Andrés Malamud

Presidential Diplomacy and the Institutional Underpinnings of MERCOSUR: An Empirical Examination

<p> The relative success of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) is a puzzle for most theories of regional integration. This is due to its having achieved remarkable progress in spite of lacking features such as significant levels of previous interdependence (demand factor) or major regional institutions (supply factor). To account for this puzzle, it has been claimed that the operation of MERCOSUR rests on presidential diplomacy. Such a mechanism is understood as the resort to direct negotiations between the national presidents whenever a crucial decision has to be made or a critical conflict solved. This article argues that presidential diplomacy—understood as political, summit diplomacy as opposed to institutionalized, professional diplomacy—is insufficient to account for the performance of MERCOSUR. Through the empirical analysis of three critical episodes, the article shows how institutional structures, shaped by the system of government of the member countries, have sustained presidential intervention and, hence, the process of regional integration.</p> <p> O relativo sucesso do Mercado Comum do Sul (MERCOSUL) constitui um enigma para muitas teorias da integração regional. Isto resulta do facto de este ter atingido um progresso notável, não obstante a ausência de características tais como níveis significativos de interdependência prévia (factor de procura) ou instituições regionais supranacionais (factor de oferta). Um dos argumentos invocados no sentido de explicar este enigma é o de que o MERCOSUL assenta na diplomacia presidencial. Esse mecanismo é entendido como o recurso a negociações directas entre os presidentes nacionais sempre que está em causa a tomada de uma decisão crucial ou a resolução de conflitos sensíveis. Este artigo argumenta que a diplomacia presidencial—entendida como diplomacia política de cúpula, por oposição a diplomacia burocrática profissional—é insuficiente para explicar o funcionamento do MERCOSUL. Através da análise empírica de três episódios críticos, o artigo mostra como as estruturas institucionais, marcadas pelo sistema presidencialista de governo dos países membros, sustentaram a intervenção presidencial, e assim, o processo de integração regional. </p>

Has Regionalism Peaked? The Latin American Quagmire and its Lessons

Since 1960, Latin American attempts at regionalism have undergone distinct phases. More notably, they have tended to diverge across space, gradually giving birth to separate blocs that seem to be tearing South, Central and North America apart. Additionally, within and across these regions several overlapping projects coexist. This article focuses on the dynamics of segmented and overlapping regionalism in order to describe what they look like, analyse how they articulate with one another, and explain why member states have pushed for such a messy outcome. This situation, linked to the evolution of the global context, might be indicating that regionalism in Latin America has reached its peak, beyond which it may be difficult to achieve further progress. Two conclusions are elicited: first, economic integration is becoming a geographically diffused phenomenon rather than a regional one; second, regionalism is still a compelling foreign policy but its causes, goals and outcomes are no longer what they used to be.

Mercosur Turns 15: Between Rising Rhetoric and Declining Achievement

Founded in 1991 as an intergovernmental association among four member countries, Mercosur is likely to begin 2006 as intergovernmental and with the same members as when it was founded. Political rhetoric notwithstanding, there has been little deepening and no enlargement in almost 15 years. There have been some achievements, however: increased regional interdependence and political cooperation. This article assesses how much Mercosur has achieved in light of its starting point and the explicit goals set by regional decision makers. It then makes a critical appraisal of the distance between political rhetoric and effective policy implementation, focusing on the role played by the two largest members, Argentina and Brazil. Finally, the article examines the current enlargement, deepening and institutionalisation agenda and assesses its feasibility.

Presidentialism and Mercosur: A Hidden Cause for A Successful Experience *

The consolidation of European unity since the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, along with the contemporary mushrooming of integrating regions all around the world, illustrate a significant new phenomenon. This is the way most nation-states are choosing, at the turn of the century, to deal with new challenges that risk placing their previous positions in jeopardy. Some of the larger regional entities are the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Common Market of the South (Mercosur or Mercosul). All of these initially – if not as maximum aspiration – aimed at becoming free trade zones, in order to increase both their intra-regional trade and investment flows and the competitive position of their member countries

The Experience of European Integration and the Potential for Integration in South America

The experience of the European Union is the most significant and far-reaching among all attempts at regional integration. It is, therefore, the most likely to provide some lessons for those world regions that are just beginning this complex process. In turn, the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and the Andean Community (CAN) are among the regional integration projects that have reached the greatest level of formal accomplishment after the EU. MERCOSUR is a customs union that aspires to become a common market, while avowing the commitment to advance towards political integration. For its part, CAN is a customs union that has already developed supranational institutions such as a Commission, a Parliament and a Court of Justice. In both cases, however, words have progressively tended to wander far from deeds. One reason underlying this phenomenon may be a misunderstanding of the European experience with integration. In this article, we discuss the theories that have been developed to account for integration in Europe and may prove useful to understand integration elsewhere and put forward a set of lessons that could be drawn from the European experience. Subsequently, we introduce a description of the experience of integration in South America and reflect (critically) on how the theories and lessons drawn from the EU could be applied to this region - and beyond.

Latin American Regionalism and EU Studies

Abstract Outside Europe, nowhere but in Latin America have integration attempts and thinking developed so extensively across space and so consistently over time. This article introduces the historical waves of Latin American regionalism in order to discuss the theories applied to account for, and frequently advocate, regional integration. The aim is twofold: on the one hand, to assess the capacity to travel of theories that have been crafted for the EU; on the other, to draw lessons from the Latin American experiences that may contribute to advance integration theory in general and EU studies in particular.

Parlamentos supranacionais na Europa e na América Latina: entre o fortalecimento e a irrelevância

Virtually no process of regional integration has been safe from the criticism of allegedly suffering from either democratic deficit, institutional deficit or both. These deficits, the argument goes, are the consequence of scarce accountability and the lack of transparency in regional decision-making. Different regional blocs have attempted in a variety of ways to confront one or both of these deficits, the most visible of which is the creation and empowerment of a regional parliament. This paper presents a comparative analysis of five of these institutions in Europe and Latin America - i.e. the European Parliament, the Latin American Parliament, the Central American Parliament, the Andean Parliament, and the Joint Parliamentary Commission of Mercosur - with the aim of understanding their impact on regional representation, decision-making and accountability. The conclusions pinpoint five plausible factors in accounting for the differences found across the Atlantic divide.After four centuries of gradual development, the modern parliament was born in England in the 17th century as an instrument by which the rising bourgeoisie could control the monarchy. It claimed legislative supremacy, full authority over taxation and expenditure, and a voice in public policy through partial control (exercized by impeachment) over the king’s choice of ministers. It later spread to America ‐ becoming a separate branch of power ‐ then to continental Europe and subsequently to the rest of the world, becoming the emblematic institution for political deliberation and legislative decision-making in modern nation-states (Orlandi 1998). Parliaments, or analogous legislative assemblies, were also established in several subnational units such as states or provinces, some of which were originally autonomous but later united into federal nation-states. Subnational parliaments date back at least as far as the 18th century, being present in the American colonies when independence was declared and the Constitution established. Supranational parliaments, in contrast, are a much more recent phenomenon. The first significant supranational parliament was the European Parliament which, in the words of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, ‘represents the peoples of the States brought together in the European Community.’ The Parliament’s first direct elections were held in June 1979; since then, it has derived its legitimacy from direct universal suffrage and has been elected every five years. Other processes of regional integration have attempted to replicate such a supranational legislative assembly, Latin America being the region where these experiments have gone the farthest. In November 2005, membership of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) accounted for 143 national members and seven associate members, all of the latter having an international nature: the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Andean Parliament, the Central American

Spillover Effects and Supranational Parliaments: The Case of Mercosur

‘Spillover’ refers to the inner dynamics whereby the members of a regional scheme feel compelled to either enlarging the scope or increasing the level of their mutual commitments or both. It is promoted by actions crystallized into institutions, whose performance creates demand for further action and incremental institution-building. In the case of the EU, the institutions commonly acknowledged as greatest ‘spillover promoters’ are the Commission, the Court, and the European Parliament; in Mercosur there are no functional equivalents to the two former institutions yet, but a common Parliament (Parlasur) has been established and is often purported as a potential engine of integration. This paper addresses its structure and performance in order to assess whether it has produced, or may produce, some kind of spillover by either fostering new regional dynamics or cajoling national governments into upgrading their commitments to the region.

Social Revolution or Political Takeover? The Argentine Collapse of 2001 Reassessed

In 1995 the Peronist party held the Argentine presidency, a comfortable majority in both congressional chambers, and most provincial governorships and municipalities. In 2013 the political landscape looked exactly the same. However, between 2001 and 2002 the country arguably went through its most serious crisis ever, which led to massive popular uprisings, the early resignation of two presidents, and the largest debt default in international history. The political collapse did not, however, constitute a spontaneous or definite rupture with the past. Instead, the social revolt detonated in December 2001 was not only temporally and territorially limited but also politically nurtured and institutionally bounded. Conventional explanations have tended to overlook a crucial set of actors that was neither marching in the streets nor voting in the Congress. These actors were subnational power holders and they were Peronist, and their participation explains how the protest began, how the crisis unfolded, and how it was resolved. En 1995, el partido peronista ocupaba la presidencia de la Argentina y gozaba de amplia mayoría en ambas cámaras, así como en las gobernaciones y municipios. En 2013, el panorama político lucía exactamente igual. Sin embargo, entre 2001 y 2002 el país sufrió una de las crisis más graves de su historia, que desembocó en levantamientos populares masivos, la renuncia anticipada de dos presidentes y el mayor incumplimiento de pago de una deuda soberana en la historia. El colapso político, sin embargo, no constituyó una ruptura espontánea ni definitiva con el pasado sino un acontecimiento que, además de temporal y territorialmente acotado, fue alimentado políticamente y digerido institucionalmente. Las explicaciones convencionales han pasado por alto a un conjunto de actores que no marchaba en las calles ni votaba en el Congreso. Estos actores tenían dos características: eran autoridades subnacionales y eran peronistas. Su participación explica el inicio de la protesta social, el desarrollo de la crisis y su resolución.

Managing Security in a Zone of Peace: Brazil’s Soft Approach to Regional Governance

Brazil’s home region has two peculiarities: first, it is essentially fuzzy as its extension and membership have changed overtime; second, regardless of its limits, its inner core has been characterized by a long period of interstate peace. These factors have led to two outcomes: first, high politics has been conducted through diplomatic rather than military means; second, region-building has remained under the strictest control of the governments rather than becoming self-sustaining. Regional public goods have been mostly defined on the negative, especially as the avoidance of negative externalities, and only recently has Brazil started to invest in the creation of a governance framework that keep extra-regional powers away. Yet, structural limitations and instrumental constraints have limited Brazilian efforts and turned South America into a still peaceful but increasingly divergent sub-region. Through an analysis of institutional overlap and policy networks, especially regarding nuclear energy and the environment, this paper shows that Brazil’s low, late and soft investment in regional security governance is explained by a combination of low regional risks, scarce domestic resources, a legalistic culture of dispute settlement, and transgovernmental networks that substitute for intense interstate cooperation and deep regional institutions.