Antonio E. Bernardo

Gain, Loss, and Asset Pricing

We develop an approach to asset pricing in incomplete markets that bridges the gap between the two fundamental approaches in finance: model‐based pricing and pricing by no arbitrage. We strengthen the absence of arbtrage assumption by precluding investment opportunities whose attractiveness to a benchmark investor exceeds a specified threshold. In our framework, the attractiveness of an investment opportunity is measured by the gain‐loss ratio. We show that a restriction on the maximum gain‐loss ratio is equivalent to a restriction on the ratio of the maximum to minimum values of the pricing kernel. By limiting the maximum gainloss ratio, we can restrict the admissible set of pricing kernels, which in turn allows us to restrict the set of prices that can be assigned to assets. We illustrate our methodology by computing price bounds for call options in a Black‐Scholes economy without intermediate trading. When we vary the maximum permitted gainloss ratio, these bounds can range from the exact prices implied by a model‐based pricing approach to the loose price bounds implied by the no‐arbitrage approach.

Liquidity and Financial Market Runs

We model a run on a financial market, in which each risk-neutral investor fears having to liquidate shares after a run, but before prices can recover back to fundamental values. To avoid having to possibly liquidate shares at the marginal postrun price—in which case the risk-averse market-making sector will already hold a lot of share inventory and thus be more reluctant to absorb additional shares—each investor may prefer selling today at the average in-run price, thereby causing the run itself. Liquidity runs and crises are not caused by liquidity shocks per se, but by the fear of future liquidity shocks.

Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard

We consider optimal capital allocation and managerial compensation mechanisms for decentralized firms when division managers have an incentive to misrepresent project quality and to minimize privately costly but value-enhancing effort. We show that in the optimal mechanism firms always under invest in capital relative to a naive application of the net present value (NPV) rule. We make a number of novel cross-sectional predictions about the severity of the under investment problem and the composition of managerial compensation contracts. We also find that firms will optimally give greater performance-based pay (at the expense of fixed wages) to managers of higher quality projects to mitigate the incentive for managers to overstate project quality. Thus, managers may receive greater performance-based pay because they manage higher-quality projects, not that greater performance-based pay causes firm value to increase.

Resources, real options, and corporate strategy ☆

The types of investments a firm undertakes will depend in part on what it expects the outcome of those investments to reveal about its skills, capabilities, and assets (i.e., its resources). We predict that a firm will specialize when young, then experiment in a new line of business for some time, and then either expand into a large, multisegment business or focus and scale up its specialized business. We derive several empirical implications for firm valuations and the reaction of stock prices to news about firm prospects. We also offer a novel explanation for the well-documented ‘‘diversification’’ discount.

Asset market equilibrium with general tastes, returns, and informational asymmetries

Abstract This paper develops a general computational approach for solving rational expectations equilibrium in asset markets with asymmetric information. Our approach can be applied to models with arbitrary specifications of tastes, return distributions, and information structures. We demonstrate our methodology by examining a variation of the canonical Grossman and Stiglitz (1980, American Economic Review 70, 393–408) model of endogenous information acquisition in which traders have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences and stock returns are lognormally distributed. We find that the results in Grossman and Stiglitz are not robust to changes in the parametric assumptions. The speed and accuracy displayed by our computational methods indicates that more complex problems are tractable.

Contractual restrictions on insider trading: a welfare analysis*

Summary. This paper analyzes the welfare effects of permitting firms to negotiate contractually the right to allow corporate insiders to trade shares in the firm on private information. A computational framework is employed to (i) analyze formally the effects of insider trading on managerial investment choice, the informational efficiency of stock prices, and the welfare of all investor types; and (ii) examine the effectiveness of various compensation schemes (such as stock and insider trading rights) to mitigate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. I show that shareholders will typically choose not to grant insider trading rights to managers. This decision is socially optimal.

Motivating Entrepreneurial Activity in a Firm

We consider the problem of motivating privately informed managers to engage in entrepreneurial activity to improve the quality of the firms investment opportunities. The firms investment and compensation policy must balance the managers incentives to provide entrepreneurial effort and to report her private information truthfully. The optimal policy is to underinvest (compared to first-best) and provide weak incentive pay in low-quality projects and overinvest (compared to first-best) and provide strong incentive pay in high-quality projects. We also show that, unlike the standard agency model, uncertainty and incentives can be positively related.

A Note on Presumptions with Sequential Litigation

This note extends the Bernardo, Talley & Welch (1999) model of legal presumptions to study situations where litigation efforts are spent sequentially rather than simultaneously. The equilibria of the litigation stage are presented as functions of the underlying presumption. The equilibria and comparative statics are shown to be qualitatively similar to those of the simultaneous version. However, sequentiality allows the principal to pre commit to a litigation strategy, and thus possibly preempt any litigation effort whatsoever by the agent.

Designing Corporate Bailouts

Although common economic wisdom suggests that government bailouts are inefficient because they reduce incentives to avoid failure and induce excessive entry by marginal firms, in practice bailouts are difficult to avoid for systemically significant enterprises. Recent experience suggests that bailouts also induce litigation from shareholders and managers complaining about expropriation and wrongful termination by the government. Our model shows how governments can design tax-financed corporate bailouts to reduce these distortions and points to the causes of inefficiencies in real-world implementations such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Bailouts with minimal distortion depend critically on the governments ability to expropriate shareholders and terminate managers.

Asset Redeployability, Liquidation Value, and Endogenous Capital Structure Heterogeneity

Firms with lower leverage are not only less likely to experience financial distress but are also better positioned to acquire assets from other distressed firms. With endogenous asset sales and values, each firm’s debt choice then depends on the choices of its industry peers. With indivisible assets, otherwise identical firms may adopt different debt policies — some choosing highly levered operations (e.g., to take advantage of tax benefits), others choosing more conservative policies to wait for acquisition opportunities. Our key empirical implication is that the acquisition channel can induce firms to reduce debt when assets become more redeployable.