Atsushi Senju

Mindblind Eyes: An Absence of Spontaneous Theory of Mind in Asperger Syndrome

Diverting Asperger Deficit Placement of Asperger syndrome within the family of autism spectrum disorders (ASD) has always been a bit uneasy; although people with Asperger syndrome do exhibit the core impairments in social interaction and communication that are characteristic of ASD, they nevertheless perform well on tests that are thought to assess the ability to mentalize or to possess Theory of Mind skills. One of the classic tests of mentalizing ability is the false-belief task, in which subjects must be able to represent their own beliefs (true) and anothers beliefs, which are false because they have not been given complete information, such as not having seen the transfer of a piece of candy from one drawer to another. People with Asperger syndrome succeed at the verbal form of the false-belief task, yet Senju et al. (p. 883, published online 16 July) show that this is owing entirely to their having learned how to cope with an existing and still demonstrable deficit in an implicit version of the false-belief task. That is, the core impairment is present, but conscious and explicit learning allows them to compensate. Asperger syndrome individuals do not pass a nonverbal false-belief test. Adults with Asperger syndrome can understand mental states such as desires and beliefs (mentalizing) when explicitly prompted to do so, despite having impairments in social communication. We directly tested the hypothesis that such individuals nevertheless fail to mentalize spontaneously. To this end, we used an eye-tracking task that has revealed the spontaneous ability to mentalize in typically developing infants. We showed that, like infants, neurotypical adults’ (n = 17 participants) eye movements anticipated an actor’s behavior on the basis of her false belief. This was not the case for individuals with Asperger syndrome (n = 19). Thus, these individuals do not attribute mental states spontaneously, but they may be able to do so in explicit tasks through compensatory learning.

Direct gaze captures visuospatial attention

This study investigated whether the direct gaze of others influences attentional disengagement from faces in an experimental situation. Participants were required to fixate on a centrally presented face with varying gaze directions and to detect the appearance of a peripheral target as quickly as possible. Results revealed that target detection was delayed when the preceding face was directly gazing at the subject (direct gaze), as compared with an averted gaze (averted gaze) or with closed eyes (closed eyes). This effect disappeared when a temporal gap was inserted between the offset of the centrally presented face and the onset of a peripheral target, suggesting that attentional disengagement contributed to the delayed response in the direct gaze condition. The response delay to direct gaze was not found when the contrast polarity of eyes in the facial stimuli was reversed, reinforcing the importance of gaze perception in delayed disengagement from direct gaze.

Deviant gaze processing in children with autism: an ERP study

This study investigated event-related potentials (ERP) during an oddball task in which detection of specific eye direction was required of children with and without autism. The detection of a change in eye direction elicited occipito-temporal negativity, which had two major differences between children with and without autism. First, while this occipito-temporal negativity predominated in the right hemisphere of typically developed children, it was distributed equally bilaterally in children with autism. Second, the amplitude of this negativity was more pronounced in typically developed children in response to the detection of direct gaze as compared to averted gaze, but was not sensitive to direct/averted gaze direction in children with autism, which converges with behavioral reports. The results concur with previous literature, suggesting the importance of the right hemisphere, especially the superior temporal sulcus, in gaze processing. Results indicate that deviant neural substrates might be involved in gaze processing in individuals with autism.

Dogs catch human yawns

This study is the first to demonstrate that human yawns are possibly contagious to domestic dogs (Canis familiaris). Twenty-nine dogs observed a human yawning or making control mouth movements. Twenty-one dogs yawned when they observed a human yawning, but control mouth movements did not elicit yawning from any of them. The presence of contagious yawning in dogs suggests that this phenomenon is not specific to primate species and may indicate that dogs possess the capacity for a rudimentary form of empathy. Since yawning is known to modulate the levels of arousal, yawn contagion may help coordinate dog–human interaction and communication. Understanding the mechanism as well as the function of contagious yawning between humans and dogs requires more detailed investigation.

Absence of contagious yawning in children with autism spectrum disorder.

This study is the first to report the disturbance of contagious yawning in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Twenty-four children with ASD as well as 25 age-matched typically developing (TD) children observed video clips of either yawning or control mouth movements. Yawning video clips elicited more yawns in TD children than in children with ASD, but the frequency of yawns did not differ between groups when they observed control video clips. Moreover, TD children yawned more during or after the yawn video clips than the control video clips, but the type of video clips did not affect the amount of yawning in children with ASD. Current results suggest that contagious yawning is impaired in ASD, which may relate to their impairment in empathy. It supports the claim that contagious yawning is based on the capacity for empathy.

Does perceived direct gaze boost detection in adults and children with and without autism? The stare-in-the-crowd effect revisited

This study extended that of von Grünau and Anston (1995) and explored whether perceived direct gaze is easily detected by individuals with and without autism, utilizing a visual-search paradigm. Participants detected target faces with either direct gaze or averted gaze. Laterally averted faces were used to eliminate the involvement of lower perceptual characteristics such as symmetry, which were inherent with the “straight gaze” used by von Grünau and Anston. Both typically developed adults and children detected targets with direct gaze more quickly than those with averted gaze, but face inversion distorted this asymmetrical performance, suggesting the contribution of configurative facial processing. In contrast, children with autism were not affected by the gaze direction presented by realistic facial stimuli. They were, however, faster to detect straight gaze defined solely by local features, which suggests that their impairment might be specific to the detection of direct gaze presented within a facial context.

Eye contact does not facilitate detection in children with autism

Eye contact is crucial in achieving social communication. Deviant patterns of eye contact behavior are found in individuals with autism, who suffer from severe social and communicative deficits. This study used a visual oddball paradigm to investigate whether children with high functioning autism have difficulty in detecting mutual gaze under experimental conditions. The results revealed that children with autism were no better at detecting direct gaze than at detecting averted gaze, which is unlike normal children. This suggests that whereas typically developing children have the ability to detect direct gaze, children with autism do not. This might result in altered eye-contact behavior, which hampers subsequent development of social and communicative skills.

Spontaneous Theory of Mind and Its Absence in Autism Spectrum Disorders

Theory of mind, the cognitive capacity to infer others’ mental states, is crucial for the development of social communication. The impairment of theory of mind may relate to autism spectrum disorder (ASD), which is characterized by profound difficulties in social interaction and communication. In the current article, I summarize recent updates in theory of mind research utilizing the spontaneous false belief test, which assesses participants’ spontaneous tendency to attribute belief status to others. These studies reveal that young infants pass the spontaneous false belief test well before they can pass the same task when explicitly asked to answer. By contrast, high-functioning adults with ASD, who can easily pass the false belief task when explicitly asked to, do not show spontaneous false belief attribution. These findings suggest that the capacity for theory of mind develops much earlier than was previously thought, and the absence of spontaneous theory of mind may relate to impairment in social interaction and communication found in ASD.

Understanding the referential nature of looking : Infants' preference for object-directed gaze

In four experiments, we investigated whether 9-month-old infants are sensitive to the relationship between gaze direction and object location and whether this sensitivity depends on the presence of communicative cues like eye contact. Infants observed a face, which repeatedly shifted its eyes either toward, or away from, unpredictably appearing objects. We found that they looked longer at the face when the gaze shifts were congruent with the location of the object. A second experiment ruled out that this effect was simply due to spatial congruency, while a third and a fourth experiment revealed that a preceding period of eye contact is required to elicit the gaze-object congruency effect. These results indicate that infants at this age can encode eye direction in referential terms in the presence of communication cues and are biased to attend to scenes with object-directed gaze.

Do 18-Month-Olds Really Attribute Mental States to Others? A Critical Test

In the research reported here, we investigated whether 18-month-olds would use their own past experience of visual access to attribute perception and consequent beliefs to other people. Infants in this study wore either opaque blindfolds (opaque condition) or trick blindfolds that looked opaque but were actually transparent (trick condition). Then both groups of infants observed an actor wearing one of the same blindfolds that they themselves had experienced, while a puppet removed an object from its location. Anticipatory eye movements revealed that infants who had experienced opaque blindfolds expected the actor to behave in accordance with a false belief about the object’s location, but that infants who had experienced trick blindfolds did not exhibit that expectation. Our results suggest that 18-month-olds used self-experience with the blindfolds to assess the actor’s visual access and to update her belief state accordingly. These data constitute compelling evidence that 18-month-olds infer perceptual access and appreciate its causal role in altering the epistemic states of other people.