Arjan Stegeman

Avian Influenza A Virus (H7N7) Epidemic in The Netherlands in 2003: Course of the Epidemic and Effectiveness of Control Measures

An epidemic of high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) A virus subtype H7N7 occurred in The Netherlands in 2003 that affected 255 flocks and led to the culling of 30 million birds. To evaluate the effectiveness of the control measures, we quantified between-flock transmission characteristics of the virus in 2 affected areas, using the reproduction ratio Rh. The control measures markedly reduced the transmission of HPAI virus: Rh before detection of the outbreak in the first infected flock was 6.5 (95% confidence interval [CI], 3.1-9.9) in one area and 3.1 in another area, and it decreased to 1.2 (95% CI, 0.6-1.9) after detection of the first outbreak in both areas. The observation that Rh remained >1 suggests that the containment of the epidemic was probably due to the reduction in the number of susceptible flocks by complete depopulation of the infected areas rather than to the reduction of the transmission by the other control measures.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1, Thailand, 2004.

Early detection and control curtail outbreaks.

The classical swine fever epidemic 1997–1998 in the Netherlands: descriptive epidemiology

The objective of this paper is to describe the severe epidemic of classical swine fever (CSF) in The Netherlands in 1997-1998 under a policy of non-vaccination, intensive surveillance, pre-emptive slaughter and stamping out in an area which has one of the highest pig and herd densities in Europe. The primary outbreak was detected on 4 February 1997 on a mixed sow and finishing pig herd. A total of 429 outbreaks was observed during the epidemic, and approximately 700,000 pigs from these herds were slaughtered. Among these outbreaks were two artificial insemination centres, which resulted in a CSF-suspect declaration of 1680 pig herds (mainly located in the southern part of The Netherlands). The time between introduction of CSF virus (CSFV) into the country and diagnosis of CSF in the primary outbreak was estimated to be approximately 6 weeks. It is presumed that CSFV was spread from The Netherlands to Italy and Spain via shipment of infected piglets in the beginning of February 1997, before the establishment of a total stand-still of transportation. In June 1997, CSFV is presumed to be introduced into Belgium from The Netherlands. Pre-emptive slaughter of herds that had been in contact with infected herds or were located in close vicinity of infected herds, was carried out around the first two outbreaks. However, this policy was not further exercised till mid-April 1997, when pre-emptive slaughter became a standard operational procedure for the rest of the epidemic. In total, 1286 pig herds were pre-emptively slaughtered. (approximately 1.1 million pigs). A total of 44 outbreaks (10%) was detected via pre-emptive slaughter. When there were clinical signs, the observed symptoms in infected herds were mainly atypical: fever, apathy, ataxia or a combination of these signs. In 322 out of 429 outbreaks (75%), detection was bases on clinical signs observed: 32% was detected by the farmer, 25% by the veterinary practitioner, 10% of the outbreaks by tracing teams and 8% by screening teams of the veterinary authorities. In 76% of the outbreaks detected by clinical signs, the farmer reported to have seen clinical symptoms for less than 1 week before diagnosis, in 22% for 1-4 weeks before diagnosis, and in 4 herds (1%) the farmer reported to have seen clinical symptoms for more than 4 weeks before diagnosis. Transportation lorries played a major role in the transmission of CSFV before the primary outbreak was diagnosed. It is estimated that approximately 39 herds were already infected before the first measures of the eradication campaign came into force. After the first measures to stop the spread of CSFV had been implemented, the distribution of the most likely routes of transmission markedly changed. In most outbreaks, a neighbourhood infection was indicated. Basically, there were two reasons for this catastrophe. Firstly, there was the extent of the period between introduction of the virus in the region and detection of the first outbreak. As a result, CSFV had opportunities to spread from one herd to another during this period. Secondly, the measures initially taken did not prove sufficient in the swine- and herd-dense region involved.

Transmission of the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus H5N1 within Flocks during the 2004 Epidemic in Thailand

This present study is the first to quantify the transmission of avian influenza virus H5N1 within flocks during the 2004 epidemic in Thailand. It uses the flock-level mortality data to estimate the transmission-rate parameter ( beta ) and the basic reproduction number (R(0)). The point estimates of beta varied from 2.26/day (95% confidence interval [CI], 2.01-2.55) for a 1-day infectious period to 0.66/day (95% CI, 0.50-0.87) for a 4-day infectious period, whereas the accompanying R(0) varied from 2.26 (95% CI, 2.01-2.55) to 2.64 (95% CI, 2.02-3.47). Although the point estimates of beta of backyard chickens and fighting cocks raised together were lower than those of laying hens and broiler chickens, this difference was not statistically significant. These results will enable us to assess the control measures in simulation studies. They also indicate that, for the elimination of the virus, a critical proportion of the susceptible poultry population in a flock (i.e., 80% of the population) needs to be vaccinated.

The 1997–1998 epidemic of classical swine fever in the Netherlands

In 1997, the pig husbandry in the Netherlands was struck by a severe epidemic of classical swine fever (CSF). During this epidemic 429 CSF-infected herds were depopulated and approximately 1300 herds were slaughtered pre-emptively. In addition millions of pigs of herds not CSF-infected were killed for welfare reasons (over crowding or overweight). In this paper, we describe the course of the epidemic and the measures that were taken to control it. The first outbreak was detected on 4 February 1997 in the pig dense south-eastern part of the Netherlands. We estimate that CSF virus (CSFV) had already been present in the country by that time for 5-7 weeks and that the virus had been introduced into approximately 39 herds before the eradication campaign started. This campaign consisted of stamping-out infected herds, movement restrictions and efforts to diagnose infected herds as soon as possible. However, despite these measures the rate at which new outbreaks were detected continued to rise. The epidemic faded out only upon the implementation of additional measures such as rapid pre-emptive slaughter of herds in contact with or located near infected herds, increased hygienic measures, biweekly screening of all herds by veterinary practitioners, and reduction of the transportation movements for welfare reasons. The last infected herd was depopulated on 6 March 1998.

Unravelling transmission trees of infectious diseases by combining genetic and epidemiological data

Knowledge on the transmission tree of an epidemic can provide valuable insights into disease dynamics. The transmission tree can be reconstructed by analysing either detailed epidemiological data (e.g. contact tracing) or, if sufficient genetic diversity accumulates over the course of the epidemic, genetic data of the pathogen. We present a likelihood-based framework to integrate these two data types, estimating probabilities of infection by taking weighted averages over the set of possible transmission trees. We test the approach by applying it to temporal, geographical and genetic data on the 241 poultry farms infected in an epidemic of avian influenza A (H7N7) in The Netherlands in 2003. We show that the combined approach estimates the transmission tree with higher correctness and resolution than analyses based on genetic or epidemiological data alone. Furthermore, the estimated tree reveals the relative infectiousness of farms of different types and sizes.

Transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus in Pekin ducks is significantly reduced by a genetically distant H5N2 vaccine

Domestic ducks play an important role in the epidemiology of H5N1 avian influenza. Although it is known that vaccines that have a high homology with the challenge virus are able to prevent infection in ducks, little is yet known about the ability of genetically more distant vaccines in preventing infection, disease, and transmission. Here we study the effect of a widely used H5N2 vaccine (A/Chicken/Mexico/232/94/CPA) on the transmission of H5N1 virus (A/Chicken/China/1204/04) in ducks. The quantitative analyses show that despite the low level of homology between the virus and vaccine strain transmission was significantly reduced two weeks after a single or double vaccination. Mortality and disease rates were reduced markedly already one week after a single vaccination.

Ecologic Risk Factor Investigation of Clusters of Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus Infection in Thailand

This study was conducted to investigate space and time clusters of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus infection and to determine risk factors at the subdistrict level in Thailand. Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) was diagnosed in 1890 poultry flocks located in 953 subdistricts during 2004-2007. The ecologic risk for H5N1 virus infection was assessed on the basis of a spatial-based case-control study involving 824 case subdistricts and 3296 control subdistricts from 6 study periods. Risk factors investigated in clustered areas of H5N1 included human and animal demographic characteristics, poultry production systems, and wild birds and their habitats. Six variables remained statistically significant in the final model: flock density of backyard chickens (odds ratio [OR], 0.98), flock density of fighting cocks (OR, 1.02), low and high human density (OR, 0.60), presence of quail flocks (OR, 1.21), free-grazing duck flocks (OR, 2.17), and a poultry slaughterhouse (OR, 1.33). We observed a strong association between subdistricts with H5N1 virus-infected poultry flocks and evidence of prior and concomitant H5N1 infection in wild birds in the same subdistrict.

Transmission of classical swine fever virus within herds during the 1997-1998 epidemic in The Netherlands.

In this paper, we describe the transmission of Classical Swine Fever virus (CSF virus) within herds during the 1997-1998 epidemic in The Netherlands. In seven herds where the infection started among individually housed breeding stock, all breeding pigs had been tested for antibodies to CSF virus shortly before depopulation. Based upon these data, the transmission of CSF virus between pigs was described as exponential growth in time with a parameter r, that was estimated at 0.108 (95% confidence interval (95% CI) 0.060-0.156). The accompanying per-generation transmission (expressed as the basic reproduction ratio, R0) was estimated at 2.9. Based upon this characterisation, a calculation method was derived with which serological findings at depopulation can be used to calculate the period in which the virus was with a certain probability introduced into that breeding stock. This model was used to estimate the period when the virus had been introduced into 34 herds where the infection started in the breeding section. Of these herds, only a single contact with a herd previously infected had been traced. However, in contrast with the seven previously mentioned herds, only a sample of the breeding pigs had been tested before depopulation (as was the common procedure during the epidemic). The observed number of days between the single contact with an infected herd and the day of sampling of these 34 herds fitted well in the model. Thus, we concluded that the model and transmission parameter was in agreement with the transmission between breeding pigs in these herds. Because of the limited sample size and because it was usually unknown in which specific pen the infection started, we were unable to estimate transmission parameters for weaned piglets and finishing pigs from the data collected during the epidemic. However, from the results of controlled experiments in which R0 was estimated as 81 between weaned piglets and 14 between heavy finishing pigs (Laevens et al., 1998a. Vet. Quart. 20, 41-45; Laevens et al., 1999. Ph.D. Thesis), we constructed a simple model to describe the transmission of CSF virus in compartments (rooms) housing finishing pigs and weaned piglets. From the number of pens per compartment, the number of pigs per pen, the numbers of pigs tested for antibodies to CSF virus and the distribution of the seropositive pigs in the compartment, this model gives again a period in which the virus most probably entered the herd. Using the findings in 41 herds where the infection started in the section of the finishers or weaned piglets of the age of 8 weeks or older, and of which only a single contact with a herd previously infected was known, there was no reason to reject the model. Thus, we concluded that the transmission between weaned piglets and finishing pigs during the epidemic was not significantly different from the transmission observed in the experiments.

Quantifying Transmission of Campylobacter jejuni in Commercial Broiler Flocks

ABSTRACT Since meat from poultry colonized with Campylobacter spp. is a major cause of bacterial gastroenteritis, human exposure should be reduced by, among other things, prevention of colonization of broiler flocks. To obtain more insight into possible sources of introduction of Campylobacter into broiler flocks, it is essential to estimate the moment that the first bird in a flock is colonized. If the rate of transmission within a flock were known, such an estimate could be determined from the change in the prevalence of colonized birds in a flock over time. The aim of this study was to determine the rate of transmission of Campylobacter using field data gathered for 5 years for Australian broiler flocks. We used unique sampling data for 42 Campylobacter jejuni-colonized flocks and estimated the transmission rate, which is defined as the number of secondary infections caused by one colonized bird per day. The estimate was 2.37 ± 0.295 infections per infectious bird per day, which implies that in our study population colonized flocks consisting of 20,000 broilers would have an increase in within-flock prevalence to 95% within 4.4 to 7.2 days after colonization of the first broiler. Using Bayesian analysis, the moment of colonization of the first bird in a flock was estimated to be from 21 days of age onward in all flocks in the study. This study provides an important quantitative estimate of the rate of transmission of Campylobacter in broiler flocks, which could be helpful in future studies on the epidemiology of Campylobacter in the field.