Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky

Measurable systems and behavioral sciences

Individual choices often depend on the order in which the decisions are made. In this paper, we expose a general theory of measurable systems (an example of which is an individual characterized by her preferences) allowing for incompatible (non-commuting) measurements. The basic concepts are illustrated in an example of non-classical rational choice. We conclude with a discussion of some of the basic properties of non-classical systems in the context of social sciences. In particular, we argue that the distinctive feature of non-classical systems translates into a formulation of bounded rationality.

An Empirical Test of Type-Indeterminacy in the Prisoner's Dilemma

In this paper, we test the type indeterminacy hypothesis by analyzing an experiment that examines the stability of preferences in a Prisoner Dilemma with respect to decisions made in a context that is both payoff and informationally unrelated to that Prisoner Dilemma. More precisely we carried out an experiment in which participants were permitted to make promises to cooperate to agents they saw, followed by playing a Prisoners Dilemma game with another, independent agent. It was found that, after making a promise to the first agent, participants exhibited higher rates of cooperation with other agents. We show that a classical model does not account for this effect, while a type indeterminacy model which uses elements of the formalism of quantum mechanics is able to capture the observed effects reasonably well.

Transparency in Public Life: A Quantum Cognition Perspective

In this paper we investigate the implications of assuming that citizens are cognitively constrained for transparency in public life. We model cognitive limitations as reflecting a quantum property of people’s mental representations of the world. There exists a multiplicity of incompatible (Bohr) complementary mental representations of a situation. As a consequence the framing of information plays a crucial role. We show that additional information can be detrimental to a quantum cognitively constrained agent: he may become more confused. We suggest some implications for the design of a public agency’s website.

Dynamic optimization with type indeterminate decision-maker: a theory of multiple-self management

We study the implications of quantum type indeterminacy for a single agents dynamic decision problem. When the agent is aware that his decision today affects the preferences that will be relevant for his decisions tomorow, the dynamic optimization problem translates into a game with multiple selves and provides a suitable framework to address issues of self-control. The TI-model delivers a theory of self-management in terms of decentralized Bayes-Nash equilibrium among the potential eigentypes (selves). In a numerical example we show how the predictions of the TI-model differ from that of a classical model. In the TI-model choices immediately (without additional structure) reflect self-management concerns. In particular, what may be perceived as a feature of dynamic inconsistency, may instead reflect rational optimization by a type indeterminate agent.

Quantum-Like Type Indeterminacy: A Constructive Approach to Preferences à la Kahneman and Tversky

Develop an example with 2 DS mention result for 1 DS and commuting DS from ALMZZ and from measurable systems too. Write in words about cognitive dissonance. Dynamic decision making conceptual and some formal description on one page and end with game with QL-players as a generalization.

Games with Type Indeterminate Players

We develop a basic framework encoding preference relations on the set of possible strategies in a quantum-like fashion. The Type Indeterminacy model introduces quantum-like uncertainty affecting preferences. The players are viewed as systems subject to measurements. The decision nodes are, possibly non-commuting, operators that measure preferences modulo strategic reasoning. We define a Hilbert space of types and focus on pure strategy TI games of maximal information. Preferences evolve in a non-deterministic manner with actions along the play: they are endogenous to the interaction. We propose the Type Indeterminate Nash Equilibrium as a solution concept relying on best-replies at the level of eigentypes.