Andrew Kevin O'Neil

Accommodation, realignment, or business as usual? Australia's response to a rising China

Abstract Since normalising diplomatic relations in 1972, successive Australian and Chinese governments have focused on deepening trade and investment links to such an extent that China now looms as one of the most critical countries on Australias twenty-first century horizon. For their part, Chinese elites have welcomed closer ties with Australia and have been particularly keen to accelerate Chinas direct investment in the Australian mining and energy sectors. Since the early 2000s, a number of commentators have argued that Australia has been gradually drifting towards Chinas sphere of influence in the Asia-Pacific. This trend, they argue, has been reinforced following the election in 2007 of the Labor party government, which has terminated Australias involvement in quadrilateral talks with the US, India, and Japan; stepped back from commitments to export uranium to Chinas long-standing rival, India; and intensified Australias public criticism of Japanese whaling practices. Meanwhile, in 2008, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd made a point of paying a high profile visit to China during his first major overseas journey, but not matching it with a visit to Japan. Is Australia drifting towards Chinas strategic orbit in Asia? The article examines this question through the prism of three key indicators of realignment and concludes that, while there is some evidence of Australia accommodating Chinese strategic preferences in Asia, there is no indication that it is realigning itself strategically towards China and away from its long-standing ally, the US.

Sino-Japanese strategic relations: will rivalry lead to confrontation?

This article analyses the strategic dynamics of the Sino-Japanese relationship and argues that the potential for confrontation between China and Japan has been exaggerated. There is an underlying tendency in much of the literature to treat the emergence of rivalry between China and Japan since the end of the cold war as synonymous with an inevitable drift towards bilateral strategic confrontation. This article argues that Beijing and Tokyo are better placed to manage the strategic dimension of their bilateral relationship than many analysts have been willing to acknowledge thus far. To test this argument, the article examines two prominent case studies that lie at the heart of the contemporary and future Sino-Japanese bilateral strategic relationship: the territorial dispute over the East China Sea and Japans virtual nuclear weapons capability.

Degrading and Managing Risk: Assessing Australia's Counter-Terrorist Strategy

Given the occasionally vexatious nature of academic discussion in Australia on the subject of terrorism, it is surprising that so little has been written regarding Australias approach to countering terrorism. This gap in the literature stands in marked contrast to the highly charged debate over the direction of terrorism studies in this country. In seeking to fill this lacuna, the article critically examines the three essential pillars of Australias counter-terrorism strategy that have evolved since 2001: domestic legislation, intelligence, and regional assistance and engagement. I argue that Australias counter-terrorist strategy exhibits greater cohesion than many of the critics have been willing to acknowledge. However, I also argue that there remain significant flaws in the Howard governments approach, particularly as it relates to a lack of transparency in justifying new anti-terrorism legislation and Australias unswerving support for a US global counter-terrorism strategy that has lost its way since the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Conceptualising Future Threats to Australia's Security

Much of the recent Australian security studies literature has focused on contemporary challenges to Australias role in Asia, the evolving trajectory of defence strategy, and the various factors that have shaped the nations ‘discourse of threats’. While this body of work is important and valuable, there is a distinct lack of scholarship that discusses the types of future security threats likely to confront Australian policy makers in the twenty-first century. Indeed, there is a tendency among scholars to assume that this sort of ‘futures’ work is best left to those outside the academy. I argue, however, that it is an area which is too important to leave to the authors of defence White Papers, think tank reports, and classified strategic assessments. Australias future security environment in a complex international system has not been subject to the sort of systematic scholarly analysis the topic merits. This article seeks to provide a stepping stone for more substantial work in the area and outlines a conceptual framework that can aid us in understanding the factors likely to impact on Australias security environment in the early part of the twenty-first century.

The 2000 inter-Korean summit: The road to reconciliation?

The inter-Korean summit held in Pyongyang between 13 and 15 June 2000 was an unprecedented event. It was the first time the leaders of North and South have met face to face since the formal partitioning of Korea in 1948. This article examines the main reasons why the 2000 summit occurred, what the summit produced, and its implications for inter-Korean relations in the early part of the 21st century. Although the summit could well be an important step towards breaking down the long-standing barriers of suspicion and mistrust between Pyongyang and Seoul, it is premature to conclude (as some observers have) that the summit has heightened the prospects for reunification on the Korean peninsula. Instead of grandly portraying the 2000 summit as heralding a transition to reunification, it is far more accurate to view it as a positive step towards the more modest objective of longer-term reconciliation between the two Koreas.

Nuclear Proliferation and Global Security: Laying the Groundwork for a New Policy Agenda

A default assumption shared by most observers in government, the academy, and nongovernment organizations is that all efforts should be expended to preserve the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, despite its shortcomings and structural weaknesses. Yet there is little evidence that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its subsidiary instruments have succeeded in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities since the end of the Cold War. And there is no foundation for assuming they will do any better in what will be an even more challenging global strategic environment in the twenty-first century. New arms control arrangements need to be developed that reflect the reality that nuclear proliferation cannot be prevented, only managed. Before reaching this point, however, the international community must lay to rest the myth that nuclear disarmament is achievable and begin to explore the prospects for a multipolar system of nuclear deterrence in the years ahead.

North Korea's emergence as a nuclear weapons state and the end of the disarmament paradigm

Writing shortly after North Korea’s inaugural nuclear test in late 2006, Jonathan Pollack observed that ‘a decision to proceed with additional testing would constitute compelling evidence that the DPRK deemed the first test results unsatisfactory and that Pyongyang’s goals for its nuclear program are more ambitious than a one-time demonstration of strategic autonomy’. Pollack’s observation, while perceptive, is probably only partly correct. While there can be no doubt that Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions go far beyond a straightforward ‘look at me’ statement of autonomy, it is not clear the DPRK’s 2009 test was undertaken because the 2006 test was a failure. Given North Korea’s long-standing weapons research and development (R&D) programme, it is very plausible that the low yield of the first test was in fact deliberate and aimed at developing a small warhead for the country’s medium range Nodong missile force. Whatever the reasons, it is clear that the North Korean testing programme will have significant repercussions for the future security of East Asia and the Asian region more generally. How the international community responds to this programme will be watched with considerable interest by other would-be proliferators, particularly Iran. The key claim underpinning the analysis here is that North Korea’s decision to undertake a second nuclear test confirms that Pyongyang is determined to become the world’s ninth nuclear weapons state. It heralds the arrival of a new phase in North Korea’s nuclear weapons development programme, where the emphasis will henceforth be on acquiring an operational capability for deployment, as distinct from the programme’s first phase which was concerned with generating sufficient fissile material and honing warhead design as a springboard for developing an operational force. The bad news in our analysis is that North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme has become so deeply ingrained in the DPRK’s political economy that disarmament is no longer an option for the regime in Pyongyang. The good news, however, is that despite its extreme anti-social behaviour in East Asia, North Korea has an established pattern of rationality in its approach to strategic issues. If stable relations with a nuclear-armed North Korea are to be achieved, the key for the international community will be to engage the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state, not as a state that can somehow be disarmed of its nuclear weapons. Persisting with the

The unhappy marriage between international relations theory and international law

As the world moves into a particularly fluid phase of global politics, interdisciplinary engagement between international law and international relations is becoming a critical task. Reformulating how we theorise the ‘global’ will be central to the development of institutions, laws, policies, and norms that govern how we manage conflict, deal with environmental challenges, smooth out the highly uneven political economy, and allow new political communities to develop beyond the nation-state. The role of international law and international relations scholarship will be central to this endeavour. Practitioners and policymakers have a particular responsibility to help develop and shape new global systems and institutions. Teachers have a responsibility to current and future generations of young scholars to equip them with the requisite intellectual tools for making choices in the policy arena that frequently straddle the various levels of international law and international relations. This article explores how we can begin to improve that process.

Learning to live with uncertainty: The strategic implications of North Korea's nuclear weapons capability

This article challenges the popular assumption that North Koreas nuclear weapons capability poses a dire threat to international security. It argues that the adverse impact of North Koreas acquisition of nuclear weapons has been exaggerated and that pessimistic accounts of the strategic implications of this capability have overlooked the strong status quo bias inherent in North Koreas worldview. These accounts have also glossed over the primarily defensive motives underpinning Pyongyangs quest for nuclear weapons. There are dangers attached to North Koreas nuclear capability, especially the possible transfer of fissile material to terrorist groups or rogue states, and the effect it may have in spurring regional neighbours to reassess their non-nuclear status. Contrary to common assumptions, however, the idea that a nuclear-armed North Korea is determined to foment regional instability and challenge the strategic status quo in East Asia is not supported by a close reading of Pyongyangs motives and worldview. The behaviour and statements of the regime suggest that the DPRK is predisposed to accept the logic of deterrence in its relationship with the US. As long as Washington maintains an active and robust posture of extended strategic deterrence on the Korean peninsula, the regime in Pyongyang will continue to be dissuaded from initiating the use of nuclear weapons against other regional states.

Australia's Nuclear Horizon: Moving Beyond the Drumbeat of Risk Inflation

The 2006 Switkowski review report commissioned by the Howard government highlighted some of the economic and foreign policy benefits that could flow from a major expansion of Australias uranium export program. It also identified the long-term advantages for Australias energy security flowing from the development of a national nuclear industry. The report has been condemned by anti-nuclear groups, who argue that proposals for Australias continuing and, possibly, deeper involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle are unacceptable. The primary risk identified is that Australian uranium exports will contribute to global nuclear proliferation pressures, but claims concerning nuclear-related terrorism are also an increasingly common theme in anti-nuclear commentary. These arguments, in turn, are framed within a broader set of assumptions about the ‘immoral’ nature of any engagement in the nuclear fuel cycle. This article examines the most prominent claims put forward by anti-nuclear proponents and argues that many of them are based on an unnecessary inflation of risk.