Anna Gerbrandy

De Kip als symptoom

‘Weet je, misschien hebben we nu wel genoeg over de Kip gehoord’, verzuchtte een bevriende advocaat die terugkwam van een van de grote jaarcongressen Mededingingsrecht. Hebben we inderdaad genoeg over de Kip van Morgen gepraat? Natuurlijk, er was discussie bij de SER, politieke discussie, discussie in het mededingingsrechtelijke discours en – zo kan ik mij voorstellen – discussie bij ACM en bij het ministerie, waar nieuwe beleidsregels in de maak zijn. En toch kom ik terug op de Kip. Want de Kip van Morgen is niet alleen maar een zaak, maar misschien ook wel een symptoom. Net als het Energieakkoord, de Bloedkolen-zaak, Living wages, en het comazuipprobleem. Dus lijkt het me tijd voor een wat fundamentelere vraag: waarom is dit (dit type zaken, u begrijpt me wel) ineens een probleem? Een eerste antwoord ligt in de doelstellingendiscussie: door de economisering van het mededingingsrecht is er geen ruimte meer voor de ‘meerderedoelstellingen-naast-elkaar’ opvatting. Ik ben tot nu toe niet overtuigd van de juridische juistheid van dit standpunt, maar dat is hier niet het punt. Het doelstellingenantwoord is niet helemaal een bevredigend antwoord want daarin ontbreekt de kant van de ondernemingen. Zijn zij zich publieke belangen meer gaan aantrekken? Er is nogal wat academische literatuur over maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen waarin een antwoord wordt gezocht op de vraag waarom ondernemingen zich meer dan alleen shareholder value aantrekken (dus feitelijk) en over waarom dat ook zou moeten (dus normatief). Omdat er een moreel-ethische verplichting op ondernemingen rust; uit altruisme; vanwege het collectieve-actieprobleem; omdat het maatschappelijk middenveld en de kritische massa van de consument daar aanleiding toe geven; omdat er winstkansen liggen;

Prospective Analysis and Establishing Substantive Truth in Review of Merger Decisions in Court

In judicial review of decisions of administrative authorities courts generally aim towards grounding a judgment on substantively true facts. Such a substantive truth is usually understood as meaning ’that which happened’. But how can true facts be established if the facts have not yet occurred and what implications does this have for judicial review in administrative procedures? In this article this question will be analysed by taking the Dutch Administrative Court’s review of merger decisions of the Dutch Competition Authority - using a substantively close copy of the European merger control assessment framework - as subject of analysis. Judicial review of the substantive assessment in merger control, including the prospective analysis involved and taking into account complexities of economic evidence, will be analyzed and set against the general aim of establishing substantive truth of facts.

Addressing the Legitimacy-Problem of Competition Authorities Taking into Account Non-Competition Values

In this paper we will address the problem of legitimacy of decisions of competition authorities where competition authorities would include non-competition elements, such as concerns for a sustainable society, in their assessment of co-operation agreements between companies. We will use shorthand to indicate this problem as ‘the legitimacy-problem’. The non-competition elements are also called non-economic interests, public interests or public values. ‘Sustainability-interests’, or at least part of what is covered by the notion of sustainability is felt to be such a on-competition element. We will first sketch the legitimacy-problem in the broader context of taking into account non-competition interests by competition authorities (subsection 2). We will then briefly discuss the concept of legitimacy, though without being able todo justice to the rich literature relating to this concept. We will also indicate why legitimacy in procedures of decision-making at competition authorities should be enhanced, specifically when dealing with non-competition interests (subsection 3). We will continue with a discussion of possible ways of addressing this problem, including some innovations to decision-making procedures (subsection 4), and take into consideration some problematic aspects of the solutions proposed (subsection 5). We will end with some concluding remarks (subsection 6).

European Competition Law for a Sustainable Society: A Research Agenda

This paper suggests a research agenda to integrate the public interest notion of sustainability in European Competition Law.

Competition Law and Sustainable Development. An Inquiry by Legal Essay.

If society takes a turn towards organizing itself on a sustainable footing then the economic order of society, and with it the law, will (have to) change. It follows that if law is understood as consisting of legal rules, regulations and their enforcement which govern the (legal) relationships between actors in society, then economic law - as governing these relationships of the economic order - will have to change to accommodate a changing society. This includes that part of economic law that relates to the government regulating economic relations on the market: public economic law. Competition law is part of public economic law. In this essay I will investigate what the above means for European competition law. Competition law and policy can be seen as a tool - an instrument - to attain a societal goal.It is part of the larger toolbox of economic policy, which in turn is part of the organization of (the economic order of) society. Competition policy applies to market relations: the interaction between companies and the relationship between government and companies. This essay starts from the proposition that current competition law can be a stumbling block for private sustainability-initiatives. This proposition is explained, but will be preceded by an introduction relating to the meaning of the all-compassing, and therefore threateningly empty, concept of sustainable development. The essay will then foray into a discussion of how to solve the problem of competition law for a sustainable society and well end with some conclusion as to that topic.

Procedural Convergence in Competition Law

In this article I will address the question of whether substantive statutory convergence, by which is meant that national statutory law holds norms that are substantively the same as European law norms, is followed by spontaneous procedural convergence. This question will be addressed in focusing on Dutch competition law, which is substantively the same as EC competition law. This means that at the statutory level there is substantive convergence, but not necessarily statutory procedural convergence. Following a general assumption that procedural law is shaped by substantive law, the expectation may be that the statutory substantive convergence in Dutch competition law will give rise to procedural convergence at the level of the courts. Though this article focuses on the influence of European procedural law on national Dutch court proceedings, its findings have a wider relevance, because of the implications these findings may have on the thesis of a general developing procedural ius commune.