Asbjørn Skjæveland

Party Cohesion in the Danish Parliament

This article formulates a comprehensive and systematic taxonomy of micro level explanations of party cohesion; party cohesion being understood as party group members acting in unity externally. This apparatus is used in an analysis of party cohesion in the final divisions in the Danish Parliament, where cohesion figures are among the highest in the liberal democratic world. The investigation is based on interviews, survey data and data on voting behaviour. The main explanations of the high level of cohesion are the absence of disagreement in the party groups and a moral commitment to the party. Variation among MPs, parties and topics is also documented and discussed. The cohesion of each party and the compliant behaviour of individual MPs are related to the importance MPs ascribe to representing their party. Furthermore, divisions on moral issues, EU integration and local matters show lower than normal degrees of cohesion.

Explaining Oversized Coalitions: Empirical Evidence from Local Governments

Government coalitions should be minimal winning. However, it is an empirical fact that oversized coalitions exist. Several theories have been offered to explain this phenomenon, but they are seldom put to a systematic empirical test. When empirical tests are performed, they are typically based on data on national government formations in post-war Europe. Since these are the data that gave rise to the theories in the first place, there is a risk of post hoc hypothesis reformulation. The purpose of this paper is to test explanations of oversized coalitions systematically in a new empirical setting and thus avoid this circularity problem. We focus on local governments in Denmark and have collected data by a survey sent to almost 3,000 local councillors. We draw hypotheses from three broad theoretical perspectives on oversized coalitions and test them in a logit regression analysis. The analysis shows that oversized coalitions cannot be explained by traditional coalition theories. Our results question the minimalist behavioural logic inherent in most coalition theories and suggest that parties may be motivated by norms.

A Danish Party Cohesion Cycle

The aim is to analyze short-term fluctuations in Danish parliamentary party cohesion on the backdrop of an American electoral pattern in party cohesion. A Danish cycle is documented: party cohesion in relation to voting behavior is especially high just after an election, then it drops to rise again as election time approaches. A rational choice re-election model predicts the rise in party cohesion, but an obligation actualization model predicts the full cycle. Elections actualize Danish MPs’ moral obligation to their party. Where American party cohesion drops in an election year, Danish party cohesion rises when an election approaches. This may be explained by different preferences in the American and Danish electorates: Danish voters value party cohesion per se, American voters do not.

Portfolio Allocation or Policy Horizons? Determinants of Coalition Formation in Danish Local Government

Abstract It is widely assumed that policy considerations are important when parties form government coalitions. But if this is so, and if coalitions are negotiated in multi-dimensional policy spaces with no majority parties, then a rapid turn-over of coalitions should be observed, cf. the chaos theorem. However, we rarely witness this. Here we analyse two of the most prominent theories that address this puzzle: Laver and Shepsles portfolio allocation model; and Warwicks policy horizon hypothesis. We do not analyse the ‘usual suspects’ (i.e. national government formations in Europe), but present a new empirical testing ground: Danish local governments. We rely on Laver and Shepsles Winset programme to identify ‘strong parties’ in the portfolio allocation model but develop a new measure of Warwicks policy horizons that better deals with problems of multi-dimensionality. In a conditional logit analysis of survey data from 3000 local councillors, we find support for the policy horizons model, but not for the portfolio allocation model.

Modelling Government Formation in Denmark and Beyond

This article proposes a new model of government formation: the Dual Power Base Model. The starting point is the median voter theorem, but an institutional limitation suggested by Laver and Shepsle (2000) is added. The claim is that it takes a certain number of MPs to cope with the practical tasks of running a government — that is, to have ‘Office Capacity’. If the median party has Office Capacity, the model predicts that the median party will form the government. If the median party does not have Office Capacity the median party will choose the closest party or parties that do have Office Capacity. This model is applied most thoroughly to government formation in Denmark, but also to the Norwegian and Swedish cases. When party positions are measured by previous voting behaviour on bills in parliament, the model explains 23 out of 25 government formations in Denmark in the period 1953 to 2007.

Putting Party First? Constituency Service in Denmark

The electoral system chosen by Danish parties and politicians appears to create strong incentives for parliamentarians to undertake activities that can be labelled constituency service. In offering parties the option of running open lists—which most do—the MPs are encouraged to cultivate a personal vote to get elected. High party unity, moreover, might also be thought to be conducive towards a strong constituency focus, in that MPs will feel less party-constrained on their ‘home patch’. This article explores whether this is the case, using both survey data and interviews with MPs. Danish legislators do not neglect their constituency, promoting and protecting its interests in a variety of ways. Yet, in light of the voting system incentives, it is surprising perhaps that they do not do more in the way of constituency service. There is some care but little surgery. It seems ‘party service’ and the attendant career gains take precedence over constituency service although the equation varies from one MP to the next.