Stephan Fruehling

Creating the next generation of NATO partnerships

Abstract NATO has a panoply of legacy partnership programmes, which should be reviewed as part of the development of a new Strategic Concept. Stephan Frühling and Benjamin Schreer argue that NATO should conceive of its partnerships in terms of the provision of public security goods, and base its activities on a more explicit consideration of the Alliances strategic interests. In combination, both aspects can achieve consensus about goals and means, provide greater coherence, and better communicate NATOs activities and intentions.

The fuzzy limits of self-reliance: US extended deterrence and Australian strategic policy

As a close US ally, Australia is often seen as a recipient of US extended deterrence. This article argues that in recent decades, Australian strategic policy engaged with US extended deterrence at three different levels: locally, Australia eschews US combat support and deterrence under the policy of self-reliance; regionally, it supports US extended deterrence in Asia; globally, it relies on the US alliance against nuclear threats to Australia. The article argues that in none of these policy areas does the Australian posture conform to a situation of extended deterrence proper. Moreover, when the 2009 White Paper combines all three policies in relation to major power threats against Australia, serious inconsistencies result in Australias strategic posture—a situation the government should seek to avoid in the White Paper being drafted at the time of writing.

Never Say Never: Considerations about the Possibility of Australia Acquiring Nuclear Weapons

Abstract Australias decision to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons was taken on medium-term strategic grounds. While similar circumstances prevail today, it is possible to identify three conditions for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Australia to be a credible option: the existence of a major threat to Australia; a loss of confidence in US guarantees; and allied acquiescence to an Australian nuclear program. These conditions interact with Australias relationship with Indonesia and the technological and industrial feasibility of “tactical” and “strategic” nuclear weapons postures, respectively. The only Australian nuclear posture that does not lack credibility in light of all these factors is the use of “tactical” weapons to deter major landings on the Australian mainland.

NATO'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND US COMMITMENTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

Abstract The rise of China poses a great challenge for the transatlantic alliance. Although the common values that bind Europe and North America will not vanish, increasing demands on US resources from the Asia-Pacific region will erode the pre-eminence of the Atlantic alliance in American security policy. NATO must therefore adapt to the new reality by acknowledging the global nature of US commitments in its new Strategic Concept – and European powers must have a debate about the implications of East Asia for their own security.

Australian defence policy and the concept of self-reliance

Since the Vietnam War, Australian defence policy has been based on the concept of self-reliance—the ability to defend Australia without allied combat forces. Self-reliance arose from concerns about US support in conflict with Indonesia. It has implications for Australian foreign policy, force structuring, joint operations and the defence industry, which were most coherently laid out in the 1987 White Paper. Later White Papers adapted this framework, but the 2013 White Paper seems to move towards a new approach to defence policy and strategy, which continued use of the term ‘self-reliance’ obscures rather than elucidates.

Uncertainty, Forecasting and the Difficulty of Strategy

Strategy in practice inevitably involves the forecasting of future cause-effect relationships. Four basic sources of uncertainty that make it difficult to predict and “test” these relationships, associated variables, as well as parameters can be distinguished: aleatory uncertainty; complex systems; mental, cognitive and physiological limits; and the enemy. To a varying degree, all four contribute to the difficulty inherent in predicting the international security environment, intelligence and deception, friction, strategic interactions with the enemy, and revolutions in military affairs. Since none of the basic sources of uncertainty can be eliminated by technical or organizational measures, strategy will always remain difficult.

Defence Planning and Uncertainty : Preparing for the Next Asia-Pacific War

1. Introduction: Defence Planning and the Problem of China 2. Defence Planning as Risk Management 3. Net Assessment-Based Planning 4. Mobilization Planning 5. Portfolio Planning 6. Task-Based Planning 7. US Defence Planning Frameworks and the Rise of China 8. Managing the Risk of Conflict in 21st Century Asia 9. Enduring Tensions in Defence Planning

The ‘Natural Ally’? The ‘Natural Partner’? — Australia and the Atlantic Alliance

Among the long list of states with which NATO intensified its relations after September 2001, Australia appears to be a ‘natural partner’ for the Alliance (Myrli, 2008). As a Western liberal democracy rooted in the Westminster tradition, it is culturally and politically close to both European and North American countries. Throughout its history, it has been closely allied to the UK and, since World War II, to the US. Through the ANZUS Treaty, the US and Australia have exchanged pledges of mutual assistance. Australia also has a significant number of troops deployed to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, most of which are operating in Oruzgan province in Regional Command South. With 1550 personnel, Australia was the largest non-NATO troop contributor to ISAF in 2010, ranking 10th out of 43 troop-contributing nations overall (NATO, 2010a).

Offense and Defense in Strategy

The terms and are central to strategic questions, yet established conceptions relate to technical-tactical, operational, or political/ethical/legal aspects of war. While they are applicable to different levels of strategy, they are not necessarily compatible, and can not serve to classify strategy as a whole. This article proposes a strategic understanding of the two terms, and defines three strategic types of offense (imposition of control, compellence, exhaustion) and defense (repellence, deterrence by punishment, assertive disarmament). Any theory of victory must combine the two, but success for both sides in a conflict is easier to achieve in the defensive than in the offensive aspect.