Anthony Miloudi

Competitive intelligence, knowledge management and coopetition: The case of European high-technology firms

Purpose Competitive intelligence (CI) includes all the information and knowledge in a business. It enables the creation, perpetuation and transmission of knowledge coming from markets and corporate stakeholders. Therefore, it seems appropriate to consider the following question: what are the levers of a CI process on knowledge management in a coopetitive context? The paper aims to discuss this issue. Design/methodology/approach To answer this question, the authors conducted an empirical study with a sample of 153 high-tech firms in Europe. Findings The results identify four business groups according to levels of monitoring and cooperation between firms, and three types of supervision in business networks. Originality/value This paper brings together the concepts of knowledge management and CI within firms that have adopted a coopetitive behaviour.

Corporate leverage and the terms of employment: evidence from French small businesses before and during the global crisis

ABSTRACT Despite the particular importance of corporate leverage and human capital for small businesses, little is surprisingly known about the relationship between these two factors for this category of firms. Accordingly, this article tries to fill this gap by investigating the relationship between leverage and human capital examined through the investment in employee-related expenditure. The analysis focuses on a sample of French listed small businesses before and during the recent global crisis. The empirical findings show that leverage serves as a monitoring mechanism of corporate managers prone to over or underinvest in employee-related expenditure to obtain private benefits. Due notably to the availability of debt, this monitoring is more effective before the crisis period, especially for low growth firms. Overall, these results provide support to the theory that leverage has a disciplining role. Simultaneously, they lead to moderate the strength of this role according to the global crisis. Thus, they should provide useful insights for academics, regulators, managers and credit institutions.

HOW DOES CORPORATE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AFFECT ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND ADVERSE SELECTION

This paper investigates whether the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure mitigates asymmetric information and adverse selection in the Euronext Paris stock exchange. We apply a disclosure index as a proxy for the extent of voluntary disclosure and use different spread measures to estimate both asymmetric information and adverse selection. Our findings show a negative relationship between the disclosure index and asymmetric information and adverse selection proxies. An analysis of sub-indexes provides additional mixed results. Several asymmetric information measures are negatively related to the volume of financial, non-financial and voluntary governance information in corporate annual reports. Nevertheless, the effect of strategic information volume is statistically significant only for effective bid-ask spreads. On the whole, these results are consistent with the view that high corporate voluntary disclosure is associated with narrow spreads and low adverse selection costs.