Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo

Bases institucionais do presidencialismo de coalizão

The idea that the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 has left untouched the institutional basis that defines the way the political system functions is refuted. It is argued that there are important changes, such as the growth of the legislative power of the President and the new mechanisms of control of parlamentary action available to party leaderships. A strong and well equiped Executive and disciplined parties form the emerging picture.

Processo orçamentário e comportamento Legislativo: emendas individuais, apoio ao Executivo e programas de governo

The article challenges the contention that individual amendments are crucial for a system of exchanging favors with the Administration by members of Congress interested in distributive policies as a way of guaranteeing their reelection. By analyzing funds allocated through Congressional amendments, their distribution in different government programs, and roll-call votes in the Brazilian House of Representatives from 1996 to 2001, the authors show that: individual amendments are not prioritized either by Congress in the budgets approval or by the Administration in its implementation; there are no differences between the agenda dictated by the Administration and that of the legislators; and party affiliation explains both House floor votes and the implementation of individual amendments and is thus an explanatory variable in the Executive-Legislative relationship.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSOLIDATION *

The article examines the effects of changes in constitutional and internal legislative regulations on the performance of the House of Representatives in law making. It presents an analysis of the flow of bills in the Lower House and the legal output in the post 1988 Constitution period, showing, on the one hand, the importance of the executive in the definition of the legislative agenda and its preponderance in legislative outcomes and, on the other hand, the role of the college of leaders, to the detriment of the standing committees, in the organization of the legislative work. The authors argue, against the conventional wisdom on Brazilian politics, that the legislature cannot be viewed as an obstacle to executive action.

The Budget Process and Legislative Behavior: Individual Amendments, Support for the Executive and Government Programs

The article challenges the contention that individual amendments are crucial for a system of exchanging favors with the Administration by members of Congress interested in distributive policies as a way of guaranteeing their reelection. By analyzing funds allocated through Congressional amendments, their distribution in different government programs, and roll-call votes in the Brazilian House of Representatives from 1996 to 2001, the authors show that: individual amendments are not prioritized either by Congress in the budgets approval or by the Administration in its implementation; there are no differences between the agenda dictated by the Administration and that of the legislators; and party affiliation explains both House floor votes and the implementation of individual amendments and is thus an explanatory variable in the Executive-Legislative relationship.

Princípios de justiça e avaliação de políticas

The article proposes a way of putting together two things which usually are dealt with separatedly: the philosophic discussion on principles of justice and the evaluation of social policies.

Political Participation in Brazil

This chapter analyzes the expansion of political participation in Brazil between 1945 and 2010. During this time, the country lived under three different political regimes: two democratic (1945–1964, 1985–2010) and one authoritarian (1964–1985). The analysis focuses on electoral participation, showing how social inequality impacted voters’ ability to register, turn out, and ultimately cast a valid ballot. The chapter shows how extensive voting restrictions in 1945 were along these three dimensions and how they declined over time. It also calls attention to the impact of changes in the electoral legislation on different social groups’ ability to exercise their voting rights.

Politische Institutionen und Performanz der Exekutive in der brasilianischen Demokratie

Wahrend der ersten Dekade nach Inkrafttreten der brasilianischen Verfassung von 1988 hat sich in der Fachliteratur eine negative Sicht der Funktionalitat des brasilianischen politischen Systems etabliert. Die Ursachen hierfur werden vorrangig in den institutionellen Weichenstellungen der verfassungsgebenden Versammlung gesehen. Die Weiterfuhrung der grundlegenden institutionellen Entscheidungen der Verfassung von 1946, vor allem die Beibehaltung des Prasidialsystems mit der proportionalen Reprasentation offener Listen mache das Land unregierbar. Der erwartete Konflikt zwischen Exekutive und Legislative, der fur Prasidialsysteme charakteristisch ist, wurde durch die Fragmentierung des Parteiensystems (aufgrund der proportionalen Vertretung im Kongress) noch verstarkt. Hinzu kamen die geringe Parteidisziplin und die Konkurrenz innerhalb der Parteien als Konsequenz der offenen Listen (Mainwaring 1993, Lamounier 1994, Ames 2000).