Anna Shubina
Dartmouth College
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Publication
Featured researches published by Anna Shubina.
wireless network security | 2010
Chrisil Arackaparambil; Sergey Bratus; Anna Shubina; David Kotz
Determining whether a client station should trust an access point is a known problem in wireless security. Traditional approaches to solving this problem resort to cryptography. But cryptographic exchange protocols are complex and therefore induce potential vulnerabilities in themselves. We show that measurement of clock skews of access points in an 802.11 network can be useful in this regard, since it provides fingerprints of the devices. Such fingerprints can be used to establish the first point of trust for client stations wishing to connect to an access point. Fingerprinting can also be used in the detection of fake access points. We demonstrate deficiencies of previously studied methods that measure clock skews in 802.11 networks by means of an attack that spoofs clock skews. We then provide means to overcome those deficiencies, thereby improving the reliability of fingerprinting. Finally, we show how to perform the clock-skew arithmetic that enables network providers to publish clock skews of their access points for use by clients.
ieee international symposium on parallel distributed processing workshops and phd forum | 2010
Chrisil Arackaparambil; Sergey Bratus; Joshua Brody; Anna Shubina
In this work we consider the problem of monitoring information streams for anomalies in a scalable and efficient manner. We study the problem in the context of network streams where the problem has received significant attention.
Sigecom Exchanges | 2003
Anna Shubina; Sean W. Smith
Privacy-providing tools, including tools that provide anonymity, are gaining popularity in the modern world. Among the goals of their users is avoiding tracking and profiling. While some businesses are unhappy with the growth of privacy-enhancing technologies, others can use lack of information about their users to avoid unnecessary liability and even possible harassment by parties with contrary business interests, and to gain a competitive market edge.Currently, users interested in anonymous browsing have the choice only between single-hop proxies and the few more complex systems that are available. These still leave the user vulnerable to long-term intersection attacks.In this paper, we propose a caching proxy system for allowing users to retrieve data from the World-Wide Web in a way that would provide recipient unobservability by a third party and sender unobservability by the recipient and thus dispose with intersection attacks, and report on the prototype we built using Google.
ieee symposium on security and privacy | 2014
Sergey Bratus; Trey Darley; Michael E. Locasto; Meredith L. Patterson; Rebecca Shapiro; Anna Shubina
Big data is changing the landscape of security tools for network monitoring, security information and event management, and forensics; however, in the eternal arms race of attack and defense, security researchers must keep exploring novel ways to mitigate and contain sophisticated attackers.
trust and trustworthy computing | 2010
Sergey Bratus; Ashlyn Lembree; Anna Shubina
We discuss the growing trend of electronic evidence, created automatically by autonomously running software, being used in both civil and criminal court cases. We discuss trustworthiness requirements that we believe should be applied to such software and platforms it runs on. We show that courts tend to regard computer-generated materials as inherently trustworthy evidence, ignoring many software and platform trustworthiness problems well known to computer security researchers. We outline the technical challenges in making evidence-generating software trustworthy and the role Trusted Computing can play in addressing them.
scalable trusted computing | 2010
Anna Shubina; Sergey Bratus; Wyllys Ingersol; Sean W. Smith
Broad adoption of secure programming primitives such as the TPM can be hurt by programmer confusion regarding the nature and representation of failures when using a primitive. Conversely, a clear understanding of the primitives failure modes is essential for both debugging and reducing the attack surface in the mechanisms built on it. In particular, differences in error processing and reporting logic significantly detract from such understanding. We present a case study of diversity in TPM behaviors and its effects on a TSS implementation, which emerged from the Sun/Dartmouth TCG/OpenSolaris project, one of the goals of which was instrumenting TPM support on Solaris. At the start of the project, both parties believed the instrumentation to be well-defined and, although time-consuming, relatively straightforward. In the course of the project we had to reexamine our assumptions concerning the state of the hardware and the software involved and the view of the system as presented to someone unfamiliar with its internals. We describe some failure modes we encountered and suggest directions for remediation.
mathematical foundations of computer science | 2007
Amit Chakrabarti; Anna Shubina
A private information retrieval scheme is a protocol whereby a client obtains a record from a database without the database operators learning anything about which record the client requested. This concept is well studied in the theoretical computer science literature. Here, we study a generalization of this idea where we allow a small amount of information about the clients intent to be leaked. Despite having relaxed the privacy requirement, we are able to prove three fairly strong lower bounds on such schemes, for various parameter settings. These bounds extend previously known lower bounds in the traditional setting of perfect privacy and, in one case, improve upon the previous best result that handled imperfect privacy.
recent advances in intrusion detection | 2008
Sergey Bratus; Joshua Brody; David Kotz; Anna Shubina
Information-theoretic metrics hold great promise for modeling traffic and detecting anomalies if only they could be computed in an efficient, scalable way. Recent advances in streaming estimation algorithms give hope that such computations can be made practical. We describe our work in progress that aims to use streaming algorithms on 802.11a/b/g link layer (and above) features and feature pairs to detect anomalies.
Cyberpatterns | 2014
Sergey Bratus; Julian Bangert; Alexandar Gabrovsky; Anna Shubina; Michael E. Locasto; Daniel Bilar
You do not understand how your program really works until it has been exploited. We believe that computer scientists and software engineers should regard the activity of modern exploitation as an applied discipline that studies both the actual computational properties and the practical computational limits of a target platform or system. Exploit developers study the computational properties of software that are not studied elsewhere, and they apply unique engineering techniques to the challenging engineering problem of dynamically patching and controlling a running system. These techniques leverage software and hardware composition mechanisms in unexpected ways to achieve such control. Although unexpected, such composition is not arbitrary, and it forms the basis of a coherent engineering workflow. This chapter contains a top-level overview of these approaches and their historical development.
Information Technology | 2017
Sergey Bratus; Anna Shubina
Abstract This position paper discusses the need for modeling exploit computations and discusses possible formal approaches to it.