Anne Yvrande-Billon

The Attribution Process of Delegation Contracts in the French Urban Public Transport Sector: Why Competitive Tendering is a Myth

This paper analyses the French recent experience of franchising in the urban public transport sector in the light of Transaction Cost Economics arguments. It provides theoretical arguments supported by empirical evidence explaining why the compulsory use of competitive tendering in this sector did not translate into better performance, the main reasons being the lack of transparency of the attribution process and the limited monitoring capabilities of local authorities.

Delivering Value for Money to Government through Efficient and Effective Public Transit Service Continuity: Some Thoughts

Abstract This paper documents some thoughts on the reform agenda in public transit that is occurring throughout the world. The specific focus is on a growing commitment to competitive regulation through competitive tendering, and the efforts by a few governments (notably in Australia) to take control of the tangible assets used by private operators as a mechanism to exercise the opportunity, if so taken, to put services out to competitive tender. The paper reviews the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on contracting regimes and asset ownership, and the role that government and the operator might play in a setting in which building trusting and collaborative partnerships has merit in delivering services that are in the main funded from the public purse.

Franchising Public Services: An Analysis of the Duration of Passenger Rail Franchises in Great Britain

for two decades, the procurement of public utilities has been engaged in a process of intensive reform. One type of organizational change that has been massively introduced is the use of franchise agreements for the provision of public services. This is the choice adopted by the reformers of the British railways, who decided to franchise the passenger rail service. But, whereas the theory on utilities restructuring recommends turning to long-term contracting, the British policy makers have chosen to rely on short-term franchise agreements.

The Law of Small Numbers: Investigating the Benefits of Restricted Auctions for Public Procurement

ABSTRACT A commonly accepted view in the academic literature is that dispensing with competition may only be beneficial when tendering complex contracts. However, restricted auctions are frequently used among EU member states to procure small contracts. In this article, we investigate this paradox. Using an original data set of 180 contracts used by a local public buyer of social housing between 2006 and 2009, we show that limiting competition may enable economies to be made on transaction costs while the most efficient bidders still come forward, and that abuses such as corruption or favouritism do not result. To our knowledge, this article is the first to shed light on the advantages of using restricted auctions when tendering small simple contracts.