Miroslava Scholten

Mind the trend! Enforcement of EU law has been moving to ‘Brussels’

ABSTRACT The EU has become increasingly involved in enforcing European Union (EU) law, including directly vis-à-vis private actors. (Multilevel implementation) research has so far neglected the question of what role it is necessary for the EU to play in this direct enforcement of EU law in order to promote the implementation of EU policies. Given the purpose of this collection of works to discuss innovative approaches in multilevel implementation, this contribution unravels three of the EU’s direct enforcement strategies. It provides original data in relation to proliferating EU entities with direct enforcement powers and to EU enforcement networks, as well as discussing the EU’s growing influence over national direct enforcement via EU hard, soft and case law. It outlines the problem-solving potential of such enforcement strategies and signals the challenges that they bring along. The aim is to urge and facilitate further research on the EU’s (direct) enforcement strategies, their legitimacy, effectiveness and operation.

From Regulation to Enforcement in the EU Policy Cycle: A New Type of Functional Spillover?*

The European Union has acquired enforcement competences in areas where it previously only had regulatory authority. This expansion of competences from one step in the policy cycle to another is a blind spot in the works on functional spillover. While the increasing enforcement powers of the EU are mentioned, it is in the context of more competences, not what type. This paper investigates the nature of this ‘policy cycle type of functional spillover’, argues that this is a new type of functional spillover and discusses the significance of this finding. The paper offers original data concerning the expansion of EUs competences in direct enforcement.

Independence vs. Accountability:: Proving the Negative Correlation

Independence and accountability ... accountability and independence ... these have become two ‘usual suspects’ when talking about independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), the classic question being whether IRAs can be accountable, if they are independent.1 While the contradiction between these two terms seems quite obvious, in recent years, scholars seem to have given more attention to the issue of how to accommodate these arguably mutually exclusive notions. According to Majone, ‘independence and accountability should be seen as complementary and mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive’.2 Busuioc distinguishes between ex ante (statutory provisions), ongoing (direct infl uence) and ex post (accountability) controls and argues that it is the ongoing control that precludes any independence; accountability and independence can therefore co-exist.3 Which is the right way? Are accountability and independence mutually complementary or mutually exclusive? Th is article proves the negative correlation between accountability and independence. It shows that the more independence there is, the less available accountability channels and accountability instruments become, and the other way around. It does so by bringing

Towards a European Division of Labour: Do Europe’s Crises Highlight Structural Challenges to Sustainable Economic Growth in the Eurozone?

The financial and economic crises of the last few years in many Southern Eurozone countries are generally studied individually, without reference to other such crises in the region. In this note, we argue that they may also be approached as symptoms of an underlying structural challenge facing the EU economy. In many ways the relationship between northern and southern Eurozone countries seems remarkably similar to typical economic centre–periphery relations, yet without the harmonizing role that a national government could play. The occurrence and combination of crises seems to be indicative of what one would expect from the adverse effects of centre–periphery relations among countries. Unfortunately, this would imply that the crises we are currently seeing are likely to continuously reoccur in the near future to the detriment of sustainable economic growth and political-economic stability in Europe.

The proliferation of EU enforcement authorities: a new development in law enforcement in the EU: Implications for Political and Judicial Accountability

Recently, the powers of the European Union (EU) have evolved from being mainly regulatory to include also direct enforcement competences. Rather than monitoring the enforcement efforts of national authorities (indirect enforcement), direct enforcement by the EU implies that EU enforcement authorities (EEAs) have the power to monitor adherence to legal rules by private actors, as well as to investigate and sanction alleged violations of EU law by those actors. The shift of power from the national to the EU level, especially in such an area as law enforcement, raises concerns about how to ensure democratic control and the rule of law. These concerns are not without valid reasons.1 In the light of such concerns, the aim of this edited collection is to analyse whether and how the shift of direct enforcement power to the EU level has been accompanied by establishing relevant accountability systems. What challenges in terms of democratic control and the rule of law does this development bring about and how could or should those challenges be addressed? Since 1999, the number of EEAs has grown from one to eight: the Commission (Directorate-General for Competition, ‘Directorate-F’ (on food law) and the Anti-Fraud Office/OLAF); European Medicines

The Sense and Nonsense of the EU Integration Debate

The current financial crisis in the Eurozone has put the debate on EU integration back on the table. Yet, how does the debate on EU integration, particularly the arguments and ideals used in it, actually influence the process of EU integration? This article wishes to provide some food for thought by arguing the debate’s irrelevance in furthering or hindering EU integration process. It does so by discussing the role of the debate’s arguments in shaping EU integration and comparing the EU debate with the one that the founding fathers of the US waged. The article shows the debate is beside the point largely because most steps in EU integration are driven by circumstances, events, or national interests, that even when one argument seems decisive it is likely to be elevated over others by circumstances, and that none of the debate’s arguments hold an intrinsic value over others.

'Independent, hence unaccountable'?

‘Independent, hence unaccountable?’ This article questions the causal relationship between agencies’ accountability problems and their ‘independence’. It does so by arguing that independent agencies are not that ‘special’ in the sense of being independent and that the revealed accountability problems in the cases of independent agencies are not caused by their independence. The article invites to extend the debate on the executive’s accountability beyond the somewhat attractive case of independent agencies. It uses a comparative legal approach and focuses on independent agencies from the EU and the US to exemplify the discussed issues.