Anuradha M. Chenoy

A Plea for Engendering Human Security

The human security concept centred around rights is a radical departure from the traditional state-centric approach to security issues. However this paradigm needs to be engendered because experience has shown that the concept of “people” still leaves out women, especially those at the margins. Threats from militarism, patriarchy, chauvinism, sectarianism, poverty and denial of rights affect women differently than they do men and since structures and institutions of power remain patriarchal, there is need for a gender balance as well as a feminization of security. Many countries in principle accept peoples rights and yet discriminate against women in practice. It is time that steps like evolving gendered security indicators in order to assess the threats to human security are brought on the security agenda.

India and Russia

India is seeking a greater role for itself in the international system. This aspiration is based on the view that India is a stable democracy with significant human and material resources; it is an increasingly important economic power; it has an established record as a responsible and law abiding state; and it has consistently voiced the concerns of the developing countries as a leader of the non-aligned group. Indian foreign policy makers argue that at this stage of ‘take off’ as a great power India needs to re-invent itself. For this proposed new role India requires new allies and partnerships, including with the dominant superpower, the United States of America (US). The US has stated that it will make India into a great power. What is the US interest in India? How will this new interest and tie-up affect Indias traditional partners like Russia? This article seeks to analyse the old model of relations that India enjoyed with Russia. This model is now being given up. Its place is being taken by an Indo-US strategic partnership. How different is this new model strategic relationship in comparison to the Indo-Soviet/Russian relationship? Some of these issues are addressed in this article.

Women in the South Asian Conflict Zones

Anuradha M. Chenoy is Professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. MOST REPORTS ON conflicts and wars tend to exclude women or view them primarily as victims. News comments on conflicts often speak of the ’enormous loss of men and material’.’ The assumption behind such a portrayal is that women are part of the supplementary infrastructure for war, either as supporters to men or accidental and inevitable victims. Feminist work, on the other hand, shows that women play multiple roles in armed conflicts and that wars have severe implications for women. This research has not changed the vision of war and armed conflict as a masculine activity because national security and the state continue to be gendered institutions where feminist voices are excluded. Further, feminist critiques and gender research remain confined primarily to ’women’s studies’ and women, especially in the Third World,

Introduction: International Development, South-South Cooperation and the Rising Powers

This chapter examines the emergence of the BRICS as a geopolitical association with systems for intellectual, policy and financial interaction and cooperation, and their growing impact on international development and global governance arrangements. The discussion considers the history and rhetoric of South-South cooperation, exploring whether it presents an alternative to the OECD-DAC model of development aid and the future evolution of this model as the BRICS themselves develop. While the BRICS have a huge significance in global development, there has been little comparative study of what each of the BRICS has been doing in their development practices and little understanding of domestic discourses and attitudes towards development cooperation. This chapter outlines the way in which this book fills this gap. It details the economic, political and development trajectories of the BRICS grouping and introduces the various chapters examining the respective BRICS members, the BRICS grouping’s trajectory of engagement with civil society and its development of shared institutions for development cooperation.

Economic Transition and State Capitalism

Yeltsin abandoned socialist policies and initiated neoliberal reforms in 1992. It was intended to usher in economic growth, stability and improve the standard of living. How far did Russia accomplish these objectives? To what extent did neoliberal reforms succeed in restoring growth, equity and development? What were the economic changes introduced by Putin’s administration? How do we assess the 25 years of transition in Russia? These are some of the questions that have been answered in this chapter.

Russian Democracy and Its Paradoxes

This chapter summarises the main arguments of the book. At the first sight, it might appear paradoxical that our book is titled Re-emerging Russia when the Russian economic growth is negative. But our arguments are based on larger political, social and economic stability that Russia has achieved since 1991. A country which was described as a lost power, tottering on the brink of disintegration, has re-emerged as a game changer in Europe and Asia. We have argued that the basic fundamentals of the Russian economy are strong. The economic slowdown of Russia is likely to reverse soon. Russia is a resource-rich country with a highly skilled human capital, and it can easily diversify its economy. Russia is politically stable and faces no major internal threats from within. It is confident, assertive and adventurous in taking actions on its borders and beyond. Europe is divided and is also facing economic hardship. This has provided Russia an opportunity to enhance its influence in the neighbourhood and beyond. It has strategically allied with China, and their role is indispensable in resolving any international dispute. Russia’s intervention in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria might be a setback to the Western countries, but this has enhanced its image in India, China and many other Islamic states. A general conception is that if the EU and the USA have the right to promote trade and democratic norms, Russia has legitimate interests too in protecting its interests on its borders and beyond.

The Constitution of Russia: Genesis, Features and Political Implications

This chapter begins with the analysis of events preceding the adoption of the constitution in 1993. It shows how referendum and violent imposition of the constitution by Yeltsin were illegal. The key features of the constitution, such as the presidency, the federal structure, separation of power, bicameral legislature and constitutionalism have been described in detail. The discussion ends with analyzing the political implication of a skewed constitution. It shows how this constitution contributed to the rise of a super-presidential system in Russia by providing a statutory legitimacy to the excessive powers of the president. All other institutions, such as the legislature and judiciary, were subordinated to the presidency. The core principle of separation of power necessary for democracy was violated. Hence, what we see in Russia today is related to the constitutional framework that was adopted in 1993.

The Formation of the Federation and Regional Politics

This chapter analyses the federal structures, processes and practices. It begins with the federal discourse and is followed by a description of the existing federal arrangements. In the 1990s, Russia witnessed a number of secessionist movements—the most important being Chechnya and Tartarstan. Some of the regional governors also became de facto independent from the Centre. Yeltsin allowed maximum autonomy to the republics to gain the political support of the governors in his fight against the Communists in the Duma. The fear of a second breakup up of Russia seemed real because of the fissiparous tendencies that played out in the early years. But this changed with the federal reforms by Putin. He subordinated the governors to the Centre and reorganised the entire federal structure. The Russian state consolidated its multiple ethnicities, regions and republics in a workable federal process. But in this process, the Centre has become very powerful, while the regions lost their autonomies they enjoyed during Yeltsin’s period. This chapter provides a detailed analysis of such transition.

The Disintegration of the Soviet Union: Systemic Change and Systematic Collapse

This chapter analyses the disintegration of the Soviet Union in a historical perspective. The key argument is that the policy of democratic centralism led to the emergence of a highly centralised system. The state came to be ruled by the Party and the Party by an individual. The state did not tolerate dissent and was resistant to reforms. But with the economic stagnation starting from the late 1970s, reforms became a political necessity. Gorbachev tried to reform the system by introducing measures, such as perestroika and glasnost, but in the process unleashed forces which hastened the demise of the Soviet Union. The bitter political rivalry between Gorbachev and Yeltsin sealed the fate of the Soviet Union. This chapter combines structural deficiencies of the Soviet Union with the role of agencies to provide a holistic explanation of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Structural variables include economic stagnation and the monolithic party system-operating in a highly centralised political system. The role of political elites and leaders constitute the agency factor.

Political Parties and Elections

The transition from one-party system of the Soviet times to a genuine multiparty system remains incomplete in Russia. Two types of parties performed better than the others: the first were those which were patronised by the Kremlin, and the second which had well-defined partisan ideology supported by extensive organisational networks. In the first category, there were parties, such as Russia’s Choice, PRES, Our Home is Russia and the United Russia party. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia survived owing to their razor-sharp ideology and regional networks. Several other parties popped up just before the election and receded into oblivion once the event was over. The party system in Russia today can be described as a “one party dominant system”. Many transitional societies have witnessed this system. India had a similar system after the independence but gradually moved to a well-established multiparty system. This chapter gives a brief account of all the major parties and explains the way the United Russia Party became a dominant party in Russia.