Andrew Johnstone

Isolationism and internationalism in American foreign relations

This article analyses the seemingly well known terms internationalism and isolationism. Both have a long history of use in the study of American foreign relations, but there are problems with both that limit their descriptive and analytical utility. Their limitations have been addressed before, yet they are still commonly used and remain popular among scholars and the wider public, partly due to the ease with which the history of American foreign relations can be simplistically defined as an ongoing struggle between the forces of isolationism and internationalism. Through an analysis of both terms, as well as a consideration of their use by historians and political scientists and with due respect to the transatlantic focus of this journal, this article looks to salvage the meaning of these terms, and more importantly, to move beyond them and find more accurate expressions.

The Perils of Perfectionism: American Reaction to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals

In the debate that followed the release of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals in 1944, the US government vigorously promoted the idea of international organization, partly due to fears of a resurgent isolationism. Yet as the debate progressed, it became clear that isolationism was not the main enemy, and concerns that the USA would not engage at all with the UN proved unfounded. Instead, the most active critics of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were not those who wished to ignore the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, but those who wanted to perfect them. Calls for a more perfect international union came from across the political spectrum and for different reasons. Ultimately, the Roosevelt administration recognized that perfectionism was an issue that threatened the peace process. Fearing a repeat of the rejection of the League of Nations, the Roosevelt administration worked tirelessly to share the message of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals to the American people. But that message was mostly a cautious one, highlighting that while the proposed UN was not perfect, it was the best option for peace.

Spinning War and Peace: Foreign Relations and Public Relations on the Eve of World War II

The eve of World War II saw the development of direct connections between public relations experts and issues of foreign affairs in the United States. Public relations professionals assisted both internationalists and noninterventionists to spread their arguments across the nation, helping them to hone their messages, to organize, and to raise money. All of the main citizens’ organizations created during this period sought public relations assistance in the face of growing popular awareness of global events, and with an awareness of the need for public relations counsel in the face of an increasingly measurable concept of public opinion.

Mistry, K. (2014). The United States, Italy and the Origins of Cold War: Waging Political Warfare, 1945–1950

In arguably the key scene of Oliver Stone’s 1991 film “JFK,” Jim Garrison (Kevin Costner) meets with the mysterious Mr X (Donald Sutherland). Mr X outlines his background in black operations—“Assassinations, coup d’état, rigging elections, propaganda, psych warfare and so forth”—before going on to outline the successful cold war history of black operations: “In Italy ‘48, we stole the elections, France ‘49, broke the strikes, overthrew Quirino in the Philippines, Arbenz in Guatemala, Mosaddegh in Iran, we were in Vietnam in ‘54, Indonesia ‘58, Tibet ‘59, got the Dalai lama out . . . we were good.” By placing involvement in Italy at the very beginning of a story of successful US operations overseas, Stone recycled a conventional and rather conspiratorial narrative of American influence and effectiveness. In his impressive new book, Kaeten Mistry challenges that narrative, complicating the story far beyond the role of the CIA and questioning the very impact of American activity in the process. Mistry’s book analyses US–Italian relations between 1945 and 1950, going far beyond the detail of the 1948 election to examine the evolution of US policy towards Italy and the implementation of that policy. More broadly, however, it assesses the evolution of the concept of political warfare in American policy making circles, and how the Italian example was crucial in convincing American leaders that political warfare—the employment of all means short of war, including both overt and covert operations—could help the United States achieve its cold war goals. Finally, it considers the legacy of American action in this era for subsequent years. In doing so, it goes beyond a conventional narrative of CIA involvement and influence to focus on numerous different levels of American engagement in Italy, from the State Department (including a key role for the original Mr X, George Kennan), through US ambassador in Rome James Dunn, down to previously overlooked transnational and non-state actors such as trade unions and the Catholic church. The introduction lays out three main arguments. First, Mistry argues that “Italy was never important in and of itself for American policy-makers although its fate was critical in a wider sense” (p. 5). Second, while American

Shaping our Post-war Foreign Policy: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Promotion of the United Nations Organisation during World War II

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) describes itself as “the oldest international affairs think tank in the United States”. In the past century, the CEIP has been a key part of the American eastern establishment elite, yet surprisingly little academic study has been undertaken on the organisation. This article examines the role of the CEIP in the promotion of the United Nations Organisation during World War II. One reason the CEIP has been overlooked during this period is the relatively low-key—or “hidden hand”—nature of its involvement. Yet this article emphasises three ways in which the Endowment worked to promote a new international organisation during the war: direct involvement in mobilising the public as a pressure group; as a facilitator for other pressure groups who also sought to mobilise the public; and as an organisation whose leadership was involved directly in the policy creation process. While there were limits to its influence, the Endowments distinctive qualities—institutional prestige, financial strength, connections to government, and individual leaders with significant experience of international affairs—left it uniquely placed to redefine Americas world role.

The United States and the United Nations: Hegemony, Unilateralism and the Limits of Internationalism

The 2008 publication of Robert Kagan’s The Return of History and the End of Dreams was the latest chapter in the ongoing debate over the nature of American internationalism. In it, Kagan argued that a new ‘league of democracies’ is required in foreign affairs. The idea is more than academic: Republican Presidential candidate John McCain promoted such an idea in his 2008 campaign.1 Sympathetic reviewers have argued the promotion of such a league represents a move away from neoconservative idealism towards international legitimacy and offers a potential brake on US foreign policy. Critics, meanwhile, claim any such league merely represents an alternative forum or international community to the United Nations from which the US could legitimise its foreign policy actions.