Andres Gomez-Lobo

Yardsticks on the road: Regulatory contracts and cost efficiency in the Norwegian bus industry

In this paper a cost frontier model is estimated for an eleven-year panel of Norwegian bus companies (1136 company-year observations) using the methodology proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). The main objective of the paper is to investigate to what extent different type of regulatory contracts affect company performance. The panel model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) allow for year/company specific efficiency measures to be estimated. Thus, unobservable network or other time invariant characteristic of the operating environment can be controlled for by analyzing the dynamics of measured productivity across time for firms regulated under different types of contracts, rather than relying solely on variations across companies during one time period. Therefore, the paper offers methodological and data advantages over previous work on this subject. The main and robust result of the paper is that the adoption of a more high-powered scheme based on a yardstick type of regulation significantly reduces operating costs. The results contained in this paper thus confirms theoretical predictions regarding the incentive properties of high powered incentive schemes and in particular the dynamic benefits of yardstick competition.

Utilities Privatization and the Poor: Lessons and evidence from Latin America

Abstract The perception that privatization hurts the poor is growing and creating a backlash against the private provision of basic infrastructure services. At the same time, governments are finding themselves fiscally strapped, searching for ways to finance the large investments needed to expand services to the poor. In Latin America, a laboratory for privatization, evidence exists which sheds light on the privatization experience. This paper analyzes the channels through which the poor might either lose or gain from privatization, examines the evidence accumulated on what has actually happened, and then discusses the policy options available to decision-makers who want to increase efficiency while at the same time dealing with the infrastructure needs of the poor that have been identified as being important for their welfare. In that context, the issue of whether welfare considerations should form part of the regulatory approach to privatized services is examined. The papers major aims are to shed light on the issue of who can and does benefit from privatization of utilities, and to guide policy-makers in the choices.

LIMITS TO COMPETITION IN URBAN BUS SERVICES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

During the past three decades, urban public transport policy has gone through several phases. From public ownership and monopoly provision, the 1980s and 1990s were characterized by a strong liberalization of the sector. This experience showed the limits of liberalization of the sector in terms of safety, prices and accountability. The paper discusses the market failures that justify this claim and the regulatory options available in this emerging new role of government. It illustrates how they are being used in practice in some countries.

Affordability and Subsidies in Public Urban Transport: What Do We Mean, What Can Be Done?

Subsidy policies on public urban transport have been adopted ubiquitously. In both developed and developing countries, subsidies are implemented to make transport more affordable. Despite their widespread implementation, there are virtually no quantitative assessments of their distributional incidence, making it impossible to determine if these instruments are pro-poor. This paper reviews the arguments used to justify subsidy policies in public urban transport. Using different tools to quantitatively evaluate the incidence and distributive impacts of subsidy policy options, the paper analyzes the findings of a series of research papers that study urban public transport subsidy policies in developed and developing countries. The available evidence indicates that current public urban transport subsidy policies do not make the poorest better off. Supply-side subsidies are, for the most part, neutral or regressive; while demand-side subsidies perform better-although many of them do not improve income distribution. Considering that the policy objective is to improve the welfare of the poorest, it is imperative to move away from supply-side subsidies towards demand-side subsidies and to integrate transport social concerns into wider poverty alleviation efforts, which include the possibility of channeling subsidies through monetary transfer systems or through other transfer instruments (food subsidies, health services and education for the poor). The general conclusion of the paper is that more effort should be devoted to improve the targeting properties of public urban transport subsidies using means-testing procedures to ensure a more pro-poor incidence of subsidies.

Information and Modeling Issues in Designing Water and Sanitation Subsidy Schemes

In designing a rational scheme for subsidizing water services, it is important to support the choice of design parameters with empirical analysis that stimulates the impact of subsidy options on the target population. Otherwise, there is little guarantee that the subsidy program will meet its objectives. But such analysis is informationally demanding. Ideally, researchers should have access to a single, consistent data set containing household-level information on consumption, willingness to pay, and a range of socioeconomic characteristics. Such a comprehensive data set will rarely exist. The authors suggest overcoming this data deficiency by collating, and imaginatevily manipulating different sources of data to generate estimates of the missing variables. The most valuable sources of information, they explain, are likely to be the following: 1) Customer databases of the water company, which provide robust information on the measured consumption of formal customers, but little information on unmeasured consumption, informal customers, willingness to pay, or socioeconomic variables. 2) General socioeconomic household surveys, which are an excellent source of socioeconomic information, but tend to record water expenditure rather than physical consumption. 3) Willingness-to-pay surveys, which are generally tailored to a specific project, are very flexible, and may be the only source of willingness-to-pay data. However, they are expensive to undertake, and the information collected is based on hypothetical rather than real behavior. Where such surveys are unavailable, international benchmark values on willingness to pay may be used. Combining data sets requires some effort and creativity, and creates difficulties of its own. But once a suitable data set has been constructed, a simulation model can be created using simple spreadsheet software. The model used to design Panamas water subsidy proposal addressed these questions: a) What are the targeting properties of different eligibility criteria for the subsidy? b) How large should the subsidy be? c) How much will the subsidy scheme cost, including administrative costs? Armed with the above information, policymakers should be in a position to design a subsidy program that reaches the intended beneficiaries, provides them with the level of financial support that is strictly necessary, meets the overall budget restrictions, and does not waste an excessive amount of funding on administrative costs.

Institutional Safeguards for Cost Benefit Analysis: Lessons from the Chilean National Investment System

This paper discusses some institutional and procedural designs that can strengthen CBA as a decision making tool within the public sector. Our discussion is based on Chile’s National Public Investment System (SNI) the earliest and most consolidated investment appraisal system in Latin America. The objective of Chile’s SNI is to provide a coherent framework for identifying, coordinating, evaluating and implementing public investments. Chile’s SNI has several interesting institutional characteristics. For example, it standardizes project presentation formats, establishes explicit application and evaluation processes for public funds, provides general as well as sector specific methodological guidelines for CBA of projects and programs, and introduces a system of “checks and balances” by separating the institution that evaluates projects from the institutions promoting projects. Besides describing the system and highlighting the features we believe strengthen the use of project appraisal as a decision making tool. The paper also presents data on the number of projects appraised by sector, the overall results of appraisals and other administrative data, as well as a summary of ex-post studies for a sample of road, rural electricity, education and health projects. Unfortunately, the limited data available and the lack of a proper counterfactual scenario do not allow for strong conclusions to be made regarding the performance of the system. However, the data presented serves as an illustration of the Chilean system and it may be of value to researches in this field as well as to policymakers in other countries wishing to improve their public investment systems.

Monopoly, Subsidies and the Mohring Effect: A Synthesis

Abstract This paper provides a unifying framework to analyze whether a monopoly transit provider will under or over-supply frequency. To this end we couch the problem in term of Spence [(1975). Monopoly, quality and regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics, 6, 417–429] who analyzed the incentives to provide quality by a monopolist. We show that all of the results of a recent academic exchange discussing this topic are special cases of Spence [(1975). Monopoly, quality and regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics, 6, 417–429], albeit with an adjustment in order to take into account the cost structure of frequency provision in the case of public transport. In theory then, there are cases when a monopolist may offer optimal or above optimal levels of frequency without requiring subsidies. However, public transport is rarely provided by an unregulated monopolist. Rather, these services are usually provided either by an exclusive operator under regulated fares or by a group of competing operators, with or without fare regulation. We show that in the first case frequency will always be below the social optimal level.

Develando econométricamente los impactos sobre la concentración atmosférica de material particulado de un proyecto de remodelación del transporte urbano: El caso del Transantiago en Chile

Estimar los impactos especificos de una reforma integral del sistema de transporte publico de una gran ciudad es una tarea compleja, debido a las numerosas variables confundentes que usualmente enmascaran los efectos especificos. Este trabajo estima el impacto que la reforma integral del sistema de transporte publico en Santiago de Chile, denominada Transantiago, tuvo sobre un aspecto especifico: la contaminacion atmosferica por material particulado (MP10) en la ciudad. Utilizando un modelo de regresion con datos diarios de panel de las distintas estaciones de monitoreo de la calidad del aire, se concluye que el Transantiago disminuyo en al menos 3,9 µg/m3 el promedio diario de concentraciones de MP10 en la ciudad. Este efecto especifico sobre la contaminacion representa un ahorro estimado en costos de salud de US

Incentives in Bus Concession Contracts: A Review of Several Experiences in Latin America

200 millones al ano en el escenario medio, 12% de los cuales corresponde al ahorro de gastos en atenciones publicas. Si se excluye de la estimacion los datos del primer ano de operacion del sistema (cuando aun no estaba en regimen), la reduccion estimada de la concentracion de MP10 es aun mayor. Obviamente otros efectos del Transantiago, tanto positivos como negativos, requeririan ser estimados, para obtener una evaluacion completa de la reforma.

How effective are policies to reduce gasoline consumption? evaluating a quasi-natural experiment in Spain

Abstract This paper reviews the incentive structure of concession contracts in several Latin American transit reforms. It also presents a conceptual analysis of the optimal design of concession contracts. The conceptual discussion and case studies reviewed indicate that payment to operators should be linked to operational variables and that some demand risk should optimally be transferred to operators. Performance standards linked to fines and penalties are not sufficient to guarantee good quality of service, particularly in citywide reforms and where institutional capacity ― in terms of size, experience and expertise of staff ― is lacking and regulatory processes are slow, bureaucratic and cumbersome. This review may be useful for policy-makers designing transit reforms in other countries. The policy lessons of the paper are particularly relevant to cities in the developing world but they are also important for reforms in other countries.