Anna Abraham

Gender and creativity: an overview of psychological and neuroscientific literature

The topic of gender differences in creativityxa0is one that generates substantial scientific and public interest, but also courts considerable controversy. Owing to the heterogeneous nature of the findings associated with this line of research, the general picture often appears puzzling or obscure. This article presents a selective overview of psychological and neuroscientific literature that has a relevant bearing on the theme of gender and creativity. Topics that are explored include the definition and methods of assessing creativity, a summary of behavioral investigations on gender in relation to creativity, postulations that have beenxa0put forward to understand gender differences in creative achievement, gender-based differences in the structure and function of the brain, gender-related differences in behavioral performance on tasks of normative cognition, and neuroscientific studies of gender and creativity. The article ends with a detailed discussion of the idea that differences between men and women in creative cognition are best explained with reference to the gender-dependent adopted strategies or cognitive style when faced with generative tasks.

Is there an inverted-U relationship between creativity and psychopathology?

A commentary on the Research Topic n nMadness and Creativity: Yes, No or Maybe? n nEdited by Anna Abraham n nFew issues polarize the scientific community within the field of creativity as the purported association between creativity and psychopathology. The idea that the two are intimately linked dates back to Greek antiquity where the mental state of creative individuals during idea generation was noted to be highly aberrant. However, such eccentric states were not held to reflect clinical levels of mental illness until the 1800s (Becker, 2001). n nThe intuitive appeal of this connection partly stems from the commonalities we associate with mental illness and creativity, including a high tolerance for ambiguity, the ability to generate non-generic conceptual connections, and the adoption of alternative perspectives (Abraham, in press). Moreover, higher than average incidences of mental illness are found among people who practice professions that demand high levels of creativity, such as visual artists and writers (Kyaga et al., 2011; Simonton, 2014). The information processing mechanism that is generally proposed as underlying the link between creativity and psychopathology is that shortcomings during normative cognition (e.g., cognitive disinhibition), that are characteristic of certain psychiatric populations (e.g., psychosis), may translate to benefits in the context of creative cognition (Carson, 2011). n nThere are, however, also good grounds to be skeptical of the “mad genius” meme, which some argue is a quixotic notion at best (Schlesinger, 2009). For one thing, many of the studies that have been used to support this idea have come under a lot of criticism on methodological counts (Thys et al., 2014). Some have even shown that the presence of psychopathological traits explains only a paltry amount of the variance in creative performance (Silvia and Kimbrel, 2010). In addition, notwithstanding notable exceptions (e.g., van Gogh), individuals who achieved creative eminence in their fields were not operating at peak levels of productivity when they reached the point of severe mental illness. n nSo how can we make sense of this picture given that the evidence of a positive relationship between creativity and mental illness is clearly mixed? One approach would be to breakdown the empirical investigations that have assessed this link into meaningful categories based on a specific criterion and to evaluate whether any systematic patterns emerge as a result. n nThe madness-creativity link has, for instance, been investigated by assessing the performance of both psychiatric populations as well as subclinical populations on measures of creativity (Kaufman, 2014). The most well studied psychiatric populations in this regard include individuals with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and autism. Subclinical populations have also been widely assessed, and these refer to high risk healthy populations who are defined as such because they exhibit a high degree of mental illness-relevant personality traits. The rationale behind investigating subclinical groups is that studying high-functioning individuals who show some degree of predisposition for a clinical disorder enables us to understand the workings of the information processing biases related to that disorder without the burden of having to control for variables that can exert a confounding effect in studies on clinical populations (e.g., medication). Indeed, much evidence points to similarities in the information processing biases (e.g., latent disinhibition) typical of specific clinical groups (e.g., schizophrenia) and their respective subclinical populations (e.g., high psychoticism or schizotypal groups). n nOne means by which the creativity-psychopathology link can be investigated then is to focus on investigations of populations that are documented to have similar information processing biases and to cluster these studies by the type of population (clinical/subclinical) and the severity of disorder (high/low dysfunction). Lets take the premise that reduced top-down down control (influence of knowledge and expectations) on information processing can have a facilitative or debilitative effect on creative cognition. A number of psychiatric populations, such as ADHD and schizophrenia, are associated with poor top-down control and corresponding fronto-striatal dysfunction (Bradshaw and Sheppard, 2000), but these vary greatly in terms of severity. ADHD is associated with top-down deficits such as high levels of distractibility, impulsivity and poor inhibitory control functioning. But these are mild relative to those typically associated with schizophrenia within domains like executive function, working memory, inhibitory control and fluency. Milder still are negative biases in top-down control, such as latent disinhibition, that have been reported in subclinical groups. So does any viable pattern emerge when clustering the findings of such behavioral and neuropsychological studies according to the degree and/or type of top-down insufficiencies: clinical-severe, clinical-moderate, and subclinical-mild? n nA number of studies on subclinical-mild populations, such as individuals who are characterized by the presence of a high degree of either schizotypal or psychoticism traits, have demonstrated that they consistently perform better than their low trait counterparts on some measures of creativity (Schuldberg, 2005; Acar and Sen, 2013). The same is true of populations who display clinical-moderate levels of top-down dysfunction, such as ADHD (Abraham et al., 2006; Healey and Rucklidge, 2006). In contrast, populations who are characterized by clinical-severe levels of top-down dysfunction, such as schizophrenia, perform poorly on almost all measures of creativity (Abraham et al., 2007; Jaracz et al., 2012). This pattern of findings suggests that while subclinical-mild and clinical-moderate levels of top-down dysfunction can, under specific conditions, confer selective advantages in creative cognition, clinical-severe levels of top-down dysfunction leads to impoverished creative thinking. A minimal level of function is probably essential to develop the original ideas one generates into something more tangible than a fleeting thought. n nThe effects of alterations in top-down control on creative performance can therefore be parsimoniously conceptualized in terms of an inverted-U shaped function or an inverted backward-J function (Figure u200b(Figure1).1). Direct investigations are necessary to reveal the precise pattern of this relationship. While diffuse or defocused top-down control in information processing may abet creative cognition, too much (normal) or too little (defective) top-down control can hinder or disrupt the same (Abraham, in press). An inverted-U function in this context is postulated to account for the abundance of conflicting findings associated with investigating the creativity-psychopathology link. The strength of this hypothesis is that it is one that readily lends itself to empirical investigation. n n n nFigure 1 n nThe hypothesized relationship between the capacity to generate original responses during creative thinking (range: low to high) and the degree of functionality in top-down control of information processing (range: normal to impaired).

Semantic memory as the root of imagination

“Imagination is what makes our sensory experience meaningful, enabling us to interpret and make sense of it, whether from a conventional perspective or from a fresh, original, individual one. It is what makes perception more than the mere physical stimulation of sense organs. It also produces mental imagery, visual and otherwise, which is what makes it possible for us to think outside the confines of our present perceptual reality, to consider memories of the past and possibilities for the future, and to weigh alternatives against one another. Thus, imagination makes possible all our thinking about what is, what has been, and, perhaps most important, what might be.”—Nigel J. T. Thomas (2004, as cited in Manu, 2006, p. 47)1. n nInvestigations of the information processing mechanisms that underlie imaginative thought typically focus on a single branch of imagination, such as prospection, mental imagery or creativity, and are often generalized as being insightful to understanding the workings of imagination in general. In reality, however, there is very little in the way of theoretical or empirical exchange between the scientific communities that conduct research within the different domains of imagination. As a result, the research impetus in each of the sub-domains may be skewed to the pursuit of hypotheses that are not particularly viable in terms of understanding imagination as a whole. An example of this is pegging the roots of imagination to the processes of episodic memory—a reasonable assumption to make based on studies of episodic prospection. However, the associated findings and theoretical conclusions that follow are not entirely consistent with the literature on the mechanisms underlying creativity (Bubic and Abraham, 2014), which is another core realm of imagination. n nIn an effort to promote interchange across the frontiers of imagination, in this Opinion Article we put forward the idea that all aspects of imagination emerge from semantic memory with increasingly higher-order levels of imaginative information processing emanating from and interacting with existing systems, eventually expanding beyond these to form new systems (Figure u200b(Figure1).1). We compare the associated neurocognitive findings and assumptions in terms of their fit with current knowledge in other fields of imagination and discuss their implications for reformulating hypotheses regarding imagination as a whole. n n n nFigure 1 n nAn informal illustration of how imaginative processes emerge from and expand beyond semantic memory operations.

The imaginative mind.

The astounding capacity for the human imagination to be engaged across a wide range of contexts is limitless and fundamental to our day‐to‐day experiences. Although processes of imagination are central to human psychological function, they rarely occupy center stage in academic discourse or empirical study within psychological and neuroscientific realms. The aim of this paper is to tackle this imbalance by drawing together the multitudinous facets of imagination within a common framework. The processes fall into one of five categories depending on whether they are characterized as involving perceptual/motor related mental imagery, intentionality or recollective processing, novel combinatorial or generative processing, exceptional phenomenology in the aesthetic response, or altered psychological states which range from commonplace to dysfunctional. These proposed categories are defined on the basis of theoretical ideas from philosophy as well as empirical evidence from neuroscience. By synthesizing the findings across these domains of imagination, this novel five‐part or quinquepartite classification of the human imagination aids in systematizing, and thereby abets, our understanding of the workings and neural foundations of the human imagination. It would serve as a blueprint to direct further advances in the field of imagination while also promoting crosstalk with reference to stimulus‐oriented facets of information processing. A biologically and ecologically valid psychology is one that seeks to explain fundamental aspects of human nature. Given the ubiquitous nature of the imaginative operations in our daily lives, there can be little doubt that these quintessential aspects of the mind should be central to the discussion. Hum Brain Mapp 37:4197–4211, 2016.

Editorial: Madness and creativity-yes, no or maybe?

There is something inherently appealing about the idea that creativity and psychopathology are inextricably linked. The eagerness with which this idea is perpetuated and often exaggerated was evidenced most recently in the media frenzy following the publication of a genome-wide association study which demonstrated what in effect was a modest genetic association between creativity and psychosis (Power et al., 2015). n nFor most investigators of the madness-creativity nexus, the question is not really answered with the categorical and binary choice of whether or not there is an association. Advocates of the “No” camp answer in the negative because they are unconvinced by the quantity and/or quality of evidence provided to support the connection. The same evidence is gauged by “Yes” advocates as constituting enough proof for the claim. It is only by venturing below the surface to understand the actual nature of the association that one can see why this is such a divisive issue. A variety of questions emerge. What is the strength and shape of this association? Is the relation mechanistic? Does one emerge as an epiphenomenon of the other? Is the similarity merely superficial? Is this a question worth asking? Are we asking the wrong question? n nThe purpose of this Research Topic was to motivate theorists and researchers in the field to take a stance in answering this question given the available evidence thus far (Kaufman, 2014). It is very telling that none of the 14 contributions advocated a resounding “Yes” verdict. The reason for this is straightforward. It is patently clear that the evidence to make a strong claim in the affirmative (all highly creative people have some form of mental illness; all people who have some form of mental illness are highly creative) simply does not exist. So any arguments of deductive reasoning that follow from either of these false premises would be invalid. n nThe “No” camp has one flag-bearer who, on the basis of grounds such as paucity of empirical evidence, selective data reporting, heterogeneity in types of mental illness, and heuristics-based reasoning behind the link, asserts not only that there is no positive relationship between creativity and mental illness, but that the relationship is in fact negative (Dietrich, 2014). From this standpoint, it is good mental health that leads to more creativity as the need to be creative is part of the self-actualization drive that sits atop the hierarchy of needs pyramid (Maslow, 1943). n nIn not taking a clear side on the debate, the “Maybe” (or “Yes, but”) camp provides a rich variety of perspectives that seek to uncover the dynamics of the relation between creativity and psychopathology. Some provide methods-based grounds for why the association can be both positive and negative. One commentary addresses the issue of sampling which, as the cross-sectional distribution of creative productivity is highly skewed, gives rise to divergent findings depending on which part of the distribution is being sampled (Simonton, 2014). Another focuses on the metric of information processing biases which are held to orchestrate the connection between creativity and psychopathology (Abraham, 2014). As this relationship follows an inverted-U as opposed to a linear function, it can result in evidence for associations in either direction. A case in point on how evidence of the creativity-psychopathology link is necessarily tied to the type of creativity measure being employed as well as to various forms of psychopathology is showcased in one of the original research articles (Zabelina et al., 2014). That a coherent picture can only be drawn with the explicit consideration and unambiguous acknowledgment of the nature of the construct under study, in terms of definition, operationalization, measures of assessment and populations sampled to assess the association, was highlighted in one of the opinion articles (Fisher, 2015). n nDrawing from evolutionary mechanisms that are held to underlie the core components of creativity: novelty (through generators of variation) and usefulness (through generators of fit selection), one postulation is that psychopathology may stem from the extreme ends of these operating principles—psychosis in the case of novelty and autism in the case of usefulness (Jung, 2014). The need to distinguish between different types of psychopathology in relation to creativity, especially in light of the potentially contradictory findings that often result, is captured effectively in one of the original research articles, where creative performance was positively correlated with the analytical/systemizing facets of autistic spectrum characteristics and negatively correlated with the social/empathizing elements of the same (Takeuchi et al., 2014). Others have emphasized that any resemblance in the performance of highly creative people with certain forms of psychopathology is limited to novelty generation as, unlike in the case of psychopathology, highly creative individuals exert efficient control in evaluating the appropriateness of their ideational output (Fink et al., 2014). n nSome perspectives showcase brain-based approaches in verifying the link between creativity and psychopathology. Relatively global differences in terms of brain organization, such as via hemispheric asymmetry, are among the earliest ideas that have been put forward to characterize the association (Lindell, 2014). The alternative approach is to focus on specific brain regions and networks. Given the predominant role played by the prefrontal cortex in orchestrating virtually all facets of higher-order function, one means of assessing mechanisms of creative cognition is in terms of prefrontal function and dysfunction. The evidence paradoxically indicates that both enhanced and diminished creative function can result from damage to different parts of this brain structure when evaluating spontaneous versus controlled aspects of the creative process (de Souza et al., 2014). One network-based hypothesis holds that the creativity-psychopathology link is an epiphenomenon that results when the neurocognitive tradeoff between rule-based/top-down systems (prefrontal) and data-driven/bottom-up systems (sensorimotor) is compromised (Ramey and Chrysikou, 2014). This vulnerability often leads to an increase in output quantity (fluency), which in turn gives rise to an increased likelihood of output quality (novelty/uniqueness). An alternate conceptualization of balance between two regulatory systems as mediating the creativity-psychopathology link is that of stability versus flexibility in neural network dynamics, specifically in relation to dopamine and response entropy (Bilder and Knudsen, 2014). n nClinically-based perspectives turn the tide of this dialogue on its head by exploring the alternate possibility that undergoing psychopathological states is what motivates afflicted individuals to seek creative avenues in order to improve their psychological health and well-being (Forgeard and Elstein, 2014). A vital insight of this perspective is that the drive may not be to increase creative output per se but to enhance crucial competencies such as flexibility and self-efficacy, which are related but not analogous to creativity. Other accounts focus on the need to consider that the presence of specific personality traits which often accompany psychopathological states, such as openness to experience, may serve as protective factors by channeling the chaotic drive for novelty generation in a productive manner (Kaufman and Paul, 2014). n nIn bringing these different perspectives together in one common forum, the hope is that this collective effort at addressing this intriguing question will lead to further constructive dialogue and debate in the scientific arena by adding more substance and rigor to discussions of the association between creativity and psychopathology.

Creative conceptual expansion: A combined fMRI replication and extension study to examine individual differences in creativity

ABSTRACT The aims of this fMRI study were two‐fold. The first objective of the study was to verify whether the findings associated with a previous fMRI study could be replicated in which a novel event‐related experimental design was developed which rendered it possible to investigate the brain basis of creative conceptual expansion. The ability to widen the boundaries of conceptual structures is integral to creative idea generation, which makes conceptual expansion a core component of creative cognition. Creative conceptual expansion led to the engagement of brain regions that are known to be involved in the access, storage and relational integration of conceptual knowledge in the original study. These included the anterior inferior frontal gyrus, the temporal poles and the lateral frontal pole. These findings in relation to the brain basis of creative conceptual expansion were replicated in the current study. The second objective of this study was to evaluate the brain basis of individual differences in creative conceptual expansion. The high creative group relative to the low creative group was shown to exhibit greater activity in regions of the semantic cognition network as well as the salience network during creative conceptual expansion. The findings are discussed from the point of view of classical hypotheses about information processing biases that explain individual differences in creativity including flat associative hierarchies, defocused attention and cognitive disinhibition. HighlightsThe present study replicated previous fMRI findings on creative conceptual expansion.Implicated regions underlie access, storage and integration of conceptual knowledge.Individual differences in creative conceptual expansion were also examined.High creatives engage regions within semantic cognition and salience networks.

Commentary: Creativity and Memory: Effects of an Episodic-Specificity Induction on Divergent Thinking.

Madore et al. (2015) reported evidence in support of the idea that episodic-specificity induction facilitates creative thinking. In this Commentary, I draw attention to the issue of clarity in the targeting of creativity-relevant operations. The basis of these concerns is grounded in the atypical nature of the adopted methodological protocols as well as the terminology used to refer to the measures of interest. Such inconsistencies could lead to confusion or the perpetuation of misguided notions. The objective of this commentary is to therefore lay bare these concerns so that future investigations based on this study will be mindful of the same.

How Social Dynamics Shape Our Understanding of Reality

Abraham examines the intrinsic effortless capacity for human beings to create and immerse themselves in multiple fictional worlds yet still not lose sight of reality. The reality–fiction distinction is discussed both as a developmental phenomenon and as an emergent product of our social experience. It is argued that the reality–fiction distinction is facilitated by spontaneous attributions of personal relevance, which is mainly defined by a variety of cultural factors.

Biases in probabilistic category learning in relation to social anxiety.

Instrumental learning paradigms are rarely employed to investigate the mechanisms underlying acquired fear responses in social anxiety. Here, we adapted a probabilistic category learning paradigm to assess information processing biases as a function of the degree of social anxiety traits in a sample of healthy individuals without a diagnosis of social phobia. Participants were presented with three pairs of neutral faces with differing probabilistic accuracy contingencies (A/B: 80/20, C/D: 70/30, E/F: 60/40). Upon making their choice, negative and positive feedback was conveyed using angry and happy faces, respectively. The highly socially anxious group showed a strong tendency to be more accurate at learning the probability contingency associated with the most ambiguous stimulus pair (E/F: 60/40). Moreover, when pairing the most positively reinforced stimulus or the most negatively reinforced stimulus with all the other stimuli in a test phase, the highly socially anxious group avoided the most negatively reinforced stimulus significantly more than the control group. The results are discussed with reference to avoidance learning and hypersensitivity to negative socially evaluative information associated with social anxiety.