Atif R. Mian

Distance Constraints: The Limits of Foreign Lending in Poor Economies

How far does mobility of multinational banks solve problems of financial development? Using a panel of 80,000 loans over 7 years, I show that greater cultural and geographical distance between a foreign banks headquarters and local branches leads it to further avoid lending to “informationally difficult” yet fundamentally sound firms requiring relational contracting. Greater distance also makes them less likely to bilaterally renegotiate, and less successful at recovering defaults. Differences in bank size, legal institutions, risk preferences, or unobserved borrower heterogeneity cannot explain these results. These distance constraints can be large enough to permanently exclude certain sectors of the economy from financing by foreign banks.

What Explains the 2007-2009 Drop in Employment?

We show that deterioration in household balance sheets, or the housing net worth channel, played a significant role in the sharp decline in U.S. employment between 2007 and 2009. Counties with a larger decline in housing net worth experience a larger decline in non‐tradable employment. This result is not driven by industry‐specific supply‐side shocks, exposure to the construction sector, policy‐induced business uncertainty, or contemporaneous credit supply tightening. We find little evidence of labor market adjustment in response to the housing net worth shock. There is no significant expansion of the tradable sector in counties with the largest decline in housing net worth. Further, there is little evidence of wage adjustment within or emigration out of the hardest hit counties.

The Great Recession: Lessons from Microeconomic Data

We highlight how a micro-level analysis of the Great Recession provides us with important clues to understand the origins of the crisis, the link between credit and asset prices, the feedback effect from asset prices to the real economy, and the role of household leverage in explaining the downturn. We hope that our discussion also serves as an example of the usefulness of incorporating microeconomic data and techniques in answering traditional macroeconomic questions.

Liquidity Risk, and Maturity Management over the Credit Cycle

We show that firm demand-side factors are strong drivers of procyclical refinancing be- havior over the credit cycle using novel data from the Shared National Credit program. Firms are more likely to refinance early when credit conditions are good to keep the ef- fective maturity of their loans long and hedge against having to refinance in tight credit conditions. High credit quality firms are better able to hedge, making their refinancing propensity more sensitive to credit cycles than less creditworthy firms. There is a strong relationship between refinancing a loan, and subsequent growth in capital expenditure, es- pecially when a loan is refinanced early.

House Price Gains and U.S. Household Spending from 2002 to 2006

We examine the effect of rising U.S. house prices on borrowing and spending from 2002 to 2006. There is strong heterogeneity in the marginal propensity to borrow and spend. Households in low income zip codes aggressively liquefy home equity when house prices rise, and they increase spending substantially. In contrast, for the same rise in house prices, households living in high income zip codes are unresponsive, both in their borrowing and spending behavior. The entire effect of housing wealth on spending is through borrowing, and, under certain assumptions, this spending represents 0.8% of GDP in 2004 and 1.3% of GDP in 2005 and 2006. Households that borrow and spend out of housing gains between 2002 and 2006 experience significantly lower income and spending growth after 2006.

Local Versus Aggregate Lending Channels: The Effects of Securitization on Corporate Credit Supply

While banks may change their credit supply due to bank balance-sheet shocks (the local lending channel), firms can react by adjusting their sources of financing in equilibrium (the aggregate lending channel). We provide a methodology to identify the aggregate (firm-level) effects of the lending channel and estimate the impact of banks’ ability to securitize realestate assets on credit supply for non real-estate firms in Spain over 2000-2010. We show that firm-level equilibrium dynamics nullify the strong local (bank-level) lending channel of securitization on credit quantity for firms with multiple banking relationships. Credit terms however become softer, but there are no real effects. Securitization implies a credit expansion on the extensive margin towards first-time bank clients, which are more likely to default. Finally, the 2008 securitization collapse reverses the local lending channel.

Fraudulent Income Overstatement on Mortgage Applications during the Credit Expansion of 2002 to 2005

Academic research, government inquiries, and press accounts show extensive mortgage fraud during the housing boom of the mid-2000s. We explore a particular type of mortgage fraud: the overstatement of income on mortgage applications. We define “income overstatement” in a zip code as the growth in income reported on home-purchase mortgage applications minus the average IRS-reported income growth from 2002 to 2005. Income overstatement is highest in low credit score, low income zip codes that Mian and Sufi (2009) show experience the strongest mortgage credit growth from 2002 to 2005. These same zip codes with high income overstatement are plagued with mortgage fraud according to independent measures. Income overstatement in a zip code is associated with poor performance during the mortgage credit boom, and terrible economic and financial economic outcomes after the boom including high default rates, negative income growth, and increased poverty and unemployment. From 1991 to 2007, the zip code-level correlation between IRS-reported income growth and growth in income reported on mortgage applications is always positive with one exception: the correlation goes to zero in the non-GSE market during the 2002 to 2005 period. Income reported on mortgage applications should not be used as true income in low credit score zip codes from 2002 to 2005.

Household Debt and Defaults from 2000 to 2010: The Credit Supply View

During the first decade of the 21st century, the United States witnessed a dramatic rise in household debt followed by a severe default crisis. In this study, we review the existing literature and provide new evidence supporting the credit supply view of the episode, which holds that an increase in credit supply unrelated to fundamental improvements in income or productivity was the shock that initiated the household debt boom and bust. The credit supply view is supported by four facts: First, from 2002 to 2005, there was an expansion of mortgage credit supply that was independent of improved economic circumstances. This can most easily be seen in the increased number of mortgages for home purchase originated to marginal households, or households that previously were routinely denied mortgage credit. Second, the expansion in mortgage credit supply increased house prices. Third, existing homeowners responded to rising house prices by borrowing aggressively out of home equity; such borrowing was prevalent in all but the top 20% of the credit score distribution and was the primary driver of the rise in aggregate household debt. Fourth, the default crisis was driven mainly by lower credit score individuals. The view that credit played only a passive role in explaining the rise in household debt and the subsequent default crisis is inconsistent with the evidence.

Household Debt and Defaults from 2000 to 2010: Facts from Credit Bureau Data

We use individual level credit bureau data to document which individuals saw the biggest rise in household debt from 2000 to 2007 and the biggest rise in defaults from 2007 to 2010. Growth in household debt from 2000 to 2007 was substantially larger for individuals with the lowest initial credit scores. However, initial debt levels were lower for individuals in the lowest 20% of the initial credit score distribution. As a result, the contribution to the total dollar rise in household debt was strongest among individuals in the 20th to 60th percentile of the initial credit score distribution. Consistent with the importance of home-equity based borrowing, the increase in debt is especially large among individuals in the lowest 60% of the credit score distribution living in high house price growth zip codes. In contrast, the borrowing of individuals in the top 20% of the credit score distribution is completely unresponsive to higher house price growth. In terms of defaults, the evidence is unambiguous: both default rates and the share of total delinquent debt is largest among individuals with low initial credit scores. The bottom 40% of the credit score distribution is responsible for 73% of the total amount of delinquent debt in 2007, and 68% of the total in 2008. Individuals in the top 40% of the initial credit score distribution never make up more than 15% of total delinquencies, even in 2009 at the height of the default crisis.

Government Economic Policy, Sentiments, and Consumption

The well-documented rise in political polarization among the U.S. electorate over the past 20 years has been accompanied by a substantial increase in the effect of partisan bias on survey-based measures of economic expectations. Individuals have a more optimistic view on future economic conditions when they are more closely affiliated with the party that controls the White House, and this tendency has increased significantly over time. Individuals report a large shift in economic expectations based on partisan affiliation after the 2008 and 2016 elections, but administrative data on spending shows no effect of these shifts on actual household spending.