Anya Samek

Facing Your Opponents: Social Identification and Information Feedback in Contests

We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in contests. Identifying subjects through photo display decreases efforts. Providing information feedback about others’ effort does not affect the aggregate effort levels but it does change the dynamics of individual behavior. We develop a behavioral model based on relative payoff maximization, and use it to estimate the degree of pro-social/status-seeking behavior. We find that decrease in ‘social distance’ between group members through photo display promotes pro-social behavior. Information feedback reduces the within-group volatility in effort level and facilitates greater adherence to the ‘group norm.’ Finally, in contrast to standard theoretical predictions, we find significant over-expenditure of efforts in all treatments. This overdissipation can be explained by a combination of non-monetary utility of winning and relative payoff maximization.

The Curious Relation between Theory of Mind and Sharing in Preschool Age Children

Young children have long been known to act selfishly and gradually appear to become more generous across middle childhood. While this apparent change has been well documented, the underlying mechanisms supporting this remain unclear. The current study examined the role of early theory of mind and executive functioning in facilitating sharing in a large sample (N = 98) of preschoolers. Results reveal a curious relation between early false-belief understanding and sharing behavior. Contrary to many commonsense notions and predominant theories, competence in this ability is actually related to less sharing. Thus, the relation between developing theory of mind and sharing may not be as straightforward as it seems in preschool age children. It is precisely the children who can engage in theory of mind that decide to share less with others.

Visual Tools and Narratives: New Ways to Improve Financial Literacy

In this paper, we developed and experimentally evaluated four novel educational programs delivered online: an informational brochure, a visual interactive tool, a written narrative, and a video narrative. The programs were designed to inform people about risk diversification, an essential concept for financial decision-making. The effectiveness of these programs was evaluated using the RAND American Life Panel. Participants were exposed to one of the programs, and then asked to answer questions measuring financial literacy and self-efficacy. All of the programs were found to be effective at increasing self-efficacy, and several improved financial literacy, providing new evidence for the value of programs designed to help individuals make financial decisions. The video was more effective at improving financial literacy scores than the written narrative, highlighting the power of online media in financial education.

Do People Anticipate Loss Aversion

There is growing interest in the use of loss contracts that offer performance incentives as upfront payments that employees can lose. Standard behavioral models predict a tradeoff in the use of loss contracts: employees will work harder under loss contracts than under gain contracts; but, anticipating loss aversion, they will prefer gain contracts to loss contracts. In a series of experiments, we test these predictions by measuring performance and preferences for payoff-equivalent gain and loss contracts. We find that people indeed work harder under loss than gain contracts, as the theory predicts. Surprisingly, rather than a preference for the gain contract, we find that people actually prefer loss contracts. In exploring mechanisms for our results, we find suggestive evidence that people do anticipate loss aversion but select into loss contracts as a commitment device to improve performance.

Divided Loyalists or Conditional Cooperators? Creating Consensus About Cooperation in Multiple Simultaneous Social Dilemmas

The current social dilemma literature lacks theoretical consensus regarding how individuals behave when facing multiple simultaneous social dilemmas. The divided-loyalty hypothesis, from organizational theory, predicts that cooperation will decline as individuals experience multiple social dilemmas with different compared to the same group members. The conditional-cooperation hypothesis, from behavioral economics, predicts that cooperation will increase as individuals experience multiple social dilemmas with different compared to the same group members. We employ a laboratory experiment to create consensus between these literatures and find support for the conditional-cooperation hypothesis. The positive effect of interacting with different group members comes from participants having an opportunity to shift their cooperative behavior from the less cooperative to the more cooperative group.

Dynamic Inconsistency in Food Choice: Experimental Evidence from a Food Desert

Despite the great deal of research on dynamic inconsistency in time preferences, few studies have ventured into investigating the question in a natural context. To address this gap, we conduct a natural field experiment with over 200 customers at a grocery store to investigate dynamic inconsistency and the demand for commitment in food choice. Over a 3 week time period, subjects are invited to allocate and re-allocate food items received as part of a grocery delivery program. We observe substantial dynamic inconsistency in our experiment, as well as a demand for commitment among a non-negligible number of subjects. Interestingly, individuals who demand commitment are more likely to be dynamically consistent in their prior behavior. For academics, our work provides direct evidence of dynamic inconsistency in consumption choices in the field and points towards potential extensions to models of temptation. For policy-makers, our findings provide insights on innovations to alter food choices.

The test–retest reliability of the latent construct of executive function depends on whether tasks are represented as formative or reflective indicators

ABSTRACT This study investigates the test–retest reliability of a battery of executive function (EF) tasks with a specific interest in testing whether the method that is used to create a battery-wide score would result in differences in the apparent test–retest reliability of children’s performance. A total of 188 4-year-olds completed a battery of computerized EF tasks twice across a period of approximately two weeks. Two different approaches were used to create a score that indexed children’s overall performance on the battery—i.e., (1) the mean score of all completed tasks and (2) a factor score estimate which used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Pearson and intra-class correlations were used to investigate the test–retest reliability of individual EF tasks, as well as an overall battery score. Consistent with previous studies, the test–retest reliability of individual tasks was modest (rs ≈ .60). The test–retest reliability of the overall battery scores differed depending on the scoring approach (rmean = .72; rfactor_score = .99). It is concluded that the children’s performance on individual EF tasks exhibit modest levels of test–retest reliability. This underscores the importance of administering multiple tasks and aggregating performance across these tasks in order to improve precision of measurement. However, the specific strategy that is used has a large impact on the apparent test–retest reliability of the overall score. These results replicate our earlier findings and provide additional cautionary evidence against the routine use of factor analytic approaches for representing individual performance across a battery of EF tasks.

Loss Aversion and the Quantity-Quality Tradeoff

Firms face an optimization problem that requires a maximal quantity output given a quality constraint. But how do firms incentivize quantity and quality to meet these dual goals, and what role do behavioral factors such as loss aversion play in the tradeoffs workers face? We address these issues with a theoretical model and an experiment in which participants are paid for both quantity and quality of a real effort task. Consistent with the basic economic theory, higher quality incentives encourage participants to shift their attention from quantity to quality. However, we also find that loss averse subjects shift their attention from quality to quantity to a greater degree when quality is weakly incentivized. These results can inform managers of the most appropriate ways to structure contracts.

Visual tools and narratives: new ways to improve financial literacy

We developed and experimentally evaluated four novel educational programs delivered online: an informational brochure, a visual interactive tool, a written narrative, and a video narrative. The programs were designed to inform people about risk diversification, an essential concept for financial decision-making. The effectiveness of these programs was evaluated using the American Life Panel. Participants were exposed to one of the programs, and then asked to answer questions measuring financial literacy – in particular, risk literacy – and self-efficacy. All of the programs were found to be effective at increasing self-efficacy, and several improved financial literacy, providing new evidence for the value of programs designed to improve financial decision-making.

When charities compete: A laboratory experiment with simultaneous public goods ☆

What happens when charities compete? We begin to answer this question through a laboratory experiment in which subjects play two public goods games simultaneously. We systematically vary the incentives for contributing in one of the games – investigating the effects of recognition, a bonus conditional on contributing, and non-monetary sanctions – and measure the effect on contributions in both games. Monetary incentives in the form of conditional bonuses increase contributions, even when two games are played simultaneously. However, non-monetary incentives such as recognition and sanctions are less effective than in related literature on games played in isolation. Moreover, we find mixed evidence of a treatment spillover on the un-treated games – bonuses increase contributions initially, recognition decreases contributions, and sanctions have no effect.