Carine Staropoli

USING LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS TO DESIGN EFFICIENT MARKET INSTITUTIONS: THE CASE OF WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS

This paper assesses the contribution of laboratory experiments to the economics of design applied to the electricity industry. The analysis is dedicated to wholesale markets, and reviews the results accumulated to date concerning both the general architecture of power markets and the very details of the market rules or institution, that is the auction rule. We argue that these experimental results contribute to a better understanding of the performances properties and implementation features of competitive market designs and that experimental economics has proven very useful to public authorities to inform the restructuring of the electricity industry. It thus confirms the role of experimental economics as a complement to theoretical approaches in the design effort

Cooperation in R&D through a network, an ‘organizational gamble’? an empirical analysis of rhône poulenc rorer-gencell

This paper is based on the empirical analysis of innovation challenges to Rhone Poulenc Rorer-Gencell (RPR-Gencell) resulting from development of biotechnology in the pharmaceutical industy. These we identify as an organizational innovation involving the development of a network of partners following and/or inducing a technological innovation. RPR-Gencell represents a ‘style of innovation’ since it is based on various factors specific to the firm and corresponds to a new organizational form, the ‘tight network’ of partners. We argue that this organizational from, in the context of the development of biotechnology in the pharmaceutical industry, can be likened to an ‘organizational gamble’ associated with a ‘technological gamble’ Altogether, this ‘gamble’ dimension means that the network of partners in R&D is still a marginal organizational form. After an introduction we show that the specficities of the pharmaceutical industry especialy since the emergence of biotechnohgy have led to the emergence of a mu...

Reforming the Reform in the Electricity Industry: Lessons from the British Experience

This book focuses on the diversity of electricity reforms in Western Europe, drawing evidence from ten European Union memberstates plus Norway and Switzerland as associate members. The contributors analyse the various ways of introducing competition in the European electricity industries, and consider both the strategies of electricity companies and their behaviour in electricity marketplaces. They also offer an explanation of the differences of reforms by the institutions and the industrial structures of each country which shape the types of marketrules, industrial restructuring and public service regulations which have been adopted.

Care Supply for Rare Diseases: Some Stakes for an Organizational Innovation within the French Healthcare System

This paper deals with the organizational change in the provision of care for rare diseases, and the creation of a new structure: the centre of reference for rare diseases (CRMR). It aims to show that this new organization of care introduces a new authority within the healthcare organizational structure, by referring of the Transaction costs paradigm and its recognition of hybrid forms. It tackles then several conditions this authority has to fulfill in order to complete CRMR missions and awaited results.

Horizontal and Vertical Agreements in PPPs

This chapter deals with corruption, favoritism, and collusion practices that economists call horizontal and vertical agreements. The authors first introduce the organization of such agreements, how damageable they are, and the way one can fight against these practices. Then, they propose to focus on the auction theory and mechanism design as a way to prevent vertical and horizontal agreements. Indeed, when it comes to complex contracts such as PPPs, negotiated procedures or adaptation of traditional procedures have the potential both to ensure competition and to provide the necessary flexibility to deal with skills and information asymmetries. The authors insist on the need of a robust institutional framework to ensure the credibility of ex ante mechanisms as well as of ex post sanctions.

An experimental study of investment incentives mechanisms in the electricity industry (Revised April 2009)

Energy-only markets are not producing efficient incentives to invest in new generation capacities. Energy spot market prices are short term signals, characterized by spikes and volatility that rise investments risks. New market designs based on the creation of separated long term capacity markets in addition to energy markets aim at correcting this market failure. In this paper, we investigate the efficiency properties of a “forward capacity market” (FCM), using the methods of experimental economics. Our contribution is in the modeling and experimentation of such a market design. Our results from laboratory experiments show that capacity markets give better private incentives to invest in new capacities that energy-only markets. The capacity mechanism also contributes to lower energy market prices in peak and extra peak demand periods.