Gayané Hovakimian

Determinants of Target Capital Structure: The Case of Dual Debt and Equity Issues

We examine whether market and operating performance affect corporate financing behavior because they are related to target leverage. Our focus on firms that issue both debt and equity enhances our ability to draw inferences. Consistent with dynamic trade-off theories, dual issuers offset the deviation from the target resulting from accumulation of earnings and losses. Our results also imply that high market-to-book firms have low target debt ratios. On the other hand, consistent with market timing, high stock returns increase the probability of equity issuance but have no effect on target leverage. r 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G32

The impact of the manager-shareholder conflict on acquiring bank returns

This paper examines whether shareholder value-maximizing corporate governance mechanisms assist in reducing the managerial incentive to enter value-destroying bank acquisitions. We find that diversifying bank acquisitions earn significantly negative announcement period abnormal returns (AR) for bidder banks whereas focusing acquisitions earn zero AR. We then find that corporate governance variables (such as CEO share and option ownership and a smaller board size) in the bidding bank are less effective in diversifying acquisitions than in focusing acquisitions. These results are robust to the inclusion of the usual control variables. 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Determinants of Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity

Using firm-level estimates of investment-cash flow sensitivity, I classify firms into groups of high, low, and negative sensitivity. I find that investment-cash flow sensitivity is non-monotonic with respect to financial constraints, cash flows, and growth opportunities. Specifically, firms with negative cash flow sensitivity have the lowest cash flows and highest growth opportunities, and appear the most financially constrained. Cash flow insensitive firms have the highest cash flows and lowest growth opportunities, and appear the least financially constrained. At least partially, negative cash flow sensitivity is driven by high investment and low cash flow levels at the inception of firms as public companies, which decrease and increase, respectively, with age.

Cash Flow Sensitivity of Investment

Investment cash flow sensitivity is associated with both underinvestment when cash flows are low and overinvestment when cash flows are high. The accessibility of external capital is positively correlated with cash flows, intensifying investment cash flow sensitivity. Managers actively counteract the variations in internal and external liquidity by accumulating working capital when liquidity is high and draining it when liquidity is low. These results imply that cash flow sensitive firms face financial constraints, which are binding in low cash flow years. Traditional indicators of financial constraints, such as size and dividend payout, successfully distinguish firms that may potentially face constraints, but are less successful in distinguishing between periods of tight and relaxed constraints. These periods are much more clearly separated by the KZ index, which, on the other hand, is less successful in identifying firms that are likely to face liquidity constraints.

Financial Constraints and Investment Efficiency: Internal Capital Allocation across the Business Cycle

The extent to which conglomerates face frictions in external capital markets has implications for their internal capital allocation. We find that, during recessions, when external financing costs are higher, conglomerates improve the efficiency of internal capital markets by increasing the allocation of funds to high q divisions relative to low q divisions. The improvement is significantly higher for conglomerates that are likely to face more binding financial constraints. This evidence suggests that although financial constraints impair managers’ ability to undertake positive net present value projects, they improve the quality of project selection by reducing free cash flow and pressuring managers to fund the more valuable investment opportunities. It is consistent with theories stressing the benefits of internal capital markets in the presence of external capital market imperfections.

Leverage Persistence and Corporate Dynamic Tradeoff Behavior

We investigate the dynamics of observed and target leverage ratios and deviations from the targets. The cross-sectional persistence in observed leverage ratios is driven by highly persistent targets, whereas the time series variation is driven by transitory deviations from targets. Deviations are less persistent for firms that are overlevered and firms that are smaller, younger, focused, or have lower credit ratings. In recessions, excess leverage is less persistent for larger firms and is more persistent for smaller firms. Thus, consistent with dynamic trade-off theories, persistence is higher when the costs of deviating from targets are likely to be lower and when the costs of adjustment are likely to be higher.