Flemming Juul Christiansen

Minority coalition governance in Denmark

Coalition governance is a challenge for political parties because it involves cooperation and compromises between parties that have different political goals and are competitors in political elections. Coalition coordination is crucial for the intra-coalitional cooperation of the governing parties. A key element in coalition coordination is coalition agreements, which to a varying degree constrain the behaviour of the coalition partners. This article explores the share of laws that were precisely defined in government agreements and/or legislative agreements, and sets out to explain variation in this share of coalition agreement-based laws. The analyses are based on unique data on legislative as well as governmental coalition agreements entered by three Danish governments with varying parliamentary strength. This study brings the blooming literature on coalition agreements one step further by showing that coalition governance is influenced by government strength. The legislative practice of strong coalition governments is less accommodative but more pre-regulated by coalition agreements.

Organizational de-integration of political parties and interest groups in Denmark

Political parties and major economic interest groups often used to be closely linked, but over recent decades they seem to have become more and more detached. Until now, this process has primarily been described in almost deterministic structural models that tell us little about how this detachment takes place and imply that it affects all players at around the same time. The article analyses this development with a simple exchange model that explains changes in organizational integration between political parties and interest groups from its effect on their respective goal-seeking as collective actors. The model is tested on four sets of political parties and interest groups in Denmark in a longitudinal analysis covering developments since 1920. The variation found largely confirms the expectations of the model that the timing of the detachment across party families depends on the strength of resources both sides can derive from the other.

Cooperation between counterparts in parliament from an agenda-setting perspective: legislative coalitions as a trade of criticism and policy

Abstract Governments may bargain with parties in parliament to silence them. This insight follows from the agenda-setting literature, which emphasises the power of the opposition to criticise the government. The literature on legislatures points to the fear of loss of future voter support as a motivation for majority building. However, it does not name factors that can cause such uncertainty. One such factor is opposition criticism. This article argues that majority building does not only involve an exchange of policy support; governments use legislative coalitions to dampen unwanted opposition blame. By offering the opposition noteworthy policy influence in legislative coalitions, governments avoid opposition criticism in return, in addition to having initiatives passed. In order to test this argument, a large dataset is compiled on opposition criticism in parliament and the media before and after the 325 bargained legislative agreements settled in Denmark from 1973 to 2003. It is found that such agreements are more likely amidst opposition criticism and that they dampen opposition criticism.

Political Parties and Innovation

ABSTRACT Public innovation and political parties are usually not studied together. Given the key position parties hold in representative democracies, it is somewhat odd that their influence on public innovation has not been explored. We propose to open this line of inquiry and introduce a typology that highlights four avenues for studying the links between public innovation and political parties: linkage, programme, interaction and policy. We use the typology to discuss relevant themes and empirical examples in existing literature and to formulate of a number of hypotheses about innovation of political parties themselves as well their impact on potentially innovative public decisions. One major expectation is that hierarchical parties with centralized leadership make more efficient decisions but that sustainable innovation outcomes promoted by collaborative efforts are easier to obtain for decentralized political parties with participatory internal democratic processes.

Putting Party First? Constituency Service in Denmark

The electoral system chosen by Danish parties and politicians appears to create strong incentives for parliamentarians to undertake activities that can be labelled constituency service. In offering parties the option of running open lists—which most do—the MPs are encouraged to cultivate a personal vote to get elected. High party unity, moreover, might also be thought to be conducive towards a strong constituency focus, in that MPs will feel less party-constrained on their ‘home patch’. This article explores whether this is the case, using both survey data and interviews with MPs. Danish legislators do not neglect their constituency, promoting and protecting its interests in a variety of ways. Yet, in light of the voting system incentives, it is surprising perhaps that they do not do more in the way of constituency service. There is some care but little surgery. It seems ‘party service’ and the attendant career gains take precedence over constituency service although the equation varies from one MP to the next.

Raising the Stakes. Passing State Budgets in Scandinavia

Abstract State budget reforms in Sweden and Norway have increased the political importance of annual parliamentary state budget votes. Informal changes of the process in Denmark have had a similar effect. This article analyzes state budget agreements in the Scandinavian countries over the last 35 years. Its results indicate that the governments of the three countries have become more prone to commit themselves to binding coalitional arrangements with other parties. In these countries with frequent minority governments, this involves institutionalized incorporation of support parties and legislative accommodations in securing a majority for the state budget.