Andrew Priest

In American Hands: Britain, the United States and the Polaris Nuclear Project 1962–1968

This article examines the diplomatic and military relationship between the US and UK on the Polaris nuclear deterrent. It takes the 1962 Nassau agreement as its starting point and explores both ‘working level’ co-operation between the two navies and diplomatic developments in London and Washington up to the launch of the first British Polaris missile in 1968. The article contends that, although the British faced a ‘deterrent gap’ during these years, the agreement on Polaris was extremely beneficial in the medium to long term, providing a credible deterrent and significant diplomatic weight in negotiations with the US and other NATO allies.

The President, the ‘Theologians’ and the Europeans: The Johnson Administration and NATO Nuclear Sharing

This article examines Lyndon Johnsons handling of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear-sharing issue and specifically plans for a NATO Multilateral Force during the first three years of his presidency. The article argues that although Johnson did not confront the nuclear sharing/Multilateral Force issue directly for the first year of his presidency, he subsequently made sensible policy decisions in the face of a number of challenges. These included pressure for a speedy resolution of the nuclear-sharing issue from within his own State Department and from the government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the one side, and opposition to the Multilateral Force from the British and French governments on the other. The nuclear-sharing issue is discussed in the context of challenges to NATO, most notably French President Charles de Gaulles rejection of US leadership and his withdrawal of French forces from NATOs integrated military structure in 1966 and broader debates about nuclear consultation within the alliance. The article concludes that by using the advisory process well and through some deft diplomacy, particularly refusing to demand a quick resolution to the nuclear-sharing problem, the Johnson administration had effectively resolved the nuclear-sharing issue by late 1966.

The US War in Iraq: Confronting the Vietnam Analogy

In their pioneering study of the application of history to political decision-making, Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May attempted to devise a model in which a protagonist can think about appropriate historical examples and analogies and utilise them in order to improve the decisions they make. By examining a number of different case studies, Neustadt and May argued history is useful and even essential in the way policymakers operate but that drawing the correct analogies and lessons is crucial in order to make good policy and avoid political disaster. If policymakers spent time thinking about history in a more systematic and structured way, they argued, the quality of the decisions they made would almost certainly improve.1