Avi Sagi

The Punishment of Amalek in Jewish Tradition: Coping with the Moral Problem *

The story of Amaleks deed occurs twice in the Bible: in Exod 17:8–16 and in Deut 25:17–19. The account in Exodus is quite succinct: “Then came Amalek and fought with Israel in Refidim” (Exod 17:8); in contrast, the description in Deuteronomy paints a broader and more detailed picture: “Remember what Amalek did to thee by the way, when you were come out of Egypt: how he met thee by the way, and smote the hindmost of thee, all that were feeble in thy rear, when thou wast faint and weary; and he feared not God” (Deut 25:17–18). The Exodus version, although sparing in its description of the particulars, offers the more dramatic account of the war between Israel and Amalek.

Yeshayahu Leibowitz : A breakthrough in Jewish philosophy : Religion without metaphysics

This article is an analysis of the theological-philosophical revolution that Leibowitzs thought represents in the philosophy of religion in general and in Jewish philosophy in particular. This revolution relies on a positivist viewpoint, which denies any possibility of making statements about God. In his approach, statements about God are interpreted as statements denoting the relationship between the individual and God. Conventional religious beliefs - such as the belief in the creation or in revelation - become meaningless. Leibowitz therefore suggests a new interpretation, both of theoretical religious beliefs and of the normative system - the Halakha. The belief in revelation is construed as a human judgment, which endows the halakhic system with divine validity. Halakha does not draw its meaning from its divine source but from its inner religious meaning, which Leibowitz sees in worship.

Religious pluralism assessed

Exclusivism is a highly appealing option in religious terms. It reflects the believers’ commitment to their religion as well as their conviction that their religion is true, and that other religions are therefore false.My central argument is that the justification of inter-religious pluralism, while not less well established than that of exclusivism, successfully preserves the social intuitions of religious devotion and commitment. The effect of this justification, which remains valid despite objections raised against various forms of inter-religious pluralism, is to undermine exclusivism.

Natural Law and Halakhah: A Critical Analysis

The status of natural law in Judaism, and in the halakhic context in particu‐ lar, has long been a concern of scholars in the field of Jewish studies. Some categorically deny that Judaism could ever recognize a doctrine of natu‐ ral law. For instance, in his classic, often quoted study, Marvin Fox argues that “in Judaism there is no natural law doctrine, and in principle, there cannot be.”1 Other scholars, such as Harry A. Wolfson, point to a tradition stretching from rabbinic times to Maimonides, which recognizes the bind‐ ing power of natural law.2 This dispute has far‐reaching implications because, as will be shown below, different views of the status of natural law entail different percep‐ tions of the essence of Halakhah, and specific theories of Halakhah tend to be associated with specific views of natural law. For instance, Yeshayahu Leibowitz views Halakhah as a normative system exclusively concerned with the worship of God.3 This approach can hardly be reconciled with support for a natural law doctrine, which seems to have no bearing on wor‐ ship; in contrast, advocates of a different perception of Halakhah may take another view of the status of natural law. To some extent, then, the dis‐ pute concerning the status of natural law in Judaism operates as a mirror, reflecting underlying theories of Halakhah. Hence, attempts to examine