Daniel Statman

Self-Assessment, Self-Esteem, and Self-Acceptance.

Abstract Teachers are often troubled by the difficulty of enhancing their pupils’ self‐esteem, particularly in the case of students who are especially weak and whose low self‐assessment is justified. Dewhurst suggested (JME, 20(1), pp. 3‐11) that these students can be helped by bringing them to accept themselves, since self‐acceptance is compatible with realistic low self‐assessment. Dewhursts thesis is criticised and it is suggested that self‐acceptance is inseparable from an improvement in ones self‐assessment. Thus, the improvement of self‐assessment is a necessary condition for enhancing self‐esteem. If cases exist where this reformation of self‐image is unattainable, that is, cases where the self‐assessment of the student cannot be improved, it is doubtful whether there is anything we can do about it.

The Time to Punish and the Problem of Moral Luck

Christopher New recently argued for the seemingly paradoxical idea that there is no moral reason not to punish someone before she commits her crime (‘prepunishment’), provided that we can be sure that she will, in fact, commit the crime in the future. I argue that the air of paradox dissolves if we understand the possibility of prepunishment as relying on an anti-moral-luck position. However, New does not draw the full conclusions from such a position, which would allow prepunishment even prior to the formation of a wrongful intention, on the basis of the idea that bad character is enough to entail blameworthiness. I conclude by examining a legal system which seems to use the idea of prepunishment, i.e. the Talmudic idea that we might punish a child who has not yet sinned in order to save him from sinning in the future.

Hypocrisy and self‐deception

Abstract Hypocrites are generally regarded as morally‐corrupt, cynical egoists who consciously and deliberately deceive others in order to further their own interests. The purpose of my essay is to present a different view. I argue that hypocrisy typically involves or leads to self‐deception and, therefore, that real hypocrites are hard to find. One reason for this merging of hypocrisy into self‐deception is that a consistent and conscious deception of society is self‐defeating from the point of view of egoistical hypocrites. The best way for them to achieve their ends would be to believe in the deception, thereby not only deceiving others but also themselves. If my thesis is sound, we ought to be more cautious in ascribing hypocrisy to people, and less harsh in our attitude toward hypocrites.

Can Wars Be Fought Justly? The Necessity Condition Put to the Test

According to a widespread view, wars are justified only if they are fought in self-defense. It follows that the same constraints that limit the use of otherwise immoral measures in individual self-defense apply to collective self-defense too. I try to show that this view has radical implications at the level of jus in bello which have not been fully appreciated. In particular, if the necessity condition must be satisfied in all cases of killing in war, then most fighting turns out to be unjust. One way to avoid this result is to adopt a contractual view of killing in war which interprets the necessity condition in a way that is more permissive with regard to killing combatants in war. At least in this respect, a contractual view of killing in war has an advantage over other candidates in explaining how wars might be fought justly.

The Morality of Assassination: A Response to Gross

My friend and colleague, Michael Gross, believes that, save for very exceptional circumstances, assassinating terrorists is both illegal and morally unjustified (Gross, 2003). As he puts it, it is a ‘morally abhorrent practice’ (p. 364). He argues that assassination also fails to achieve its avowed purpose, as it increases rather than decreases the level of bloodshed. Hence, he concludes, Israel’s policy of assassination against Palestinian terrorism during the uprising (Intifada) of 2001–2002 was unwarranted.

The Protection of Holy Places

Abstract Holy places are protected by the law, but the rationale for this protection has received little attention. The purpose of our paper is to fill this gap. The natural explanation for this protection lies in terms of religious freedom. However, since this freedom is violated only when believers are required to actively act against the dictates of their religion, this notion is of no help in the present context. Even when holy places serve as sites for worship, there is usually no religious duty to carry out worship there. Another explanation would base the protection of holy places on the prohibition against hurting religious feelings. But while this looks promising when the desecration is intentional, it is less so when the desecration or the hurt are incidental. Finally, the protection of holy places is sometimes understood as a way of preserving “cultural heritage.” But many holy sites do not fall under this definition and still enjoy protection. Our tentative conclusion is that holy places do not enjoy automatic protection just because they are perceived as such by some religious group. This protection must be earned by arguments that would establish the (“objective”) holiness of the relevant site within some religious tradition, explain the exact nature of the harm or offense that is the matter of concern, and demonstrate why the believers’ interests regarding the perceived holy place override those of the public.

Ending War Short of Victory? A Contractarian View of Jus Ex Bello*

In light of the enormous suffering brought about by war, war might be justified only if the benefit it yields is significant enough, namely, a clear and durable victory over the enemy. The logic of this argument leads to a Clausewitz-style war of “annihilation.” I argue that the best way to justify the ending of war short of such annihilation is by relying on a contractarian view of jus ex bello. I conclude by exploring the implications of this view to warfare in which no effective social contract is in place.

More on the Comparative Nature of Desert: Can a Deserved Punishment Be Unjust?

Utilitas / Volume 25 / Issue 03 / September 2013, pp 316 333 DOI: 10.1017/S0953820812000532, Published online: 08 July 2013 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0953820812000532 How to cite this article: RONEN AVRAHAM and DANIEL STATMAN (2013). More on the Comparative Nature of Desert: Can a Deserved Punishment Be Unjust?. Utilitas, 25, pp 316-333 doi:10.1017/S0953820812000532 Request Permissions : Click here

Note: Reciprocity of Rights and Duties, Benefits and Burdens: National Service for Israeli Arabs

Abstract Jews and Arabs in Israel often agree that there is a reciprocal relation between rights and duties, though they derive opposing conclusions from it. Jews infer that Arabs are not entitled to the same rights and privileges as Jews are, since they do not shoulder an equal share of the duties. Arabs, by contrast, argue that they are under no duty to share the burdens, particularly military or national service, since their rights are not fully respected. The Paper assesses these opposing claims and ends up rejecting both. It argues that the rights to which citizens are entitled do not depend on citizens carrying out all their social or legal duties, while the citizens’ duty to contribute to the welfare of their countries by national service or other means is generally not contingent on the countries’ fulfillment of its duties towards them. The Paper focuses on national service by Israeli Arabs and suggests that (a) that there is nothing wrong in making such service mandatory though there are practical considerations against doing so and (b) that making such service optional is an excellent alternative, one that should be encouraged as much as possible.

Religious Arguments in the Public Sphere: A View from Israel

It is commonly believed that, from a liberal point of view, there is something problematic in government action rooted in religious considerations. We begin by showing exactly what kind of religious considerations might thought to be ruled out as a basis for such action. We then discuss at length the approach expressed by the Supreme Court of Israel, according to which legislation and other government actions based on religious considerations are problematic because they violate the right to freedom from religion of non-religious citizens. We reject the court’s interpretation of this right and conclude that the court has failed to explain why government action based on religious considerations is illegitimate.