Antoine Reberioux

Revitalizing the institutional roots of Anglo-American corporate governance

Abstract Over the past three decades, the topic of corporate governance has become an increasingly high-profile aspect of social-scientific scholarship, in both the Anglo-Saxon world and continental Europe. To a significant extent, however, the conceptual boundaries of the corporate governance debate have been set narrowly in accordance with the logic and language of the dominant ‘agency’ paradigm of governance. According to agency theory, the central problem of corporate governance is the question of how to minimize the (harmful) consequences of the separation of ownership and control within public companies first identified by Berle and Means (1932), by reference to competitive market pressures coupled with market-based incentive and disciplinary mechanisms. In this article, we present an alternative interpretation of the corporate governance problem premised on the logic and language of institution rather than the market, which we argue is both more empirically relevant and conceptually defensible than the dominant agency paradigm. To this end, we rely on some fundamental and longstanding doctrines of Anglo-American corporate law in conjunction with recent developments in the economic theory of the firm. According to the proposed ‘institutional’ model of corporate governance, the central governance problem is that of how to exploit, rather than minimize, the (beneficial) consequences of the separation of ownership and control, so as to engender the development of a more sustainable system of governance than that emanating from the free interplay of (stock) market forces. After setting out the key conceptual underpinnings of our revived institutional model, we analyse how worker involvement in corporate decision-making might be advanced as a way of instrumentalizing this framework within firm-level governance practices.

Corporate Governance, Labour Relations and Human Resource Management in the UK and France: Convergence or Divergence?

Do modes of management depend on company ownership? Does macroeconomic performance rely on shareholder value? The contributions collected in this book explore these questions from economic, historical and legal perspectives. They examine company ownership through the study of national institutions, with particular focus on North America and Europe. The twelve economic and legal specialists of this volume seek to explain why firms organized along the shareholder model have not outperformed other forms of ownership. Answers lie in the historical and institutional background of each country.

Financial Disclosure and the Board: A Case for Non-Independent Directors

In listed companies, the Board of directors has ultimate responsibility for information disclosure. The conventional wisdom is that director independence is an essential factor in improving the quality of that disclosure. In a sense, this approach subordinates expertise to independence. We argue that effective certification may require firm-specific expertise, in particular for intangible-intensive business models. However, this latter form of expertise is negatively related to independence as it is commonly measured and evaluated. Accordingly, there exists an optimal share of independent directors for each company, related to the level of intangible resources.