions About the Truth Conditions and Implications of Novel Generics Versus Quantified Statements

Generic statements express generalizations about categories and present a unique semantic profile that is distinct from quantified statements. This paper reports two studies examining the development of childrens intuitions about the semantics of generics and how they differ from statements quantified by all, most, and some. Results reveal that, like adults, preschoolers (a) recognize that generics have flexible truth conditions and are capable of representing a wide range of prevalence levels; and (b) interpret novel generics as having near-universal prevalence implications. Results further show that by age 4, children are beginning to differentiate the meaning of generics and quantified statements; however, even 7- to 11-year-olds are not adultlike in their intuitions about the meaning of most-quantified statements. Overall, these studies suggest that by preschool, children interpret generics in much the same way that adults do; however, mastery of the semantics of quantified statements follows a more protracted course.

Fast-mapping placeholders: Using words to talk about kinds.

Fast-mapping is the ability to acquire a word rapidly on the basis of minimal information. As proposed by Carey (1978), we assume that children are able to achieve fast-mapping because their initial word meanings are skeletal placeholders that will be extended gradually over time. In this paper, we propose that a notion of “kind” is fundamental to childrens initial mappings for object labels. We illustrate this point by considering the acquisition of generic noun phrases, which are understood by children as kind-referring from very early on. We argue that the acquisition of generics has implications for mechanisms of word learning. Evidence suggests that generics cannot be acquired solely on the basis of associative learning mechanisms; rather, they are a default interpretation for young children.

The Developing Theory of Mental State Control: Changes in Beliefs about the Controllability of Emotional Experience from Elementary School through Adulthood

ABSTRACT In everyday life, we use folk theories about the mind and behavior to understand ourselves and others. An important part of our folk theory of mind is our intuitions about the role of the self in mental functioning—namely, whether the self is able to control each mental operation. The current study explored beliefs about the nature of control over emotional aspects of mental experience from middle childhood through adulthood. Elementary school children (n = 46), middle schoolers (n = 46), 18-year-olds (n = 46), and adults (n = 104) were presented with vignettes depicting characters experiencing negative emotions. Participants evaluated the intentionality, changeability, and chronicity of the characters’ responses. Results showed that by elementary school, children share adults’ view that emotions are largely outside of volitional control. However, beliefs about the changeability and chronicity of emotions mature beyond middle childhood. Between elementary school and adulthood, participants decreased their endorsement of the ability to change one’s current negative emotions and increased their beliefs in the chronic, enduring nature of these responses. With age, these changeability and chronicity beliefs also came to differ depending on the emotional response (i.e., feeling grumpy, being nervous, acting mean). Together, these findings suggest that intuitions about the controllability of emotional experience become more differentiated and less optimistic across development.