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Die Legitimation von Ausnahmezuständen. Eine Analyse zeitübergreifender Legitimationsmuster am Beispiel der USA

Ausnahmezustande als kriseninduzierte Expansionen von Exekutivkompetenzen sind in reprasentativen Demokratien gegenuber der politischen Offentlichkeit in besonderem Mase begrundungspflichtig. Der Beitrag untersucht anhand verschiedener Ausnahmesituationen in der Geschichte der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika vom 19. bis ins 21. Jahrhundert, welcher Plausibilisierungsstrategien sich die Exekutivorgane jeweils bedient haben. So entsteht eine den jeweiligen historischen Kontext einer Krise transzendierende Matrix von Plausibilisierungen. Diese sind demokratietheoretisch relevant, weil sie als wiederkehrende Muster die Verschiebung der Grenze demokratischer Freiheit zu Ungunsten der Burgerinnen und Burger markieren.

Die Normalisierung der Ausnahme

In Reaktion auf die Anschlage vom 11. September 2001 verhangte der damalige Prasident George W. Bush den Ausnahmezustand. Es folgten eine Reihe von Gesetzen und Verordnungen, die in Berufung auf die Bedrohung durch den internationalen Terrorismus exekutive Handlungsspielraume erweiterten und grundlegende Normen des US-amerikanischen politischen Systems suspendierten. Der Beitrag untersucht, inwiefern diese Masnahmen zu einer Normalisierung der Ausnahme und damit zu einer nachhaltigen Veranderung der politischen Ordnung und Kultur der USA gefuhrt haben. Entlang zentraler Gesetze und Verordnungen zeichnet der Beitrag den Aufbau eines auserrechtlichen Raums sowie dessen partielle Ruckgewinnung durch das Recht nach.

Die Grenzen der Demokratie – Einleitung

Der Beitrag stellt einleitend die zentrale Fragestellung der Tagung vor: Unter welchen Umstanden kann eine Demokratie noch als demokratisch bezeichnet werden? In den Blick rucken somit konkrete Praktiken etablierter Demokratien, die moglicherweise eine Erosion ihrer Demokratiequalitat anzeigen. Demokratien, die auf solche Praktiken – wie etwa Ausnahmezustande oder Folter – verstarkt zuruckgreifen, stehen, so die These, moglicherweise an der Grenze zu einer anderen, eben nicht mehr demokratischen Institutionen- und Verfahrensqualitat. Neben einer kurzen Reflexion uber den Begriff der Grenze werden die Beitrage des Bandes vorgestellt.

Supranationalität und Demokratie

Seit ihrer Grundungsphase gilt die supranationale Integration in Europa nicht einfach nur als ein wirtschaftspolitischer Zweckverband. Sie wurde vielmehr durchweg auch als ein politisches Projekt wahrgenommen und vorangetrieben, das Handlungsautonomie von den Nationalstaaten abzieht, eigene Staatsqualitat erlangt, politische Identifikationsanreize bereitstellt und so mit weitreichenden demokratischen Anspruchen und Erwartungen einhergeht. Je deutlicher die Herrschaftsgewalt der Europaischen Union(EU) an Konturen gewann, umso dringlicher stellte sich das Anliegen ihrer demokratischen Legitimation. Mit dem Zuwachs an supranationaler Regulierung wurden dem europaischen Organgefuge freilich immer haufiger Defizite in Hinblick auf seine demokratischen Qualitaten bescheinigt, die Demokratie gilt notorisch als unerfulltes Desiderat des supranationalen Geschehens. Das Themenfeld Supranationalitat und Demokratie bildet jedenfalls seit langem einen zentralen Gegenstandsbereich, der uber die teils ersehnte, teils bezweifelte politische Qualitat der Europaischen Union als weltweit einzigartiger transnationaler Kooperationsform Auskunft gibt.

Peace, Justice and International Order: A Conclusion

With The Law of Peoples, Rawls has contributed to the discussion not only on the moral status of the diverse types of political regimes, but also to their foreign relations as they should be to enhance stable peace and justice in the international order. The project at hand hopes to have contributed to that debate by exploring, analysing, testing, defending and critiquing LP from within and beyond the Rawlsian framework. Recalling the course of this undertaking, Rawls’ ideal theorizing and his realistic utopian framework has been positioned within Rawls’ work and in relation to the real world. A profound analysis of central aspects of LP and Rawls’ terminology, specifically, the differentiation between peoples and states, as well as his typology of political regimes, functioned as a baseline for understanding and discussing LP. The applicability and value of Rawls’ theory to and for international relations were assessed. The problems and contributions of the principles of the Law of Peoples and the Society of Peoples were investigated. It was explored whether at least aspiring decent peoples exist, and discussed whether the democratic peace thesis could be enlarged to a decent peace thesis.

Why Peoples, Not States: Why States, Not Peoples?

When referring to states, Rawls uses different terms, each having an own, partly stipulated, meaning; a fact which often leads to confusion between the different types of states in LP and the positive and negative characteristics ascribed to them. Rawls uses idiosyncratic definitions of the terms ‘peoples’ and ‘states’ to assign distinct characteristics to different regimes. Rawls’ definition of the terms ‘people’ (and ‘state’) is hard to grasp. Clearly, Rawlsian states and peoples are distinct, if not opposite, terms. Treating both as one and the same, as for example Allen Buchanan (2000, 699) does, would miss Rawls’ ambition to differentiate himself from traditional thinking and to emphasize the special character of peoples in contrast to ‘states as traditionally conceived’. To put it very simply: ‘peoples’ to Rawls are ‘states as they should be’, in a normative sense, whereas Rawlsian ‘states’ are ‘states as they should not be’. ‘Society’ is used as a general term and may refer either to one of his five types of political regimes (well-ordered or non-well-ordered) — like the use of ‘regime’ on certain occasions — or to society as a constituent of a state, the sum of its members and the community they constitute.

Decent Peoples and the Real World

The question of whether or not states that correspond to Rawls’ concept of peoples actually exist is essential to LP, especially where decent societies are concerned, as they seem to be mere constructions and Rawls does not satisfactorily answer the question of whether peoples exist beyond ideal theory. If there are no existing or historical decent societies, they might be invented to justify imposing liberal principles, the principles of the Law of Peoples, on non-liberal regimes. If decent societies lacked counterparts in the real world, Rawls’ justification for imposing the principles of the Law of Peoples on other societies would be pointless. They would remain liberal principles that are only honoured by liberal democratic societies and imposing them on other regimes would constitute a form of liberal imperialism, which Rawls in LP aims to avoid and which, from a Rawlsian perspective, constitutes a violation of liberal principles, foremost the principle of reasonable pluralism. Furthermore, the identification especially of decent regimes would enhance the applicability of LP to international relations and therefore the potential to be helpful for improving real world conditions. It might be an appealing model for liberal regimes to improve their relations with states qualifying as decent, not only as they are suitable cooperation partners, but also to enhance international stability and justice and to advance peaceful relations.

The Society of Peoples: A Union of Well-Ordered Societies?

Rawls uses the term ‘Society of Peoples’ more than a hundred times in his monograph without providing a detailed account of what it might look in practice. As Rawls leaves this question more or less open, it could be argued that a clearer sketch of the Society of Peoples is not essential for understanding his theory. It may be merely a way to refer to ‘all those peoples who follow the ideals and principles of the Law of Peoples in their mutual relations’ (LP, 3). So why is it worth pursuing this matter? In fact, the Society of Peoples within Rawls’ theory serves as a focus for the establishment of peaceful, stable and just relations between peoples, uniting well-ordered societies under the Law of Peoples. It is therefore crucial to his project. The Society of Peoples may constitute an international institution promoting peace, justice and stability in the international order. It might be an instantiation of Kant’s pacific union, only that it covers liberal and decent regimes rather than republics, extending to more and more regimes over time, thus enlarging the zone of peace. Even beyond LP, the sketch of a Society of Peoples links to a broader discussion on the legitimacy and performance of international institutions and the United Nations (UN) and of whether further institutions are needed, especially referring to the League of Democracies.

International Justice and the Principles of the Law of Peoples

Peaceful international cooperation between liberal and decent societies is in need of an overlapping consensus, an appropriate set of principles according to which relations between societies can be organized in as peaceful, stable and just manner as possible. The principles of the Law of Peoples are the general and basic norms of political justice that regulate the relations between peoples and non-well-ordered regimes, and they ‘can and should be accepted’ by peoples (LP, VI, 3, 35, 37). They form the ‘Charter of the Society of Peoples’ (LP, 85, see also Beitz 2000, 673).

A Typology of Political Regimes

As indicated earlier, Rawls introduces five types of political regime, distinguished according to liberal-democratic ideas (Herrera 2005, 337) of political participation, the recognition of (basic) human rights and non-aggressiveness towards other regimes. The last point is not (genuinely) liberal democratic. The global political landscape is divided into the five categories: (1) liberal peoples, (2) decent peoples, (3) benevolent absolutistic societies, (4) burdened societies and (5) outlaw states, though there is room for other types of regime, two of which are introduced later in this chapter.