Arnaud Dellis

Approval voting with endogenous candidates

Abstract We present a formal model of political competition under approval voting which allows for endogenous candidate entry. Our analysis yields a number of novel insights. First, we develop a notion of sincere voting behavior under approval voting, called relative sincerity . We then show that the relatively sincere voting behavior is consistent with the strategic calculus of voting. Second, we show that in a one-dimensional model with distance preferences, equilibria in relatively sincere strategies and without spoiler candidates always generate outcomes close to the median voter. Moreover, approval voting satisfies Duvergers Law in the sense that there are at most two winning positions! Finally, we extend our analysis to arbitrary policy spaces. In the general setting, approval voting is shown to be susceptible to the same kinds of problems as the plurality rule, such as the possibility of non-majoritarian outcomes, failure to elect the Condorcet winner and existence of spoiler candidates.

The two-party system under alternative voting procedures

Countries that elect their policy-makers by means of Plurality Voting tend to have a two-party system. This observation can be explained by the strategic behavior of voters. This article derives two broad classes of voting procedures under which strategic voting behavior induces a two-party system under standard assumptions on voter preferences. One class consists of the voting procedures with unique top-score, i.e., under which a voter can cast a top-score vote for only one candidate (e.g., Plurality Voting, Borda Count). The other class consists of the voting procedures that permit truncated ballots, i.e., under which voters do not have to cast all their votes (e.g., Approval Voting). This analysis suggests that the key for strategic voting behavior to induce a two-party system is that voters can always cast a different score for the two candidates they rank first and second on their ballots.

Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization

We use the citizen-candidate model to study the differential incentives that alternative voting rules provide for candidate entry, and their effect on policy polarization. In particular, we show that allowing voters to cast multiple votes leads to equilibria which support multiple candidate clusters. These equilibria are more polarized than those obtained under the Plurality Rule. This result differs from the one obtained in the existing literature, where the set of candidates is exogenous. Thus, our paper contributes to the scholarly literature as well as public debate on the merits of using different voting rules by highlighting the importance of endogenous candidacy.

Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion

This paper challenges the prevailing view in the literature that informational lobbying is socially beneficial. Key to our analysis is the fact that policymakers are constrained on the number of issues they can address, which forces them to prioritize issues. Under reasonable conditions, interest groups advocating less-salient reforms produce information, inducing policymakers to prioritize those reforms instead of more-salient ones. Such distortion of the policy agenda reduces social welfare. Our story is consistent with empirical accounts of the lobbying process.

Multiple Votes, Ballot Truncation and the Two-Party System: An Experiment

Duverger’s law states that Plurality Voting tends to favor a two-party system. We conducted laboratory experiments to study whether voting procedures other than Plurality Voting could favor a two-party system as well. Plurality Voting is compared with Approval Voting and Dual Voting, both of which allow to vote for multiple candidates, but differ in whether voters are required to cast all their votes. We find that in most elections held under Plurality Voting and Approval Voting, at most two candidates are viable. By contrast, three candidates are viable in a sizable number of elections held under Dual Voting due to strategic voting. Our evidence suggests that Approval Voting may encourage a two-party system, whereas Dual Voting may encourage multipartism. The voters’ ability to truncate ballots (i.e., not cast all their votes) is essential for supporting the two-party system under Approval Voting.

Blame-game politics in a coalition government

An important question in political economics concerns delays in the adoption of socially beneficial reforms. The present paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision-making process, nor the policy preferences of the politicians. It shows that a governing party favoring a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption and blame its coalition partners for the non-adoption. This is referred to as blame-game politics. The rationale for playing such a game is to prevent some parties from acquiring a better reputation as supporters of the reform. At a more general level, the argument applies to situations where several agents, whose types are private information have each to take an action while the principal observes only the aggregate outcome.

Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections

Approval Voting is a voting procedure in which a voter can vote for as many candidates as she wishes, and the candidate who receives the most votes wins the election. Since the seminal contribution of Brams and Fishburn (1978), Approval Voting has received considerable attention. Of course, Approval Voting has been the subject of numerous scholarly papers, as this handbook testifies. But Approval Voting has also received considerable attention outside academics. This is best exemplified by the fact that there are now several professional associations that elect their officers by means of Approval Voting.1 Also, the use of Approval Voting in political elections has been advocated relentlessly and, at one point, was even hailed as the electoral reform of the twentieth century (Brams 1980, p. 105).

Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative Vote Rule

We use the citizen-candidate model to study electoral outcomes under the Alternative Vote rule, a voting method often proposed as a replacement to the prevalent Plurality rule. We show that, like the Plurality rule, the Alternative Vote rule deters multiple candidate clusters and the presence of candidates at more than two positions. Moreover, the Alternative Vote rule tends to support less policy polarization than the Plurality rule. These results stand in contrast to those obtained under other proposed voting rules, Approval Voting in particular, which are prone to candidate clustering and, as a result, can support greater policy polarization vis-à-vis the Plurality rule.

The Political Economy of Social Choices

We survey the literature that compares the theoretical properties of different voting procedures using models of electoral competition with endogenous candidacy. In particular, we focus on the predictions made by these models regarding the number of candidates running for election and their polarization. We organize the different models into three families based on different assumptions regarding candidate motivation and the timing of candidate entry. We argue that endogenous candidacy models offer both theoretical and empirical advantages over the standard Hotelling-Downs model in the comparison of the properties of alternative voting procedures. On the theoretical front, these models can provide a more satisfactory microfoundation for the emergence and/or stability of a specific configuration of parties or candidates under different voting procedures. On the empirical front these models offer a better account of the stylized facts about elections, particularly when it comes to explaining the cases where Duvergers propositions apply and the cases where they do not. We also point to shortcomings of these models and propose some directions for future research.

Comparison of Voting Procedures Using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy

We survey the literature that compares the theoretical properties of different voting procedures using models of electoral competition with endogenous candidacy. In particular, we focus on the predictions made by these models regarding the number of candidates running for election and their polarization. We organize the different models into three families based on different assumptions regarding candidate motivation and the timing of candidate entry. We argue that endogenous candidacy models offer both theoretical and empirical advantages over the standard Hotelling-Downs model in the comparison of the properties of alternative voting procedures. On the theoretical front, these models can provide a more satisfactory microfoundation for the emergence and/or stability of a specific configuration of parties or candidates under different voting procedures. On the empirical front these models offer a better account of the stylized facts about elections, particularly when it comes to explaining the cases where Duvergers propositions apply and the cases where they do not. We also point to shortcomings of these models and propose some directions for future research.