Armen Hovakimian

The Debt-Equity Choice

When firms adjust their capital structures, they tend to move toward a target debt ratio that is consistent with theories based on tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of debt. In contrast to previous empirical work, out tests explicitly account for the fact that firms may face impediments to movements toward their target ratio, and that the target ratio may change over time as the firms profitability and stock price change. A separate analysis of the size of the issue and repurchase transactions suggests that the deviation between the actual and the target ratios plays a more important role in the repurchase decision than in the issuance decision.

Determinants of Target Capital Structure: The Case of Dual Debt and Equity Issues

We examine whether market and operating performance affect corporate financing behavior because they are related to target leverage. Our focus on firms that issue both debt and equity enhances our ability to draw inferences. Consistent with dynamic trade-off theories, dual issuers offset the deviation from the target resulting from accumulation of earnings and losses. Our results also imply that high market-to-book firms have low target debt ratios. On the other hand, consistent with market timing, high stock returns increase the probability of equity issuance but have no effect on target leverage. r 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G32

Effectiveness of Capital Regulation at U.S. Commercial Banks, 1985 to 1994

Unless priced and administered appropriately, a governmental safety net enhances risk-shifting opportunities for banks. This paper quantifies regulatory efforts to use capital requirements to control risk-shifting by U.S. banks during 1985 to 1994 and investigates how much risk-based capital requirements and other deposit-insurance reforms improved this control. We find that capital discipline did not prevent large banks from shifting risk onto the safety net. Banks with low capital and debt-to-deposits ratios overcame outside discipline better than other banks. Mandates introduced by 1991 legislation have improved but did not establish full regulatory control over bank risk-shifting incentives. Copyright The American Finance Association 2000.

Credit Rating Targets

Credit ratings can be viewed as a summary statistic that captures various elements of a firm’s capital structure. They incorporate a firm’s debt ratio, the maturity and priority structure of its debt, as well as the volatility of its cash flows. However, regressions of credit ratings on firm characteristics provide inferences that are not always consistent with the interpretations of extant regressions that include various debt ratios as independent variables. In particular, we find that coefficients of variables that have been viewed as proxies for the uniqueness and the extent that assets can be redeployed, e.g., R&D expenses and asset tangibility, have different effects in the credit rating regressions than in the debt ratio regressions. In addition, we find that after controlling for whether or not firms have debt ratings, the extant evidence of a positive relation between debt ratios and size is reversed. Finally, using regression-based proxies for target ratings and debt ratios, we find that deviations from rating targets as well as debt ratio targets influence subsequent corporate finance choices. When observed ratings are below (above) the target, firms tend to make security issuance and repurchase decisions that reduce (increase) leverage. In addition, firms are more likely to decrease (increase) dividend payouts when they have below (above) target ratings and make more (fewer) acquisitions when they have above (below) target ratings.

US Analyst Regulation and the Earnings Forecast Bias Around the World

We examine the spillover effects of the Global Analyst Research Settlement (or Global Settlement) on analysts’ earnings forecasts in 40 developed and emerging markets. Prior to the Global Settlement, analysts generally made overly optimistic forecasts, this bias tending to be higher in countries with less investor protection. This forecast bias declined significantly after passage of the Global Settlement, the spillover effect being stronger for countries with lower investor protection. The spillover effect is also stronger for countries with a more significant presence of the analysts of the 12 banks directly involved in the Global Settlement.

Institutional Shareholders and SEO Market Timing

Pecking order and market timing theories assume that corporate financing decisions are made in the interests of existing shareholders. We find that existing institutional investors, on average, significantly increase their share ownership at the time of the SEO, including SEOs that would be classified as overpriced based on ex-ante measures of mispricing, such as pre-issue returns and market-to-book ratios. We further find that higher pre-existing institutional shareholdings lead to less SEO timing. Overall, the results question whether firms engage in equity timing to benefit existing shareholders at the expense of investors buying shares in the SEOs.

Do Firms Have Unique Target Debt Ratios to Which They Adjust

The estimates of the speed of adjustment to target leverage tend to be significant but low. One interpretation for the slow adjustment is that firms fully adjust to target only infrequently, when the benefits of adjustment exceed its costs. Using both ex-ante and ex-post information to identify situations when the adjustment should be full, we find no evidence of full adjustment. We find that adjustments to target are rarely full, with many firms adjusting beyond or away from the target. The results imply that firms may have target ranges but no unique target debt ratios to which they ever want to fully adjust. One implication of this is that empirical analyses, such as partial adjustment regressions, that rely on the existence of a well-defined target debt ratio may be ill-suited for quantifying the importance of dynamic tradeoff behavior vis-a-vis alternative theories.

Shareholder Investment Horizons and Payout Policy

We find that institutions with short and long investment horizons have different effects on corporate payout policy. Firms with higher long (short) term institutional holdings are more (less) likely to pay dividends and tend to have larger (smaller) dividend payouts. Although high long-term institutional holdings also lead to more and larger repurchases, long-term institutions tend to prefer dividends to repurchases. In contrast, short-term institutional investors prefer repurchases to dividends. Overall, the results are consistent with long-term institutional investors playing an important monitoring role and with short-term institutional investors trading on their short-term information.

Tracking Variation in Systemic Risk at US Banks During 1974-2013

This paper proposes a theoretically based and easy-to-implement way to measure the systemic risk of financial institutions using publicly available accounting and stock market data. The measure models the credit enhancement taxpayers provide to individual banks in the Merton tradition (1974) as a combination put option for the deep tail of bank losses and a knock-in stop-loss call on bank assets. This model expresses the value of taxpayer loss exposure from a string of defaults as the value of this combination option written on the portfolio of industry assets. The exercise price of the call is the face value of the debt of the entire sector. We conceive of an individual bank’s systemic risk as its contribution to the value of this sector-wide option on the financial safety net. To the extent that authorities are slow to see bank losses or reluctant to exercise the call, the government itself becomes a secondary source of systemic risk. We apply our model to quarterly data over the period 1974-2013. The model indicates that systemic risk reached unprecedented highs during the financial crisis years 2008-2009, and that bank size, leverage, and asset risk are key drivers of systemic risk.

Corporate Financing of Maturing Long-Term Debt

We test the pecking order theory by examining how firms finance maturing long-term debt. This allows us to resolve the issues of debt capacity and endogeneity of financing deficit, to examine the role of internal financing, and to generate evidence regarding the order in which different sources of financing are used. We find that firms use internal funds before they issue new debt to refinance maturing long-term debt. Firms with more cash on hand are less likely to issue new debt to refinance. On average, each marginal dollar of maturing long-term debt is fully financed with new debt issuance.