Andrew F. Cooper

Global and/or regional development at the start of the 21st century? China, India and (South) Africa

Abstract Projected economic growth for China and India presents considerable opportunities and dilemmas for the African region, especially for human development, rights and security around its own growth centre, South Africa. This article juxtaposes a set of overlapping perspectives—emerging economies versus nics, fragile versus developmental states, new regionalisms, resource conflicts and new South – South relations—to analyse the present and prospective implications for sub-Saharan and South African development. Sustained Chinese and Indian growth may present opportunities, even windfalls, for some countries, companies, classes and sectors on the continent but not for all. This opens up a number of fundamental questions in terms of an expanded research agenda. Will Chinese and Indian multinational corporations and supply chains operate similarly or differently from familiar Anglo-American ones? Will civil societies within and diasporas around India and China affect their respective transnational relations? And will African regional institutions be able to moderate any negative impacts from these changing dynamics? Recent review articles have suggested that international relations (ir) in Africa is ‘different’. But what is neglected is how the emerging relationship with China affects this assertion. The article concludes with reflections on implications for development policy and theory arising from ‘drivers’ such as China, India, and South Africa at the start of the new century. Our thesis is that, given growing divergences in Africa to sustain resource extraction, the emerging economies have to deal with fragile well as developmental states. Crucial in determining this outcome is whether or not the continents single ‘superpower’ can facilitate or mediate this process given its own national interest and human development concerns.

Emerging Powers and Africa: Implications for/from Global Governance?

This article examines the increasing engagement between the ‘emerging powers’ and African countries, and the implications for international governance. The global power dynamic is undergoing a cumulative reordering process, where countries including China, India, Brazil and Russia are occupying increasingly prominent roles in the international system. In their approach to Africa, the ‘BRIC’ countries have employed a mix of soft power, public diplomacy, direct investment and private sector partnerships to deepen relations. This article suggests that strict macro-economic explanations do not allow for the myriad political, strategic and social matters that are arising in this engagement. The analytical complexities of these emerging modes of South–South cooperation are examined at state and societal levels from a political economy perspective. Despite their differing intentions, Africa and the emerging powers appear to share common goals of advancing their respective national economies and enhancing their diplomatic status. These shifts are further giving rise to a new ‘global middle’. The emergence of this multi-layered international order challenges scholars to stretch conceptions of world order, multipolarity and interdependence. The article concludes by surveying the relevance of BRIC interests in Africa for various subfields in international relations and points to areas for further research.

Foreign Policy Strategies of Emerging Powers in a Multipolar World: an introductory review

Abstract This Introductory Review examines the major debates concerning the rise of emerging powers in the global system. It points to the fundamental difference between the contours of ascendancy in the first quarter of the twenty-first century from previous historical eras with reference to the number of countries placed in this category, the privileging of economic dimensions of power, and the much more elaborate and open levels with regard to institutionalization. Ample attention is paid to the BRICS, but consistent with the image of multipolarity, it also gives some emphasis to the question of whether the changing global system provides enhanced space for middle powers. After highlighting these highly relevant contextual considerations, the core of the Review moves to an analysis centred on more specific puzzles about the foreign policy strategies of emerging powers. One major puzzle is whether the preference of rising states is to work through established institutions or to utilize parallel and/or competitive mechanisms. Another concerns the balance between material interests, status-enhancement, and identity issues as motivators for policy preferences. Still another focuses on the degree to which China should be differentiated from the other BRICS, or indeed whether the BRICS share values such as a common politics of resentment or want to differentiate themselves on a normative-oriented basis in alterative groupings such as IBSA. A more sophisticated awareness of the limitations as well as of the capacities of the BRICS - with an appreciation of the intricate mix of concerns about solidarity and sovereignty, as well as conceptual tensions between realism and complex interdependence – is not only important for assessing the future trajectory of the BRICS role in the world, but in locating space for categories of countries such as middle powers. The major puzzle for middle powers is whether or not they will be able to mobilize attributes, notably the leveraging of ‘network power’, that provide them with comparative advantage. Although in overall terms the global system has not progressed towards multipolarity in a linear fashion underwritten by alternative actors, it is precisely due to this imprecision – and level of academic and operational contestation – that the articles assembled in this Special Issue have such salience.

A Model for the Future

A remarkable story unfolded last year in Peru: The Organization of American States (OAS) played a central role in successfully resolving a crisis sparked by President Alberto Fujimori’s efforts to win an unprecedented third term in office. In disputed first-round elections on 9 April 2000, Fujimori won just under 50 percent of the vote, forcing him into a runoff with second-place finisher Alejandro Toledo. As the May 28 runoff approached, however, concerns over electoral fraud led Toledo to withdraw and the OAS to suspend its own electoral-observation mission. The suspect election, which triggered widespread popular protest in Peru, became the main agenda item at the annual General Assembly of the OAS in Windsor, Ontario, at the beginning of June. Building on a recent trend of defending democracy in the Americas through multilateral means, the OAS General Assembly arrived at a diplomatic compromise. It adopted Resolution 1753, which sent a HighLevel Mission led by OAS secretary general Cesar Gaviria and Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy to Peru on June 27–30. Their visit resulted in the establishment of an OAS-facilitated mesa de dialogo (roundtable), where Peruvian government, opposition, and civil society representatives discussed a concrete reform agenda. Despite widespread initial skepticism both in Peru and internationally, this OAS initiative provided a mechanism for important democratic reforms, eased the Andrew F. Cooper, professor of political science at the University of Waterloo in Ontario, Canada, is coeditor of Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy? (forthcoming, United Nations University Press). During the spring semester of 2000, he was a CanadaU.S. Fulbright Scholar at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. Thomas Legler has taught Latin American politics at the University of Victoria and the University of Toronto. In April 2001, he observed the first-round presidential election in Peru.

The Group of Twenty (G20)

Introduction 1. Rebalancing world order 2. G20 Finance as prelude 3. G20 competitors as reform options 4. Financial crisis as catalyst: From Washington to Pittsburgh 5. Consolidating or fragmenting the G20 6. The G20 between the dynamics of innovation and constraint 7. The G20 as the answer to the crisis of global governance

Overcoming Constraints of State Sovereignty: global health governance in Asia

Abstract In an increasingly globalised world effective international communicable diseases control requires states to embrace basic norms informing global health governance. However, recent international public health crises have shown that states continue to use national sovereignty to justify non-compliance with these norms. In this article we use three recent high-profile examples from Asia in which the tight hold of state sovereignty cut into the effective implementation of international communicable disease control efforts. Taken together, the three cases illustrate a wider trend in which states historically diminished in structural power or subject to imperialist intrusion contest the legitimacy of global governance initiatives if they are perceived to be another vehicle for the imposition of exogenous norms that do not reflect the values or goals of that state. In response to these challenges, three strategies are posited for how the actors involved in protecting public health might overcome the constraints of state sovereignty to more effectively address global public health threats created by the fluid movement of pathogens across borders.

Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy

Enhancing Global Governance analyzes the means by which global governance has been promoted by innovative diplomatic practices. The impetus for a new diplomacy has emerged not from traditional channels, but through a series of cross cutting coalitions among like-minded states and civil society. The question of how these alternative leadership forms have been expressed through the United Nations system, together with an evaluation of the impact they have achieved, provides the fundamental theme of this book. Following an overview of the frustrations concerning the nature of leadership from the UN Security Council, experts look at the manner in which innovative diplomatic practices played out in two significant case studies: the development of the Ottawa Treaty to ban anti-personnel landmines and the campaign to establish an international court. The book then reviews the application of new diplomacy approaches, first in the commercial domain of international activity, particularly in the application of codes of conduct that would affect both states and global business, and then in selected areas of the expanded security agenda; including child soldiers and the exportation of diamonds from areas of conflict.

Qatar and Expanded Contours of Small State Diplomacy

It is increasingly obvious that Qatar is playing above its weight in the international role. There is no one script that defines Qatars diplomatic role. It is best seen as a maverick, willing to work with the US as well as Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. It operates a complex form of public diplomacy via Al-Jazeera and other high profile initiatives at the same time as it mediates behind the scenes with Israel and Lebanon. Qatars role as a unique hybrid diplomatic actor is reinforced by the enthusiastic support it displayed towards the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, including operational support for the UN Security Resolution to place a no-fly zone with respect to the Qaddafis regime, while being more circumspect on the uprising in Bahrain. Such an extensive, unconventional and differentiated approach creates risks as well as opportunities. Yet, through a combination of resources and vision, it is skilled resilience not vulnerability that defines Qatar.

The Diplomacies of Small States at the Start of the Twenty-first Century: How Vulnerable? How Resilient?

While there are now more small states than ever, the analytic and policy attention towards these states has not matched their proliferation. Hence the timeliness of this collection, which is designed as a catch-up exercise from both an academic and practical perspective and concentrates on the Caribbean. Reflective of a structurally imposed condition, small states continue to be disconnected from the most salient debates in International Relations (IR). Current theoretical shifts in IR to the regional-global architecture are almost universally perceived to be due to the emergence of the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) — or alternative acronyms such as the Next 11 (N11) — at the upper middle of the international hierarchy, and not to any relocation among small actors.

In search of niches: Saying “yes” and saying “no” in Canada's international relations

For Canadian diploma to retain its credibility and effectiveness, some hard choices will have to be made. On the basis of this logic, Canada has a great incentive to specialize. The core theme of this article is that Canadian diplomacy should concentrate on specific niches. This approach may well be a politically sensitive in the sense that it limits or disciplines Canadas international activity. Yet the targeting of Canadian diplomacy towards an efficient and equitable process of niche‐selection has a number of solid rationales. Historically, it builds on the functional principle, which underpinned the constructive reputation of post‐war Canadian diplomacy. In contemporary circumstances, niche‐building allows Canada to direct attention to issue‐areas where it can best make a difference. In some cases, this will mean Canada must clearly and openly say that it will not perform certain tasks. In other cases, however, this dynamic will enhance the forms of Canadas creative statecraft.