Avner Ben-Ner

Economics, Values, and Organization

In this path-breaking book, economists and scholars from diverse disciplines use standard economic tools to investigate the formation and evolution of normative preferences. The fundamental premise is that an adequate understanding of how an economy and society are organized and function cannot be reached without an understanding of the formation and mutation of values and preferences that determine how we interact with others. Its chapters explore the two-way interaction between economic arrangements or institutions, and preferences, including those regarding social status, the well-being of others, and ethical principles. Contributions have been written especially for this volume and are designed to address a wide readership in economics and other disciplines. The contributors are leading scholars who draw on such fields as game theory, economic history, the economics of institutions, and experimental economics, as well as political philosophy, sociology and psychology, to establish and explore their arguments.

Share and share alike? Gender-pairing, personality, and cognitive ability as determinants of giving

We conduct dictator game experiments in which women and men are allowed to split

The life cycle of worker-owned firms in market economies. A theoretical analysis

10 with a completely unknown person or a person of known gender. Subjects also complete personality and cognitive tests. We find that (a) gender information significantly affects giving only in the case of women, who give systematically less to women than to men and persons of unknown gender; (b) largely on account of this difference, women give less than men on average, although the difference is not statistically significant; and (c) giving is significantly explained, especially for women, by personality measures and the cognition score.

Comparative empirical observations on worker-owned and capitalist firms

Abstract The population of worker-owned firms is likely to grow countercyclically: in contrast with capitalist firms, many worker-owned firms are born during recessions, frequently out of capitalist firms, and are transformed into capitalist firms during economic booms. There exists an offsetting tendency as worker-owned firms are formed during periods of sustained increase in the standard of living and are dissolved during economic decline. These are some of the conclusions of a theoretical analysis of the obstacles to the formation and relative efficiency attributes of worker-owned and capitalist firms carried out in a dynamic framework emphasizing the influence of changes in the environment on organizational life cycles.

Treadmill desks: A 1-year prospective trial

Abstract The paper analyzes the available quantitative information on worker-owned and capitalist firms in a few industrialized countries in an attempt to draw a comparative profile of their respective sectors. The population of worker-owned firms is found to be heterogeneous, changing over time, and significantly different from the population of capitalist firms. Worker-owned firms are smaller, concentrate in a few industries, and since the mid 1970s have higher birth rates and lower demise rates than capitalist firms. These findings are interpreted with the aid of a theoretical framework and in a broad historical context.

The Shifting Boundaries of the Mixed Economy and the Future of the Nonprofit Sector

Objective: Sedentariness is associated with weight gain and obesity. A treadmill desk is the combination of a standing desk and a treadmill that allow employees to work while walking at low speed.

On some implications of evolutionary psychology for the study of preferences and institutions

The nonprofit sector exists because it can solve better than for-profit firms problems associated with the provision of products with publicness (nonrivalry or nonexcludability) attributes, or those affected by asymmetric information between providers and customers. This advantage is likely to be eroded in the future by various technological advances, particularly in the area of information transmission, analysis, storage and retrieval, and by the increase in the effective size of markets. Consequently, the demand for nonprofit organizations will possibly decline in the future. On the other hand, the operational efficiency of nonprofit organizations is likely to improve due to possibilities of stricter audit of and control over management made possible by enhanced access by nonprofit stakeholders to budgetary and operational information. This will help nonprofit organizations respond better to various failures of for-profit firms and to the insufficiency of government correctives. It is difficult to forecast the net effect of the myriad factors that work in opposite directions on the demand for and supply of nonprofit organizations, although it appears to this author that the economic weight of nonprofit organizations and their distinctive features will wane.

The Theory of Nonprofit Organizations Revisited

Abstract In many economic interactions, for instance in firms, the standard approximation of strict self-interest is inadequate to modeling human behavior. A scientific theory of preferences, grounded in evolutionary psychological and biological theory, can avoid resort to ad hoc assumptions. Evolutionary theory is supported by a growing body of data including new results in experimental economics. It holds that the evolved human nature includes an ability to solve social dilemma problems through reciprocity and punishment of cheaters. Treating realized preferences as phenotypic expressions with both environmental and genetic causes will also allow economists to study the impact of institutions on preferences.

A Sectoral Comparison of Wage Levels and Wage Inequality in Human Services Industries

Much has been written during the last two decades about the theory of nonprofit organizations (NPOs). Researchers, policy makers, and practitioners in NPOs have repeatedly asked themselves variants of the following set of questions: • What do NPOs do that for-profit firms (FPFs) and government agencies are not doing already? • Do NPOs operate as efficiently as their for-profit counterparts? • Do NPOs serve the same broad groups as government units do? • Should NPOs receive special tax treatment?

Treadmill Workstations: The Effects of Walking while Working on Physical Activity and Work Performance

The authors explore differences among for-profit, nonprofit, and local government organizations in wage levels and inequality. Based on the intrinsic-motivation perspective and agency theory, the authors hypothesize that compared to for-profit organizations, nonprofit and local government organizations (a) are less likely to provide financial incentives, (b) pay lower or higher compensation to their employees, depending on a host of factors, and (c) have less wage inequality. The authors use wage data for five narrowly defined industries in a single state (Minnesota) where all types of organization produce the same service, employ employees with similar job titles, compete in the same labor markets, and face similar regulations. They also employ detailed data from a survey administered in two of these industries. The empirical analyses lend support for the theoretical hypotheses. However, the differences across sectors are small in magnitude.